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This thesis examines Indonesia’s growing interest to play a more significant role at 
the regional and global levels in the post-authoritarian era particularly during the 
presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004 – 2014) through the lens of role 
theory. Drawing on interviews with forty research participants, ranging from 
Indonesian government officials, parliamentarians, and other foreign policy actors, as 
well as an analysis of key documents, this thesis identifies four main national role 
conceptions that were conceptualised and enacted by the Yudhoyono administration. 
These overarching roles are a voice for developing countries, a regional leader, an 
advocate of democratic and human rights norms, and a bridge-builder. These four role 
conceptions are set against the backdrop of significant changes in the domestic 
political environment as well as the international system, which gave Indonesian 
foreign policymakers an opportunity to reconstruct Indonesia’s role in the regional and 
global order. However, these roles are by no means stable given that they are 
constantly being negotiated and contested. I develop this argument in case studies of 
Indonesia’s engagement in regional and global governance in four areas: (1) regional 
human rights governance; (2) global human rights governance; (3) regional trade 
governance; and (4) global trade governance. Through the analysis of Indonesia’s 
engagement in governance initiatives at the regional and global levels, this thesis 
contributes to role theory literature by further developing the conceptualisation of 
domestic and international audiences. The analysis aims to unpack the state by 
incorporating insights from several bodies of literature ranging from ontological 
security to work on state transformation which arguably provides the student of role 
theory with a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics within the state in 
articulating its role conceptions. This endeavour is important in the context of 
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International order in the 21st century is changing rapidly due to the shift in the global 
distribution of power. After the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, many scholars characterised the current international order as unipolar, in 
which the United States was the only remaining superpower.1 This claim might have 
been warranted since, in terms of hard power, the United States had an enormous 
margin of military and economic superiority compared to other states in the world.2 
However, at the dawn of the new millennium, the rise of emerging powers that are not 
traditionally US allies, as well as the seeming economic decline of the United States - 
culminating in the 2008 global economic crisis - led to a new consensus that the 
unipolar moment had changed to one of multipolarity. This means that the global order 
is not dominated by one or two great powers but shaped by many important players.3 
The change in the international system is seen in the rise of non-Western middle 
powers that previously were exclusively viewed as regional powers. Together, with 
rising powers like China, emerging middle powers such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
South Africa, and Turkey now have the capability to shape global governance through 
their active engagement in several areas of it, such as trade, finance, the environment 
and human rights, among others. Unlike traditional middle powers such as Canada, 
Australia, and Japan, which have been US allies, the emerging middle powers might 
resist the current US-dominated international order. For instance, Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, and South Africa, despite their acceptance of US leadership in certain areas, 
have been reserved and expressed criticism towards the United States in others. For 
example, in regard to security issues, the emerging middle powers have criticised the 
                                                          
1 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990): 23–33. 
2 Christopher Layne, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay,” 
International Security 34, no. 1 (August 20, 2009): 147–72. 
3 Randall Schweller, “Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder,” Global Governance: A Review of 
Multilateralism and International Organizations 17, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 285–97; Richard N. Haass, 
“The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2008; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008); Robert H. Wade, “Emerging World Order? From 
Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF,” Politics & Society 39, no. 




US and its Western allies for their unilateral approach to dealing with threats by 
invading countries in the global war on terror. In terms of trade governance, the 
emerging powers tend to view the US as a stumbling block for successful trade 
liberalisation negotiations, due to its protectionist policies in the agricultural sector.4 
The behaviour of the emerging middle powers towards the US-led existing order might 
be more complex since they sometimes oppose the existing liberal norms, but at other 
times accept them.5 As a result, over the past few years, a growing body of literature 
has appeared, dedicated to analysing the behaviour of the emerging powers in the 
global order.6 Given the importance of the emerging middle powers in the international 
system, the question is, why do non-Western emerging middle powers seek to play a 
significant role? What role do they want to fulfil in pursuing such an endeavour? To 
what extent are their role preferences driven by domestic or international factors? 
These questions have driven a new research programme in International Relations (IR) 
that is looking closely at emerging middle powers.  
To contribute to the research agenda, this thesis examines Indonesia’s growing interest 
in playing a more significant role, on the regional and global levels in the post-
authoritarian era, particularly during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(2004 – 2014). Just like other emerging middle powers, the impetus for Indonesia to 
play a more significant role could be a logical implication of its transition to 
democracy from the late 1990s onwards as well as recent economic development. 
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world as well as the largest 
country in Southeast Asia when it comes to the size of the population and the economy. 
Since 2004, the Indonesian economy has shown significant development, growing by 
around 5% each year. Besides its economic rise, under the presidency of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia has become a model of functioning democracy in the 
                                                          
4 Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
5 Xiaoyu Pu, “Socialisation as a Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of 
International Norms,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 
341–67. 
6 Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy 
Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia (Oxford University Press, 2012); Mikko Huotari 
and Thilo Hanemann, “Emerging Powers and Change in the Global Financial Order,” Global Policy 
5, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 298–310; Matthew D. Stephen, “Rising Powers, Global Capitalism and 
Liberal Global Governance: A Historical Materialist Account of the BRICs Challenge,” European 
Journal of International Relations 20, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 912–38. 
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Islamic world and developing countries. These achievements have provided 
conditions for Indonesia to enhance its international status. 
Indeed, during Yudhoyono’s presidency, Indonesia sought to strengthen its 
international status through greater involvement by proposing reform and suggesting 
new initiatives in regional and global governance. Under his leadership, Indonesia 
hosted several high-profile international summits such as the thirteenth session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP-13) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2007, and the ninth World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Ministerial Conference in 2013. By hosting these international summits Indonesia 
was, to some extent, able to enhance its international standing and set the agenda. This 
is shown by a growing expectation from the international community, particularly the 
Western powers, that Indonesia will have a more significant role in many global issues 
such as development, security, and human rights. In the same period, Indonesia also 
hosted the Asian-African Conference Commemoration in 2005 and 2015, where it 
sought to play a leading role among developing countries by reviving the South-South 
Cooperation (SSC) through the Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership agenda.  
The foreign policy agenda under Yudhoyono aimed for Indonesia to have a greater 
role in the global order, which is puzzling. First, unlike other new emerging powers 
such as India, Brazil, and South Africa, in which the domestic political actors 
encourage the foreign policy actors to play a greater role in the global order, Indonesia 
does not have the same domestic pressure to have a greater role at the global level. In 
fact, the domestic audiences emphasise the importance of Indonesia solving its own 
domestic problems rather than investing in an enlarged role at the international level. 
Second, for almost thirty-two years in the Suharto authoritarian era, Indonesia had an 
institutionalised foreign policy that emphasised the regional level as its priority. The 
above discussion raises the question of the motivation behind Indonesia’s choice to 
become a regional and global player. What role does Indonesia take at the regional 
and global level in order to fulfil its aspiration to become an emerging middle power? 
How can we explain Indonesia’s inconsistent and contradictory roles at regional and 
global levels? These questions outline the initial puzzle that drives this thesis. 
Indonesia’s inclination to become a global player shows an ambition to assert its status 
as an emerging middle power. While in terms of its material capability Indonesia can 
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be categorised as a middle power, until recently the country’s foreign policy circles 
rarely used this concept in the political discourse around Indonesia’s greater aspiration 
for engagement in the global order. The Indonesian foreign policy circles prefered to 
perceive Indonesia as ‘a regional power with global interests and concerns’.7 This was 
due to the perception that defining Indonesia as a middle power would be patronising, 
and would reduce its position to merely a medium-sized power.8 Only during the 
second term of Yudhoyono’s presidency (2009-2014), did Indonesian foreign 
policymakers accept the term middle power as a status that Indonesia should pursue. 
It was under Joko Widodo’s Presidency (2014-2019) that the notion became 
incorporated into the official mid-term development plan 2015-2019 and became 
widely used among Indonesian policymakers.9 Thus, due to its material capability as 
well as how policymakers see their systemic position, much of the more recent 
literature by Indonesian authors has firmly established that Indonesia should be 
categorised as a middle power.10  
Given its size, strategic location and economic potential, as well as its success in the 
country’s designation as an emerging democratic middle power, there has been 
increased desire among scholars to understand the nature of Indonesian foreign 
policy.11 The extent to which Indonesia can seek a leadership role at the global level 
                                                          
7 R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, “Annual Press Statement Minister for Foreign Affairs Republic of 
Indonesia” (Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, January 7, 2014), 
https://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/PPTM%202014/Annual%20Press%20Statement%20Minister%
20for%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf. 
8 Author’s personal interview with senior official from Agency for Policy Review and Development, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2015.  
9 National Development Planning Agency, “Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional 
2015-2019” (National Development Planning Agency, January 5, 2015),  
https://www.bappenas.go.id/index.php?cID=5009. 
10 Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir, “Indonesia and International Institutions: Treading New 
Territory,” in Indonesia’s Ascent, ed. Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir, and Leonard C. 
Sebastian, Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 177–94; Moch 
Faisal Karim, “Middle Power, Status-Seeking and Role Conceptions: The Cases of Indonesia and 
South Korea,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 0, no. 0 (March 13, 2018): 1–21; Mohamad 
Rosyidin, “Foreign Policy in Changing Global Politics: Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for 
Major Power Status in the Asian Century,” South East Asia Research 25, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 175–
91; Awidya Santikajaya, “Walking the Middle Path: The Characteristics of Indonesia’s Rise,” 
International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 71, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 
563–86,; Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really 
Matter?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 2 
(September 15, 2011): 157–82. 
11 See Anthony Reid, ed., Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: 




remains inconclusive; some believe that Indonesia has already played a more 
significant role,12 while others are not convinced.13  
Furthermore, it is intriguing to study Indonesia as an emerging middle power because 
it can shed light on some theoretical debates in IR; particularly the impact of domestic 
changes on state behaviour in international politics. The democratisation in the post-
authoritarian era (1999-present) has changed Indonesia’s normative preferences 
towards democratic values, as I will discuss in more detail below.14 It has also 
internally transformed the Indonesian state, fragmenting it, with the proliferation of 
multiple state agencies, and decentralising it with the devolution of many authorities 
to sub-national governments which reduce the power of central government.15 Even 
though the protectionist economic policies of the Sukarno and early Suharto eras are 
still prevalent, the impetus for development coupled with the pressure from 
transnational capitalist interests have pushed the central government in the post-
authoritarian era to adopt a neoliberal agenda, in order to tap into the opportunities of 
an interconnected and market-driven economy.16 
Drawing upon the case of Indonesia, this thesis argues that analysing emerging middle 
power behaviour require us to combine both agency and structure to provide more 
nuanced understanding of them. This means that there is a need for an alternative 
framework, one that goes beyond the conventional approaches to emerging middle 
powers, which focus on one of the other as I will detail below. To do so, instead of 
approaching the emerging middle power concept through the lens of the mainstream 
                                                          
12 Amitav Acharya, Indonesia Matters: Asia’s Emerging Democratic Power (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 2014); Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size 
Really Matter?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, 
no. 2 (September 15, 2011): 157–82.  
13 Greg Fealy and Hugh White, “Indonesia’s ‘Great Power’ Aspirations: A Critical View,” Asia & the 
Pacific Policy Studies 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 92–100, https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.122; Dave 
McRae, “More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor” (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 
February 27, 2014), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/more-talk-walk-indonesia-foreign-
policy-actor.  
14 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Finds a New Voice,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (October 14, 2011): 
110–23. 
15 Moch Faisal Karim, “Institutional Dynamics of Regulatory Actors in the Recruitment of Migrant 
Workers,” Asian Journal of Social Science 45, no. 4–5 (January 1, 2017): 440–64. see also Adam D. 
Tyson, Decentralization and Adat Revivalism in Indonesia: The Politics of Becoming Indigenous 
(Routledge, 2010). 
16 Richard Robison and Andrew Rosser, “Contesting Reform: Indonesia’s New Order and the IMF,” 




grand theories of IR, this thesis seeks to apply a mid-range theorisation that allows us 
to unpack micro-process dynamics within the state.17 In this endeavour, this thesis 
suggests that role theory can provide a better understanding of middle power 
behaviour that captures both the structural and agential level of analysis, as well as 
addressing material and ideational factors that motivate and constrain states’ 
behaviour. In our case, role theory can help us in understanding how Indonesia’s 
internal state transformation, as well as the international expectations towards it, 
affects its foreign and trade policies at regional and global levels. Arguably, role theory 
enables us to analyse these two inter-related factors into one single coherent 
framework.  
The next section will substantiate and justify why this thesis focuses on bridging the 
gap in the agent-structure debate, in order to understand the complexity of emerging 
middle powers’ behaviour at regional and global levels. But before that, we need to 
conceptualise the difference between traditional and emerging middle powers, to 
demonstrate how the classification applies to Indonesia.  
 
Indonesia: an emerging middle power 
Recently, literature on emerging middle powers has attracted more attention by 
scholars of International Relations who have the aim of understanding the behaviour 
of emerging middle powers in the international system.18 A middle power state is 
generally defined as one that is “neither great nor small in terms of their power, 
capacity and influence and exhibits the capability to create cohesion and obstruction 
                                                          
17 Andrew Moravcsik, “‘Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark?’ Constructivism and European 
Integration,” Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (January 1, 1999): 669–81; Juliet Kaarbo, “A 
Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory,” International 
Studies Review 17, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 189–216, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12213; Alastair Iain 
Johnston, “Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe,” 
International Organization 59, no. 4 (October 2005): 1013–44. 
18 Janis van der Westhuizen, “Class Compromise as Middle Power Activism? Comparing Brazil and 
South Africa,” Government and Opposition 48, no. 1 (January 2013): 80–100; Ralf Emmers and 
Sarah Teo, “Regional Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific,” International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 15, no. 2 (May 1, 2015): 185–216; Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, 




toward global order and governance”.19 However, this conceptualisation of middle 
powers has been criticised for being too biased towards traditional middle powers, 
such as Australia, Canada, and the Nordic countries. The theorisation of the concept 
mainly comes from the analysis of industrialised Western and high-income countries, 
which predominantly prefer liberal values. Given this limitation, many scholars tend 
to criticise middle power theory, given that current emerging middle powers such as 
Turkey, South Africa, and Indonesia do not share traits with those traditional middle 
powers.20 
There are fundamental differences between countries that can be categorised as 
traditional middle powers and those that are emerging middle powers. First, while the 
traditional middle powers are most likely Western, liberal, industrialised countries, the 
emerging middle powers are not. Given that many newly emerging middle powers are 
non-Western countries, there is a chance that they will have a different approach 
towards the United States as a great power, at least in some areas of the international 
order.21 
Indeed, the traditional middle powers also experience domestic constraints with regard 
to their global ambitions, including those posed by a democratic polity on the foreign 
policy capacity of the executive. In general, traditional middle powers support today’s 
global institutions, such as the international trade regime that evolved into the WTO, 
or human rights regime that evolved into the UN Human Rights Council. This is 
precisely because today’s global institutions are built on a vision of the liberal 
international order.22 Besides, as core countries in the global system, the traditional 
middle powers are also heavily involved in the making of US-led global governance, 
including its inception after the end of World War II. Thus, the traditional middle 
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powers have interests, ideas, and identities that are compatible with the current global 
order.  
By contrast, the current emerging middle powers did not collaborate equally in 
creating the international order.23 Nevertheless, accepting the US-led global 
institutions without reservation was not the only option for countries outside of the 
western world. During the Cold War, there were some initiatives by non-Western 
middle powers to challenge the US-led international order by creating an alternative 
international forum, such as the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), or to incorporate 
a new agenda within the existing UN framework, such as the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO).24 Due to still being preoccupied with internal political and 
economic issues, as well as the bipolar nature of the international system, these non-
Western middle powers posed no real challenge to the US-led global order.  
In the case of Indonesia, its strengthening bilateral relations with the US and its further 
acceptance of democratic values were not reflected in its support towards the US-led 
global order. Thus, while Indonesia benefitted from the US-led liberal order, it also 
criticised the lack of reform within US-led global governance. During the Yudhoyono 
presidency, which will be discussed in more detail later on, Indonesia consistently 
voiced the need for reform of the UN. Notably, Indonesia joined the call for reform of 
the permanent membership of the Security Council, to represent the distribution of 
power in the contemporary world.25 Indonesia’s criticism towards the UN was also 
voiced in the late 1990s when it was still under an authoritarian regime. During that 
time, the criticism towards the UN was driven by the regime’s frustration towards the 
international community’s meddling in Indonesia’s internal issues. Under the 
Yudhoyono presidency, rather than focusing on its criticism of the dominance of the 
Western powers in the global order, Indonesia’s push to reform US-led global 
governance was framed as efforts to democratise global governance. This shows that 
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emerging middle powers are more likely to be a force of reformism, rather than 
maintaining the status quo in the current international order. 
Secondly, there are also differences in the preference for regionalism among 
traditional and emerging middle powers. While traditional middle powers might not 
necessarily be regional powers, and might not have a regional orientation, the 
emerging middle powers are first and foremost regional powers. As argued by Andrew 
Hurrell, the historical path of the current emerging middle power shows that emerging 
powers have a strong regional focus rather than a global focus.26 While traditional 
middle powers were never regional powers, the emerging middle powers started their 
global reputation through leadership at the regional level. Hence, emerging middle 
powers make their regional issues and stability top priority. This means that the 
emerging middle powers tend not to compromise their leadership at the regional level 
in order to achieve more at the international level.27 This is true in the case of Indonesia 
as an emerging middle power. Indonesia, first and foremost, claimed to be and was 
accepted as a regional power within Southeast Asia long before it self-identified as a 
middle power. Moreover, its strength and international expectations to become a 
middle power are based on its role as a regional leader in Southeast Asia. 
Thirdly, while the traditional middle powers tend to have stable domestic orders that 
embrace democratic and liberal values, the emerging middle powers are most likely to 
be newly democratised states, in which those values are not fully institutionalised. As 
a result, the traditional middle powers tend to play a greater role in areas such as human 
rights.28 At the same time, despite undergoing the process of democratisation, there 
might be reluctance and resistance from the emerging middle powers to embrace the 
ideas and agendas of liberal norms at the global level. This could be the result of 
different interpretations of democracy and liberal values between emerging middle 
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powers and their Western middle power counterparts. Therefore, emerging middle 
powers like Indonesia might not have the strong inclination to a liberal approach due 
to norms that might not be compatible with their society.29 
Fourth, while traditional middle powers come exclusively from the developed world, 
emerging middle powers tend to be developing countries. The aggregate economic 
force of emerging middle powers might be huge. However, they are still facing issues 
of extreme poverty as well as inequality within their territories.30 In the case of 
Indonesia, it continues to build on solid economic growth, as suggested by a variety 
of economic indicators. The World Bank even classifies Indonesia in the top ten 
countries in the world economy based on purchasing power parity (PPP). Stable 
economic growth over the past ten years has ranked Indonesia among the top 20 of the 
world’s largest economies, hence its membership of the G20. During Yudhoyono's 
administration, the average growth in Indonesia’s economic period 2009-13 reached 
5.9%, third in the G20, only after China and India. The Indonesian economy grew by 
6.1% in 2010, 6.5% in 2011, 6.23% in 2012, and 5.78% in 2013.  
However, the economic growth in Indonesia has been very uneven and has not 
translated into a general improvement in welfare for the majority of its people. This is 
reflected in the increasingly worrisome Indonesian Gini ratio of 0.41, with the 
Indonesian poor that live on less than 2 USD per day accounting for 36.5% of the 
population.31 Despite being a member of the G20 and classified as a newly 
industrialised country with the seventh largest economy in terms of GDP (PPP), 
Indonesia still faces many domestic issues that constrain its power projection. Thus, 
unlike traditional middle powers that might not have such domestic constraints, 
emerging middle powers might have to deal with their domestic audience before 
embarking on a more active foreign policy. 
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A mid-range theory to understand emerging middle powers 
Having conceptualised the difference between traditional and emerging middle 
powers and established Indonesia’s claim to emerging middle power status, the main 
question that needs to be asked is, what motivates emerging middle powers to play a 
greater role in the regional and global order? There are several mainstream theoretical 
approaches that seek to provide an explanation. The first two widely used in 
International Relations theory, structural realism and liberal institutionalism, might 
give the most straightforward answer regarding the motivation of emerging middle 
powers to play a greater role in the US-led global order.32 Both provide parsimonious, 
yet simplified answers that look at the behaviour of states, since both focus their 
discussions solely in terms of cooperation and conflict. For neorealists and neoliberal 
institutionalists, the more expansive behaviour of emerging middle powers can be 
explained by the structural constraints of the international system, as well as their 
pursuit of power for their own survival. However, they differ regarding why the 
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emerging middle powers behave as they do. Neorealists would argue that since states 
need to accumulate power for their own survival, the emerging middle powers have 
an incentive to attain a more dominant role in the international system.33 Their pursuit 
of power would create the rivalry of power that leads to destabilization of the 
international order.34  
Despite their incentive to attain a more dominant role, neorealists also argue that 
emerging powers are not solely destabilising actors in the international system. In 
regard to pursuing power for their own survival, neorealists differentiate the emerging 
powers into two categories of states based on their intentions. The first category is the 
status quo states, whose motivation is to bandwagon with the existing great powers to 
benefit from the existing order. The second category is revisionist states, whose 
motivation is to change the existing order.35 However, given that the US enjoys greater 
power in the realm of military security, the cost of challenging that supremacy might 
be greater than the gain from accepting it.36 Thus, emerging powers tend to behave as 
status quo states in the system that has been created and maintained by the United 
States. 
Unlike neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists differ in their explanation of the motives 
of emerging middle powers to play a greater role in the international order. Neoliberal 
institutionalists accept that the motivation of states is heavily dependent on the pursuit 
of their national interests as well as their survival.37 However, neoliberal 
institutionalists argue that states pursue absolute gains instead of relative gains and 
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thus, despite some disagreement with the principles of the US-led liberal order, states 
will still accept the order.38  
As suggested by Ikenberry, the current international order seems to be more 
accommodating towards emerging powers than pre-1945, since it offers a wide array 
of channels in which the emerging powers might play a constructive role.39 Thus, 
rather than creating their own global institutions or playing outside of the current 
institutions established by the existing great powers, the emerging powers tend to play 
within existing global institutions.  
Other than the structure that accommodates emerging middle powers, neoliberal 
institutionalists also argue that their advancement, first and foremost, is due to their 
deeper engagement in the liberal world order sustained by the United States. Without 
their active engagement in the global order, the emerging middle powers would not be 
in a position to have a greater role in the international order.40 As a result, for the 
emerging middle powers, there is a greater incentive to be more engaged in the 
international order, since this will further enhance their capabilities.  
Due to their considerable focus on the structure of the international system and current 
global governance, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists provide a similar 
explanation for the motivation of emerging middle powers in the global order. 
However, these two approaches cannot compellingly explain why in some areas of the 
global order emerging middle powers challenge dominant states in the existing global 
order, while in other areas they do not. Besides, focus on the systemic level means that 
the two approaches pay less attention to the dynamics within the state. These dynamics 
might explain the motivation behind emerging middle powers’ greater involvement in 
the US-led global order. 
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The incorporation of a constructivist approach to emerging middle powers has, to 
some extent, enhanced our understanding of their behaviour by drawing attention to 
issues of agency. Constructivists see the possibility of treating ‘middle powers’ as a 
‘constructed identity’. As suggested by many constructivist studies, states’ behaviour 
might be driven by shared ideas and identities rather than material gains.41 While the 
concept of state identity is not used exclusively by constructivists, it was developed 
by them.  
The concept of state identity in International Relations has gained attention, thanks to 
the rise of the constructivist research programme in the 1990s. It is not surprising that 
the concept of state identity has become a permanent feature of the discourse. 
Constructivists mainly define state identity as simply the state’s perception of what 
role it should play and what status it should enjoy in international relations.42 
According to constructivists, states’ interests are mainly shaped by their identities and 
states’ identities are subject to change. Employing this logic, the motivation of 
emerging middle powers to be involved in global governance is shaped by their quest 
for a new identity. 
Several studies have tried to incorporate the constructivist approach into the study of 
emerging middle powers.43 For instance, Neack shows how constructivism can explain 
middle power behaviour by investigating the extent to which the notion of 
middlepowermanship has been internalised by policymakers.44 Shin further 
conceptualises middle power identity construction by focusing on the agential level of 
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analysis through the notion of the framework of self-conceptualisation, self-
identification and intersubjectivity.45 Building upon Shin, Teo focuses on the 
conceptualisation of middle power identity through constitutive norms, social 
purposes, relational comparisons and cognitive models.46 
Despite it being a pervasive theoretical argument, the concept is problematic. This is 
because identity is something that is relatively fixed and statist. In their discussion on 
state identity, Katzenstein47 and Johnston48 argue that state identity is usually a semi-
permanent feature because it is rooted in social, political, and historical beliefs. 
Therefore, there must be strong belief in a set of values within states that push them to 
change their identity. For constructivists, state identity is likely to change when old 
norms are abandoned, and new ones are embraced. It is assumed that certain values 
must exist for such a choice. Hence, a state identity is projected in parallel with the 
values or cultures that the society embraces.  
In the case of emerging middle powers, this does not mean that middle power can be 
seen as a state identity, given that the claims made by political elites, by nature, are 
politically driven. Hence, it may not represent strong belief in a set of values in the 
society within states. As a result, middle power should not be seen as a state identity, 
as state identity is a semi-permanent feature and is rooted in social, political and 
historical beliefs that exist in the society.49 Moreover, the middle power literature that 
mobilises the identity approach rarely clarifies the dynamic between identity and 
foreign policy agenda, particularly in terms of how middle power identity translates 
into foreign policy agenda. Hence, treating middle power as an identity would not 
provide a meaningful understanding of how the concept can explain the behaviour of 
countries that self-identify as middle powers. 
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Despite these caveats, the constructivist approach to middle power has provided a new 
direction, suggesting that middle power should not be treated as a fixed concept or 
categorisation; rather, it is more of a construct being pursued by policymakers. This 
approach might be unsettling for those scholars trying to provide a more sustainable 
definition of middle power.50 With the constructivist turn, a growing number of studies 
have shifted their focus to unpacking the state by taking an agency-level analysis into 
account when analysing the activism of the middle powers. 
Building on the constructivist approach in middle-power literature, I propose that role 
theory can be a common ground to apply mid-range theory to the study of emerging 
middle powers’ behaviour in the international order. Role theory, arguably, could 
provide a more nuanced understanding.  
Indeed, role theory is not new in the literature of International Relations. It has been 
widely used by the students of foreign policy analysis. Role theory, which was 
developed in other disciplines such as social psychology and sociology, was 
introduced by KJ Holsti in the 1970s to analyse the foreign policy behaviour of states 
in the international system. One of the basic concepts in role theory according to Holsti 
is national role conception.51 As an independent variable, the national role conception 
can explain the behaviour of states in the international system. As a dependent 
variable, national role conception is formed through dynamics within the states and 
the international system. National role conception can be defined as a set of norms that 
define the foreign policy behaviour of a government, including the attitudes, decisions, 
responses, functions, and commitments made by the government.52 Thus, national role 
conception refers to foreign policy-makers’ perceptions of their states’ position in the 
international system.  
In the study of foreign policy, role theory has been a useful tool to explain changes in 
states’ behaviour.53 This is because role theory can provide rich conceptual tools to 
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describe specific foreign policy phenomena, while at the same time engaging and 
incorporating different levels of analysis, as well as supplementing other theoretical 
approaches.54 In regard to our theoretical objective, the notion of role conception can 
capture the varieties of roles taken by emerging middle powers in the international 
system. It enables us to examine how both structure and material interests, as 
advocated by the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approach, as well as ideas 
and agency, as championed by the constructivist approach, motivate them to play a 
greater role at the regional and global levels. 
The notion of role conceptions also allows us to engage with various concepts from 
mid-range theories to understand emerging middle power behaviour. This includes the 
importance of the notion of biographical narrative, as suggested by ontological 
security scholars such as Mitzen, Steele, Zarakol, and the notion of state 
transformation, as suggested by Murdoch school scholars such as Hameiri and Jones 
and Jayasuriya.55  
As a part of the developing world with a history of distrust towards Western powers, 
Indonesia tries to embrace and seemingly promote liberal norms. Indonesia is also the 
country with the largest Muslim population in the world, despite being situated socio-
historically outside of the core of the Muslim world. This is not to mention that it is 
geographically situated in a region with heightened uncertainty regarding the 
international order, characterised by the rise of China, which has pushed Indonesia to 
respond strategically. These conditions have complicated how Indonesian 
policymakers make sense of Indonesia’s position in the world. Moreover, the process 
of state transformation that has taken place in Indonesia, as will be discussed later, 
requires us to engage in theories that allow us to analyse dynamics within the state to 
complement more systemic approaches. 
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Given the discussion above, the mid-range theorisation of emerging middle power 
behaviour beyond the conventional framework of realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism would provide more theoretical insights for students of International 
Relations theory. However, role theory is by no means complete in its theorisation, 
especially in capturing both the agential and structural levels of analysis in 
understanding the behaviour of emerging middle powers. Thus, this thesis aims to 
further enhance the analytical power of role theory by drawing on insights from the 
experience of Indonesian in the global order specifically. Chapter 2 will expand on 
this brief discussion of role theory and elucidate further the core analytical concepts 
employed in this thesis. 
 
The argument in brief 
My first objective in this thesis is to frame the study of Indonesian foreign policy 
within the literature on role theory, by arguing that role theory captures the complexity 
of Indonesian foreign policy behaviour at both the regional and global levels. 
In order to pursue its status as an emerging middle power, Indonesia has enacted 
several role conceptions at regional and global levels. Drawing on interviews with 
forty research participants, ranging from Indonesian government officials, 
parliamentarians, and other foreign policy actors, as well as an analysis of key 
documents, I have identified four overarching role conceptions that were enacted by 
the Yudhoyono administration: Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries; 
as a regional leader; as an advocate of democratic and human rights norms;56 and as a 
bridge-builder. These four overarching role conceptions are set against the backdrop 
of significant changes in the domestic political environment as well as the international 
system, which gave Indonesian foreign policymakers an opportunity to reconstruct the 
country’s role in the regional and global orders. However, these roles are by no means 
stable, constantly being contested and negotiated.  
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In the light of democratisation after the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 
1998, this thesis argues that state transformation, which opens up space for state 
fragmentation and domestic contestation, has affected the way in which Indonesian 
foreign policymakers enact Indonesia’s role conceptions at regional and global levels. 
The thesis enriches the role theory literature by contributing to a growing research 
agenda that tries to unpack the state in terms of the theorisation of international 
relations. As observed by Cantir and Kaarbo, since the incorporation of the 
sociological role theory in understanding states’ behaviour, the literature tends to treat 
the state as a unified actor because the assumption creates a parsimonious 
understanding in applying role theory in international relations.57 Consequently, it is 
also largely assumed that the domestic arena is a ‘black-box’, and the dynamic process 
within the state is ignored. At best, the literature treats domestic factors as a tool for 
policymakers in formulating role conceptions.  
In order to understand the change and continuity of role conception, I incorporate the 
notion of biographical narrative, borrowed from the ontological security literature. I 
claim that the notion of biographical narrative can help role theorists understand the 
conditions that influence continuity and change of role conception, in the light of 
changes in state identity. I argue that roles are a constitutive part of identity formation, 
but they can also be an instrument to maintain a coherent biographical narrative of the 
state. Role conceptions, thus, are crafted and enacted to reflect the continuity of a 
state’s biographical narrative and manifested to both international and domestic 
audiences. This claim will be substantiated in chapter 3 by my historical analysis of 
Indonesia’s national role conceptions, since its independence in 1945. 
The role theory literature so far has not paid enough attention to re-conceptualising 
the notion of role conflict. To further understand the notion of role conflict, this thesis 
unpacks the notion of international and domestic audiences. In relation to unpacking 
the international audience, I advance the application of role conflict by arguing that 
we should also consider the different levels of international audiences, namely the 
regional and global ones. Borrowing from the symbolic interactionist 
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conceptualisation of social interaction as a stage, the international system can also be 
seen as an arena. This allows us to see the regional and global levels as a role-playing 
stage with the different expectations from the audience that need to be fulfilled. I 
propose two types of role conflict, stemming from the difference between the regional 
and global levels. In relation to unpacking the domestic audience, I focus on 
disagreements across bureaucratic agencies, by touching upon the literature on state 
transformation approaches, developed, inter alia, by Hameiri and Jones.58  
Moreover, given that there is a need to reduce the likelihood of domestic role 
contestation, it is necessary for policymakers to legitimise role conceptions and their 
enactment to domestic audiences. I propose a new analytical concept to analyse how 
governments resolve role contestation from domestic audiences by developing the 
notion of role legitimation. Role legitimation can be defined as a social process in 
which policymakers aim to strategically legitimise their role conceptions towards 
domestic audiences with the purpose of avoiding the likelihood of contestation. This 
thesis puts forward two social mechanisms through which role legitimation is 
performed. The first mechanism is reviving the historical role that has been entrenched 
in a state’s biographical narrative. The second one is reproducing the international 
expectations in the domestic political discourse. Through role legitimation, I 
contribute to the role theory literature by conceptualising the extent to which the roles 
enacted link to perceived legitimacy. 
I elucidate these theoretical claims through the study of Indonesia’s regional and 
global engagement in four case studies: first, Indonesia’s role in regional human rights 
governance, particularly its role in the ASEAN Political-Security Community 
(APSC); the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), as well as Indonesia’s regional strategy 
in enhancing the democratic agenda in Myanmar; second, Indonesia’s role in global 
human rights governance, where I focus heavily on Indonesia’s role in the United 
Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (HRC); third, Indonesia’s role in regional trade 
governance, particularly its role in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the 
ongoing trade negotiation, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
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(RCEP); and fourth, Indonesia’s role in global trade governance with a focus on 
Indonesia’s role in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
Contribution to theory building 
This study is of significance for scholarship on International Relations and foreign 
policy analysis. Public and scholarly interest in Indonesia is likely to increase given 
its growing importance in the changing global order. The thesis has both conceptual 
and empirical objectives. Conceptually, this thesis seeks to challenge the 
understanding of Indonesian foreign policy by conceptualising it within the frame of 
a more reflective theoretically-driven mid-range tradition, outside of more mainstream 
IR frameworks such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism. With this intention, 
this thesis not only speaks to students of Indonesian foreign policy but also aims to 
tackle and engage on debates within the IR scholarship. Through the case of Indonesia, 
this thesis aims to enhance the analytical power of the role theory literature by 
conceptualising the notion of role conflict and role legitimation. Indonesia’s growing 
interests beyond its region enable us to further scrutinise the relationship between role 
theory and international audiences, particularly the nexus of regional and global levels.  
Empirically, this thesis aims to provide a comprehensive study of Indonesian foreign 
policy at the regional and global levels. Following the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime, Indonesian foreign policy attracted some interest from students 
of International Relations who aimed to analyse the effect of democratisation. Several 
peer-reviewed journal articles have been written on this topic. Nevertheless, many of 
them discuss democratisation narrowly, only in the context of parliament and non-
state actors (think tanks and Non-Governmental Organisations) as well as domestic 
public opinion in shaping foreign policy preferences.59 For example, the work of 
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Wirajuda analyses the positive impact of democratisation on Indonesian foreign 
policy, particularly in regional cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the promotion of political values, and conflict management.60 The 
study conducted by Murphy focuses on the extent to which democratisation has, in 
some ways, hampered Indonesia-US relations, given that it opened up a space for 
domestic actors to advocate policies that are antithetical to the US interests.61 These 
competing explanatory approaches seem to indicate conflicting positions taken by 
Indonesia. The approach proposed in this thesis could arguably provide a more 
compelling analysis in regard to understanding Indonesian foreign policy.  
A recent book by Rüland entitled “the Indonesian Way: ASEAN, Europeanization and 
Foreign Policy Debates in a New Democracy” provides a systematic and 
comprehensive study of foreign policy in a newly democratised Indonesia.62 It also 
engages heavily in Acharya’s norm localisation theory to explain how Indonesian 
foreign policy enables the localisation of European norms of regional integration 
within ASEAN by focusing on the establishment and ratification of the ASEAN 
Charter. Rüland’s book has indeed provided a substantial understanding of Indonesian 
foreign policy in the post-authoritarian period. However, given his case study that 
focuses on discourse on ASEAN Charter, many important cases of Indonesian foreign 
policy in the post-authoritarian period are left out, particularly under the Yudhoyono 
administration, when Indonesia showed a great interest in playing a greater role at the 
global level. 
Rüland’s study could be seen as a representation of a typical analysis that focuses 
primarily on the regional level. With the emergence of Indonesia as a global player, it 
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is worth examining the extent to which Indonesia has a variety of strategies for 
pursuing a greater role at the regional and global levels. 
This thesis is not the first attempt to engage role theory to understand Indonesian 
foreign policy. Borchers focuses on Indonesia’s role conceptions in promoting liberal 
values in ASEAN while Rüland traces back changes in foreign-policy role concepts 
in order to understand the extent to which democratisation changed the country’s 
established conceptions. 63 However, neither study seeks a sustained engagement with 
role theory literature, let alone uses insights from Indonesia to expand its conceptual 
apparatus. Instead, they merely apply the notion of role conceptions to the case of 
Indonesia in ASEAN. This thesis aims to further scrutinise both domestic and 
international audiences as important extensions of the theoretical underpinning of role 
theory in IR. 
The case of Indonesia, which has undergone state transformation and has a growing 
aspiration to be a global player, provides new terrain for a contribution to enhancing 
the role theory theoretical approach. The case of Indonesia can certainly contribute 
theoretical enrichment to role theory, which usually derives its theorisation from a 
Weberian and Westphalian state. Moreover, the case of Indonesia can give an insight 
into how the nexus of regional and global levels affect the enactment of role 
conceptions. As a country in which the foreign policy agenda has long been confined 
within the region, its growing role at the global level provides us with a venue to 
compare Indonesia’s role enactments.  
Given the above discussion, investigating Indonesian foreign policy in the post-
authoritarian era by situating it in the broader debate on role theory literature can be 
considered original research in the field of International Relations. 
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Research approach and empirical contribution 
The theoretical goal of this research is to bridge the divide between structural-driven 
and agency-driven analysis in International Relations through the application of role 
theory. In doing so, the research utilises several methodological tools to provide rich 
empirical findings and insightful theory-driven analysis. In general, this thesis 
employs a qualitative methodology to examine the driving factors behind Indonesia’s 
greater involvement in regional and global governance during the Yudhoyono 
presidency. As will be further argued in Chapter 2, role theory provides an excellent 
framework for capturing the structural and agential, as well as the material and 
ideational dimensions of Indonesia’s behaviour. In this study, employing a qualitative 
methodology enables me to evaluate the empirical findings from fieldwork, with 
theoretical insights informed by role theory. 
The research for this thesis utilises two qualitative methods, namely the comparative 
case study method, with more than two cases to examine Indonesia’s role in regional 
and global governance, and process tracing, to investigate the causality within the case 
under scrutiny. As argued by Landman, there are four reasons to use a comparative 
case study approach, namely: contextual description, classification, hypothesis-testing 
and theory building, and prediction.64 In the light of those reasons, this research utilises 
a multiple case studies method to generate a rich contextual description of Indonesia’s 
greater involvement in regional and global governance. Furthermore, the research also 
relies on the comparative case study method since the aim is to elucidate and refine 
theoretical arguments derived from a variety of literature from the areas of role theory, 
ontological security, and state transformation. The comparative case study method 
also allows the researcher to have greater space for analysing specific concepts, as 
well as increasing the possibility of generalising the conclusion. However, I did not 
use a comparative case study to conduct hypothesis-testing and prediction given that 
since the inception of the research, I have not set up a hypothesis to be tested and have 
no attention to provide a future prediction. Rather, in employing the comparative case 
study, this research combines the use of deductive reasoning and empirical observation 
to discover new insights that can help to enhance this debate in the literature. Hence, 
                                                          
64 Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 4. 
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in employing the qualitative methodology, I frame my research within an interpretive 
paradigm that enables me to explore reasons behind complex, interrelated, or 
multifaceted social processes. 
In addition to using the comparative case study method, this research also employs 
process tracing. Process tracing, which can be considered a within-case research 
method, is vital in understanding the causal mechanism for each case presented in this 
thesis. As argued by Bennett, employing process tracing enables the researcher to 
examine whether the hypothesised cause and observed effect are present, as suggested 
by the theory.65 Furthermore, employing process tracing can elucidate our proposed 
conceptualisation by providing a fine-grained narrative and analysis.66 While the 
comparative case study method gives a rich description as well as a flexible space to 
understand which variables have a more significant impact, process tracing provides 
a tool to develop a new interpretation of events and phenomena in understanding the 
extent to which the evidence under investigation affects the outcome.67 Employing 
process tracing allows me to use insights from the theoretical framework to analyse 
the topics, while at the same time being flexible enough to incorporate unexpected 
clues that might be overlooked by the theory.68 This methodological choice fits with 
my theoretical endeavour which aims to incorporate several strands of the literature 
into a role theoretical framework.  
 
Sources of data and data analysis 
This research, which evaluates Indonesia’s role conceptions, draws extensively from 
several qualitative methods, namely document research, elite interviews, secondary 
data collection, and other tertiary material, for the collection of the primary and 
secondary data. One should note that this thesis focuses on tracing role conceptions 
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which refers to a set of norms that define the foreign policy behaviour of a government, 
including the attitudes, decisions, responses, functions, and commitments made by the 
government. In order to understand it, this thesis focuses on looking at how 
governments make sense of the world. Hence, this thesis primarily investigates official 
documents and interviews officials to determine Indonesia’s role conceptions. 
Document analysis refers to a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating 
documents to extract meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical 
knowledge.69 Document analysis also fits with the research design for this thesis, 
which is framed within an interpretive paradigm.70 
As suggested by Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott, there are several 
research procedures that can be used to attain empirical sources for research that uses 
sociological concepts in IR.71 They recommend the use of discourse analysis, surveys, 
and content analysis in this kind of research agenda. The use of discourse analysis and 
content analysis mobilises the official documents in the form of official reports, 
policies, regulations, and speeches. For this research, document analysis helps me 
determine the conceptualisation of Indonesia’s role conceptions by relevant 
policymakers and agencies. Furthermore, document analysis provides background 
information as well as historical insights, which can help researchers determine the 
historical roots of the specific issues and events being investigated.72 
The documents consulted for this thesis include official publications, namely white 
papers, the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) and the National 
Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN), agreements, official reports, government 
regulations, speeches, minutes of meetings, and official press releases. The thesis 
makes use of several official documents issued by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 
the Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning 
Agency (Bappenas), the Office Staff of the Presidency, the Ministry of Trade, the 
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Ministry of Industry, and the House of Representatives, Republic of Indonesia, known 
as Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). Other than official documents issued by 
Indonesian state agencies, this thesis mobilises documents issued by regional and 
international organisations, such as ASEAN, the UN, the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Those documents are mainly in the form of reports, press releases, news 
briefs, speeches, and statements, as well as minutes of meetings.  
As the literature on role theory might suggest, using documents as a source to 
determine role conceptions is always fraught with the danger of selection bias and 
errors of interpretation. To counter this issue, interviews with forty Indonesian 
policymakers and other foreign policy actors, as well as domestic actors such as 
Members of Parliament and non-governmental organisations, were conducted to 
supplement the document analysis.73 Although role theorists from the American 
tradition rarely use the interview method due to their methodological leaning towards 
quantitative methods in determining role conceptions,74 I follow the Anglo-European 
tradition of role theory, in which interviews are necessary to substantiate how 
policymakers articulate and justify the enactment of role conceptions. Through the 
interviews, I was able to examine the internal contestation of the roles within the state 
and thus unpack the rhetoric-performance gap regarding the enactment of Indonesia’s 
role conceptions.  
Furthermore, as argued by Tansey, the in-depth elite interview is one of the most 
important research tools in establishing a causal mechanism for process tracing. 
According to Tansey, there are four functions of in-depth elite interviews: (1) to 
corroborate what has been established from other sources; (2) to establish what a set 
of people think; (3) to make inferences about a larger population’s characteristics and 
decisions; (4) and to help reconstruct an event or set of events.75 In this research, given 
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my leaning towards interpretative paradigm, the elite interviews mainly served the 
second and fourth functions. 
For this thesis, I interviewed informants whose roles were considered important, to 
evaluate the operationalised variables, namely the policymakers directly involved in 
policy-making and policy enactment. In the case of Indonesia’s greater involvement 
in human rights governance, I interviewed diplomats who were responsible for 
conducting diplomacy in regard to human rights issues. In the Indonesian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, there is a directorate that deals with these specific issues, the 
Directorate of Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues. Besides the officials working 
in this Directorate from 2004 to 2014, I interviewed diplomats stationed at the United 
Nations Human Rights Council, which was established in 2006. 
In investigating the national role conception and role enactment in Indonesia’s 
involvement in trade-related issues, this thesis draws upon in-depth interviews with 
policymakers, both at the Ministry of Trade, who dealt with international trade 
negotiations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who dealt with trade diplomacy. 
From the Indonesian Ministry of Trade, I interviewed the former Trade Minister, the 
General Director of International Trade Cooperation, senior officials working in the 
Ministry of Trade, and Indonesia’s former and current trade negotiators. From the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I interviewed policymakers in the Directorate General of 
Multilateral Cooperation Affairs. Furthermore, to gain an insight into the process of 
role expectation, I interviewed diplomats and trade negotiators stationed at the World 
Trade Organization, who are involved in many trade negotiation initiatives (see 
appendix for full details).  
As Indonesian foreign policy making is also undergoing democratisation, besides 
those institutions mentioned above, there are several governmental and non-
governmental institutions that have influenced the Indonesian foreign policy making 
process in the post-authoritarian era. These are representatives of NGOs and think 
tanks as well as Members of Parliament, who indirectly influence the Indonesian 
foreign policy making process. The increasing number of actors involved might 
increase the likelihood of role conflict, especially in defining the role that Indonesia 
should take in these two areas of global governance. In order to examine the 
occurrence of role conflict, I interviewed at the Office of the Special Staff on 
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International Affairs under the Office of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, 
the DPR, and nationally-acclaimed Indonesian think tanks such as INFID and The 
Habibie Center as well as the national branches of transnational NGOs such as Human 
Rights Watch Indonesia and the Institute for Global Justice (IGJ). In assessing role 
expectation for Indonesia in these two areas of global governance, I interviewed 
diplomats and representatives of ASEAN member countries. 
Besides using primary data, such as official documents and elite interviews, the 
research draws on other documents such as bulletins published by ministries, 
departments, and relevant state agencies. These documents are essential in giving a 
background on the particular issues, especially the chronological timeline of specific 
policies and decisions made by Indonesian policymakers. This research also utilises 
Indonesian and international newspapers, and articles from publications such as 
Antara News, the Jakarta Post, Reuters, Kompas, Kontan, Berita Satu, and Bisnis 
Indonesia. This research also draws on reports by think tanks, INGOs such as the 
South Centre and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
(ICTSD), the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), as well as civil society 
movements, which enabled me to conduct triangulation of the data and findings from 
the official documents. 
 
Case study selection  
This thesis focuses on two areas in which Indonesia has sought a greater role in the 
post-authoritarian era: (1) democracy and human rights, and (2) trade issues. In terms 
of democracy and human rights issues, this thesis focuses on Indonesia’s aspiration to 
have greater engagement in democracy and human rights promotion, despite the lack 
of full acceptance of the democratic norm. In regard to trade issues, the thesis aims to 
analyse the puzzling case of Indonesia’s greater support for trade liberalisation despite 
its domestic audience’s preference for protectionism.  
I chose these specific cases for two reasons. First, they highlight areas in which 
Indonesia has been seen to, and continues to be expected to, play a more significant 
role outside of its previous foreign policy agenda, which focused on maintaining 
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regional stability for domestic economic development. However, despite Indonesia’s 
greater involvement in these issues, the degree of its involvement, as well as the factors 
driving the involvement, might vary across cases. Therefore, the cases chosen might 
provide an interesting comparison of the differences and similarities in Indonesia’s 
engagement in several areas of global governance. Second, the cases show the high 
degree of contestation from domestic actors, but Indonesia is still expected by the 
international community to take an active role in enhancing the Western-led global 
agenda. Hence, by examining Indonesia’s engagement in these two areas, we can 
examine the continuity and change in its foreign policy towards global governance 
before and during the Yudhoyono presidency and the extent to which Indonesia’s roles 
confirm, emulate, or resist the Western-led global order. 
Given that emerging middle powers are, first and foremost, regional powers, their 
behaviour on the regional and global levels may be different, and thus so will their 
enactment of roles be different. Hence, Indonesia’s behaviour at the regional and 
global levels may vary despite focusing on the same issues. Moreover, the theoretical 
objective of this thesis is to understand the different dynamics that affect how role 
conceptions are enacted. To understand the variance, this thesis seeks to examine the 
regional-global dynamics of this emerging middle power’s pursuit of status by 
focusing on Indonesia’s regional and global engagement. This thesis will examine four 
different cases: (1) Indonesia’s role enactment in regard to regional human rights 
governance; (2) Indonesia’s role enactment in regard to global human rights 
governance; (3) Indonesia’s role enactment in regard to regional trade governance; 
and (4) Indonesia’s role enactment in regard to global trade governance. 
In this thesis, I treat the agenda of promoting democracy as part of the broader 
campaign in promoting human rights, given that both are usually mutually inclusive. 
On the one hand, democracy, as understood as a norm, requires a commitment to the 
equal political status of persons, which is the notion of human rights. On the other 
hand, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the essential 
elements of democracy.76 Moreover, as argued by Guilhot, with the end of the Cold 
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War democracy and human rights have become the organising principles of the new 
international order.77 Thus, it is logical to treat the promotion of democracy and human 
rights as one big project to promote liberal values.  
In the light of the democratisation process, most recent studies have focused on how 
the process has shaped the outcomes of Indonesian foreign policy.78 Few studies have 
thoroughly analysed the extent to which the enactment of the role of democracy 
promoter in Indonesian foreign policy aligns with Indonesia’s pursuit of leadership at 
the regional and global levels. Within the regional order, this thesis focuses on 
Indonesia’s role in enhancing democracy and human rights in three case studies, 
namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the Bali Democracy 
Forum (BDF), as well as Myanmar democratisation. 
At the global level, this thesis focuses on the United Nations (UN) Human Rights 
Council (HRC). Arguably the Council is not the sole representative of complex global 
human rights mechanisms that include a dense array of human rights treaties, 
institutions, networks and standards.79 However, as the primary international 
collaborative mechanism responsible for the promotion and protection of all human 
rights, the Council serves as a venue in which non-Western powers accept or contest 
the liberal view of promoting and protecting human rights.80 This case enables us to 
further examine Indonesia’s role in global human rights governance.81 Despite its 
growing assertiveness,82 the literature on Indonesia’s role in global human rights 
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governance remains scarce compared with that on other emerging democratic powers, 
such as Brazil, India, and South Africa.83 The case study aims to fill this lacuna by 
investigating Indonesia’s involvement in the Human Rights Council. The focus on 
Indonesia in the Council is essential. Since its inception, Indonesia has been a member 
of the Human Rights Council during the following periods: 2006-07; 2007-10; and 
2011-14. Indonesia was again elected a member of the Council for the period 2015-
17. 
In the case of Indonesia’s role in the context of regional trade governance, this thesis 
focuses explicitly on Indonesia’s role in two regional integration projects, namely the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ongoing mega-regional trade 
negotiation, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). It could be 
argued that these two regional integration processes are not focused solely on trade 
but also on broader economic integration; covering a wide range of economic issues, 
such as infrastructure connectivity, labour movement and investment flows, the 
critical issues discussed or negotiated initially were trade-related issues.84 This case 
study contributes to enhancing our understanding of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
regarding regional economic integration projects. 
Furthermore, this thesis focuses on Indonesia’s role in the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) round negotiations processes at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as a 
case study of Indonesia’s global role in trade governance. The case of emerging middle 
powers’ role in global trade governance through the WTO has been chosen because it 
is the most obvious example of countries from the Global South challenging 
imbalances in the Western-led system. In our case, its role in DDA negotiations is a 
case in point for Indonesia’s aspiration to play a more significant role outside of its 
previous foreign policy agenda.  
The case study contributes to the role theory literature by advancing the notion of role-
playing in the study of states’ behaviour in regard to global governance. Moreover, by 
employing role theory, this thesis also further enhances our understanding of emerging 
middle powers’ behaviour in the WTO. The majority of the theoretical approaches 
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employed to understand emerging middle powers’ behaviour in the WTO are heavily 
reliant on rationalist underpinnings in explaining emerging middle powers’ behaviour 
in the WTO.85 This thesis aims to give a more nuanced reading of emerging middle 
powers’ behaviour in the WTO by looking at the roles enacted within the organisation.   
Empirically, the case study aims to further analyse the role of emerging middle powers 
in the multilateral trading system. Studies on the Global South’s experiences in the 
multilateral trading system have become increasingly important. However, those 
studies on the role of emerging middle powers focus mainly on Brazil, India, South 
Africa, and China.86 Surprisingly few studies aim to understand the role of Indonesia 
in the WTO, which is also an important emerging middle power that played a more 
active role in the WTO Doha round negotiation.87 This case study aims to expand the 
empirical scope of study by analysing Indonesia’s behaviour in the Doha round 
negotiation. 
 
Table 1.2 Case studies of the thesis 
Issue  Regional  Global 
Democracy and 
Human Rights 
ASEAN, Bali Democracy 
Forum, Myanmar 
democratisation 





AEC and RCEP WTO 
Source: Author 
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Plan of the thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters and is divided into three parts. The first part is the 
theoretical and historical section, which consists of two chapters. The second part 
consists of two chapters focusing on Indonesia’s engagement in human rights 
governance. The third part comprises two chapters dealing with Indonesia’s 
engagement in trade governance. The last chapter provides the conclusion. 
Chapter 2 further explores how role theory links agential and structural levels of 
analysis in explaining the behaviour of states in international politics. There are three 
theoretical discussions that aim to sharpen role theory’s analytical power, namely the 
distinction between role and identity, the importance of unpacking the notion of 
international and domestic audiences, and the need to conceptualise the notion of role 
conflict and role legitimation. To conceptualise such notions, this chapter introduces 
the literature on state transformation and ontological security.  
Chapter 3 traces Indonesia’s role conceptions from the post-independence period in 
1949, until the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime and the subsequent early 
reformasi era, by examining the change and continuity of Indonesia’s national role 
conceptions to understand the historical context of its foreign policy. Building upon 
this discussion, the chapter then identifies four main overarching national role 
conceptions that were conceptualised and enacted by the Yudhoyono administration, 
but draw on historical precedence. This chapter contends that the stability of role 
conception may not only be explained by the temporal dimension but also by the 
nature of role construction, which should be able to reflect on the state’s biographical 
narrative, rather than the articulation of ego or alter expectations that are captured by 
foreign policymakers. 
Chapter 4 examines how Indonesia’s role as an advocate for democracy and human 
rights has been enacted at the regional level. By mobilising the notion of role conflict, 
this chapter argues that Indonesia has experienced ‘role conflict’ in its efforts to be an 
advocate of democracy and human rights norms at the regional level, particularly in 
ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific. This role has been hindered by its other roles, namely 
the role of regional leader and bridge-builder. Moreover, in Chapter 4, I challenge the 
conventional view that Indonesia’s democracy promotion agenda is a function of its 
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democratic identity by demonstrating that the identity-based explanation is incomplete 
in understanding the country’s policy on promoting democracy. While it could be 
argued that democracy has become Indonesia’s state identity, it does not necessarily 
drive democracy promotion agendas. 
Chapter 5 analyses the enactment of Indonesia’s role conception in the UN Human 
Rights Council. This chapter argues that two interrelated factors are constraining role 
conceptions in enhancing the human rights issue at the global level. The first factor is 
Indonesia’s state transformation, which has created fragmentation among state 
agencies. The second factor is Indonesia’s current domestic issue regarding the 
separatist movement in Papua province. These factors have created ambivalence in 
Indonesia’s enactment of the role of advocate of democracy and human rights norms 
at the global level. 
Chapter 6 discusses how the process of state transformation, leading to the 
fragmentation of the state, hinders the coherent enactment of Indonesia’s role 
conception in the realm of regional trade governance especially in the AEC as well as 
in RCEP. This chapter argues that Indonesia’s ambition to enact the role of regional 
leader in Southeast Asia by continuously providing new ideas and direction to regional 
institution-building has pushed its foreign trade rhetoric to support liberal economic 
policies. The neoliberal norm underpinning the project has not been well-received by 
the majority of domestic actors in Indonesia and has only been advocated by economic 
and technocratic elites. As a result, the enactment of the role of regional leader in the 
realm of regional trade governance is not thoroughly embraced by policymakers in 
other ministries. 
Chapter 7 investigates why Indonesia seems to enjoy relatively little hindrance in 
enacting the role conceptions it aspires to at the global level. This chapter contends 
that multilateral trade governance, particularly the DDA round, has been utilised by 
Indonesian foreign policymakers as an arena for Indonesia to play a greater role at the 
global level. However, rather than reflecting the domestic policy preferences, 
international expectations towards Indonesia are more likely to drive the enactment of 
Indonesia’s roles in the DDA negotiations. At this point, the commitments made as 
well as the rhetoric calling for a more liberalised multilateral trading system within 
the negotiation by Indonesia are not in line with its domestic trade policies. The reason 
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for the gap between its role conceptions and domestic policies can be interpreted as a 
result of the co-optation of trade policy in the WTO by the Indonesian foreign policy 
agenda. 
Chapter 8 provides an overall assessment of how the main empirical findings confirm 
and support the theoretical framework proposed. It also briefly states the limitations 




























































This chapter includes theoretical exploration and refinement of role theory literature. 
Despite having the potential to provide a new research agenda for the foreign policy 
of emerging middle powers discussion, current literature on role theory still lacks the 
ability to explicitly link the agency and structural levels of analysis. This chapter 
explores how role theory could combine agential and structural levels of analysis in 
explaining the behaviour of emerging middle powers in international politics. To do 
so, I incorporate key concepts from cognate fields; mainly symbolic interactionism, 
state transformation, ontological security, identity theory, and norm diffusion, into role 
theory literature. There are three theoretical discussions that this chapter aims to tackle 
in order to sharpen role theory’s analytical power.  
First, this chapter clarifies the conceptual link and distinction between role and 
identity. This endeavour is vital because conceptual confusion within the 
constructivist approach sometimes treats the concept of roles as interchangeable with 
the concept of identity. Building upon the symbolic interactionist tradition and 
ontological security literature, I reiterate that notion of role is an essential feature of 
state identity. While state identity might be more rigid, roles are much more malleable. 
This provides agencies within the state with freedom and discretion to craft role 
conceptions. Therefore, the changes in the domestic and international systems may not 
change identity; instead, the changes would be reflected in the roles taken by the state. 
Second, this chapter further conceptualises role conflict, by unpacking the notion of 
international and domestic audiences. Here, I engage with the literature on state 
transformation and incorporate it into role theoretical framework. Third, this chapter 
introduces the notion of role legitimation, to enhance analytical tools within role 
theory for better analysis of the domestic contestation of role conceptions and how the 
state, represented by policymakers, deals with such contestation. The discussion on 
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role conflict and role legitimation is the crux of my contribution to role theory 
literature. 
This chapter presents five sections. In the first, I provide a general overview of the 
development of role theory by situating it within broader literature on Sociology and 
IR. The second section is a detailed discussion of role and identity, by engaging with 
identity theory and ontological security literature. In the third and fourth sections, I 
develop and refine the notion of international and domestic audiences to further 
unpack the concept of role conflict. The fifth section introduces role legitimation as a 
concept that links discussions on how state agency legitimises its roles enactment to 
avoid domestic contestation. 
 
Understanding role theory in International Relations 
In the previous chapter, I have briefly introduced the notion of role conception and 
how it could be a framework to apply mid-range theory to the behaviour of emerging 
middle powers. However, role theory should not be reduced only to the discussion of 
role conception, which was developed by K.J Holsti in 1970’s to bring role theory into 
the field of International Relations. Holsti’s seminal work inspired role theory 
research, especially within the sub-field of foreign policy analysis. Although Holsti 
brought some insights of role theory to International Relations scholarship, it was the 
constructivist literature which shifted the focus from interest towards identity and 
norm that has made IR scholarship utilise the notion of roles.88 
Role theory has a long tradition in the field of Sociology. It concerns the most 
important characteristic of social relations and behaviour, that is, how individuals 
behave based on their respective social identities and situation.89 In general, there are 
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five strands of role theory: functional, structural, interactional, organisational, and 
cognitive.90 As summarised by Biddle, structural role theory treats roles as social 
positions conceived by stable organisations of sets of persons who share the same 
societal norms and expectations. Symbolic interactionist role theory accepts the 
existence of social positions with broad imperatives for roles to be worked out, 
although the actual roles are negotiated and understood during interaction. In other 
words, symbolic interactionism emphasises how actors define and construct roles 
during interaction. Functional role theory emphasises the characteristic behaviours of 
persons and thus treat roles as ‘parts’ or ‘positions’ of a stable social system.91 
Organisational role theory mainly focuses on how different normative expectations 
may reflect the official demands of the organisation and pressures of informal groups 
within an organisation.92 The last one is cognitive role theory which focuses on how 
social condition give a rise to expectations. This strand of role theory mainly 
flourished in the field of cognitive social psychology. 
Given my discussion of role theory is framed within the agent-structure debate, I focus 
more on the structural and interactional strand of role theory. In fact, the notion of role 
in the field of International Relations is mainly discussed within the structural 
framework approach. This is due to the prevalence of the structural approach, in which 
the distribution of power within international system is the most celebrated 
independent variable for explaining states’ behaviour. Thus, while structural role 
theory has not yet achieved a significant following within Sociology,93 it has gained 
ground within IR scholarship.  
Alexander Wendt, in his seminal work Social Theory of International Politics, 
discussed the importance of the concept of role in his constructivist approach to IR. 94 
Due to the structuralist inclination within International Relations scholarship, roles are 
                                                          
90 B. J. Biddle, “Recent Development in Role Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 67–92. 
91 Dirk Nabers, “Identity and Role Change in International Politics,” in Role Theory in International 
Relations, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 74–92. 
92 Mark Wickham and Melissa Parker, “Reconceptualising Organisational Role Theory for 
Contemporary Organisational Contexts,” Journal of Managerial Psychology 22, no. 5 (July 3, 2007): 
440–64, https://doi.org/10.1108/02683940710757182. 
93 Biddle, “Recent Development in Role Theory.” 
94 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




usually assumed as attributes of a structure, not as attributes of agency. As argued by 
Wendt, the treatment of roles as an attribute of a structure is a part of critique towards 
the understanding of roles as beliefs of the decision-makers that situates the notion of 
roles as a merely unit-level property.95 For Wendt, roles should be a property of macro-
structures rather than actor belief. However, due to this treatment of role, Wendt’s 
typology is too narrow and rigid; he only offers three roles within international politics 
namely enemy, rival, and friend.96 Furthermore, given that roles are primarily a 
function of status or position, they are constrained by the position of the actor within 
the social structure.97 As Barnett put it, for roles to be able to explain state behaviour 
‘they must exist before interaction and constrain state action’.98 For Barnett, roles are 
properties of institutions. Through this understanding, it is the structure of the 
international system rather than interactions that drive states’ role enactment. It is not 
surprising that many of the analyses of IR scholars that employ role theory 
automatically assume that states’ roles mainly are derived from the international 
system. 
Within IR scholarship, states’ roles, or role conception is defined as ‘an actor’s 
perception of his or her position vis-a-vis others ... and the perception of the role 
expectations of others as signalled through language and action’.99 Originally, Holsti 
defined role conception as ‘policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of 
decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, 
if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system’.100 
Both definitions assign a greater significance to policymakers in crafting role 
conceptions. However, for Holsti the source of role conceptualisation always came 
from international expectations. As put by Holsti, ‘it seems reasonable to assume that 
those responsible for making decisions and taking actions for the state are aware of 
                                                          
95 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
96 Wendt. 
97 Hans Joas, Pragmatism and Social Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 226. 
98 Michael Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System,” 
International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1993): 272. 
99 Sebastian Harnisch, “Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts,” in Role Theory in 
International Relations, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 8. 
100 K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies 




international status distinctions and that their policies reflect this awareness’.101 Thus, 
as pointed out by McCourt, the international sources of roles, such as the expectations 
of other governments and legal norms expressed through custom and treaties, are the 
dominant source in the conceptualisation of roles.102 Consequently, early scholars of 
role theory in IR often neglected the domestic source of roles. 
While structural role theory treated roles as a product of factors such as trends in the 
external environment, symbolic interactionist role theory aims to assert the importance 
of the domestic sources. In so doing, it provides a more nuanced analysis of roles that 
states enact in international politics. This strand of role theory places greater emphasis 
on agency, where roles are not a fixed list of duties and positions. Instead, it defines 
the notion of roles within three interrelated dimensions. First, actors cognitively 
structure their own position into roles that they aim to enact. Second, roles are a result 
of how actors learn to react in a given situation. Third, roles are used by actors as a 
resource for interaction in given situations.103 Through this premise, agents as role 
beholders also shape the process of role-making through their preferences.104 In our 
case, Indonesia’s role conceptions are also shaped by the changes in the way how 
policy-makers, as role beholders, react to the changes in the international system and 
how they mobilise the roles in a given situation. For instance, Indonesia’s role as an 
advocate of democracy can be interpreted as a result of the democratisation process 
which can be mobilised to define Indonesia’s international position as a newly 
democratic power. The role is also a part of the policymakers’ reading of the decline 
of western-style democracy promotion agenda which give a room for Indonesia to play 
a more significant role in such an agenda. Moreover, the role as an advocate of 
democracy can be strategically utilised by Indonesia as a resource to increase its 
regional leadership in Southeast Asia and beyond. 
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Most role theorists within the field of Sociology agree that expectations are the central 
generators of roles, acquired through learning and experience.105 Despite wide 
acceptance that roles are a product of expectations, just like any social concepts, there 
is disagreement on defining the source of those expectations. Some scholars argue that 
norms are the source of expectation, others assert that beliefs and preferences as the 
source of expectation.106  
Although the sources of expectation are varied, by synthesising both structural and 
symbolic interactionist role theory scholarship, there are two main processes through 
which roles are constructed. These are, ego understanding of the self (ego expectation) 
and other expectation of the self (alter expectation).107 In this work, the former 
captures the domestic-driven factors in influencing the construction of role 
conceptions while the latter could capture the international dimension. Hence, unlike 
structural, symbolic interactionist role theory does not heavily rely on structural 
factors in its analysis of roles conceptions. Instead, the state is actively shaping its 
roles within the social system by considering these two processes. 
In our case, domestic-driven factors, as I will discuss further below, is primarily 
focused on the contestation among policymakers regarding Indonesia’s role 
conceptions. The international dimension of role conceptions is primarily concerned 
with the way how expectations from international actors drive the enactment of 
particular role conceptions. The process of internal contestation and acceptance of 
external expectations shapes the enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions. 
Ego expectation could also be seen as an articulation of state identity that needs to be 
translated into a role conception. Although roles are not just a function of this identity, 
they usually reflect the norms, values, ideology, as well as beliefs that are currently 
dominant features of domestic political culture.108 For instance, Indonesia’s role as an 
advocate of democracy is not merely a result of policymakers’ deliberate choice to 
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enact such role. Neither because democracy has become Indonesia’s state identity that 
needs to be articulated through the enactment of role conception. Rather, it is driven 
by a fundamental change in Indonesia’s domestic political landscape namely 
Indonesia’s democratisation process which provides policymakers with an opportunity 
to enact the role as an advocate of democracy. Therefore, the changes in the domestic 
political environment might lead to recalibration of role conceptions that affect the 
foreign policy agenda. 
Besides ego expectation, the expectations of others (alter) is vital in role construction. 
Symbolic interactionist role theory mainly distinguishes alter into two broad 
categories, significant and generalised other.109 Alter can refer to more tangible actors 
such as states or international organisations that are significant (significant other) as 
the leading socialising agent towards the self. It could also refer to abstract terms 
(generalised other) such as democracy, human rights, or liberalisation.110 In line with 
the constructivist approach, role expectation could capture the essence of socialising 
and learning processes that contribute to the actor preferences, which might have an 
impact on the future roles.111 Other than significant and generalised other, role 
expectation is also dependent on the structure of an international system. The changes 
in the structure of an international system, which are usually characterised by 
redistribution of power, would have an immense impact on overall expectations 
towards the self. Thus, alter role expectation could also be regarded as a structural 
element of role conceptions. 
In this section, I do not try to refute conceptualisation of roles by constructivist IR 
scholars that are mainly structural, nor do I wholeheartedly agree with a 
conceptualisation developed by symbolic interactionism that mainly focuses on 
interaction and agency. Symbolic interactionist role theory is not without limitation. It 
tends to ignore the structural factors in explaining actors’ behaviour, which makes its 
analysis of state behaviour rather incomplete. This is because structural constraints 
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cannot be ignored in the study of states’ behaviour in the international system, given 
that structural factors have significant influence. Both structural and symbolic 
interactionist role theory have their own merits and limitations. Incorporating and 
synthesising the two types of literature could provide a fruitful discussion of the agent-
structure problem within IR scholarship, particularly in bridging both an actor-
dominant and a system-dominant perspective into the analysis.112 In the case of 
Indonesia as an emerging power, incorporating both literature provides us with a more 
nuanced narrative for its seemingly ambivalent roles at regional and global levels. 
Ultimately, incorporating the two provides students of International Relations a space 
to analyse how state agency could navigate expectations from both actors within states 
and alter expectations while at the same time maintaining the state’s sense of self-
identity. 
 
The nexus between role and identity 
Having discussed the evolution of role theory within broader literature on 
constructivism in IR, this section further disentangles the nexus between role and 
identity. Despite the similarity of literature on role theory and identity,113 many studies 
that engage with constructivism in IR do not explicitly try to further synthesise or 
differentiate the two. As argued by McCourt, role and identity within IR scholarship 
are sometimes conflated at the conceptual level, leading to the literature in IR to ignore 
the distinctions. Therefore, many scholars in IR automatically accept that roles and 
identities are co-constitutive and that their relationship is a two-way process. On the 
one hand, actors may formulate and enact the roles that support and confirm their 
identity. On the other hand, identity could provide actors with a set of references to 
help them to interpret the social position that roles provide.114 
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The growing interest in role theory has facilitated more conversation between the two 
concepts. As argued by Breuning, ‘Much of the constructivist work on identity, self-
images, culture, and even norms shares a close kinship with the literature on national 
role conceptions’.115 To clarify the nexus between roles and identities in IR, I draw 
several insights from identity theory, developed mainly by social psychologists, that 
integrates structural and symbolic interactionism theory.116 Identity theorists have 
focused on the match between the actors occupying a role and their identity, as well 
as to what extent these factors influence each other.117 According to identity theory, 
identity could be conceptualised as ‘a set of meaning that is tied to and sustains the 
self as an individual’.118 A role, however, can be the basis for identity because, for 
identity theorists, the role is a morphological component of the social structure that 
allows identity to emerge.119 Furthermore, according to identity theory, roles are an 
important part of identity formation because the core of identity is rooted in ‘the 
categorization of the self as an occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, 
of the meanings and expectations associated with that role and its performance’.120 
Given this condition, as a part of maintaining identities, agents also need to maintain 
roles. This means that in order to have a particular identity, one will act to fulfil the 
expectations of the role, coordinating and negotiating interaction with role partners 
and manipulating the resources for which the role has responsibility.121 Through this 
understanding, Indonesia’s role conceptions reflect the dominant identity that the state 
currently embraces and wants to maintain. For instance, Indonesia’s recently 
constructed identity as a moderate Muslim requires it to enact the role as a bridge-
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builder between the Western and the Islamic world in light of the War on Terror waged 
by the US. 
One should note that in enacting roles a state’s experience is shaped by their 
relationships with other actors, groups they identify with, networks they engage with, 
and institutions they belong to. Thus, while actors learn to play the roles during 
interactions, the structure of an international system acts as ‘facilitators of and 
constraints on entrance into and departures from networks of interpersonal 
relationships’.122 Hence, understanding particular roles of the state should also take 
into account the importance of the context in which the role is enacted. For instance, 
the roles being enacted in the realm of trade may not have the same function with the 
role enacted in the realm of security or human rights. Likewise, the roles enacted at 
regional levels might be different with the roles enacted at the global level. 
In short, roles supply actors with a sense of meaningful self.123 Here many scholars 
use the term role-identity, which refers to ‘the character and the role that an individual 
devises for themselves as an occupant of particular social position’.124 Through this 
understanding, roles are expectations attached to positions in networks of 
relationships, while identities are basically internalised role expectations.125 In this 
conceptualisation, actors have a general understanding of the existing social position 
but try to make the performance of the role unique to themselves. Given that social 
position and role are only loosely prescribing appropriate behaviour, actors have more 
flexibility to individualise the performance of their role in order to express their own 
identity. 
The conceptual distinction between role and identity is helpful in analysing the 
seeming incoherence between roles taken by the state and its deep-rooted identity. For 
instance, many would argue that Indonesia’s democracy promotion is the result of its 
state identity as democratic. However, despite this image, Indonesia’s democracy is 
quite vulnerable. Many Indonesians believe that democracy creates excessive 
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freedom, despite the fact that the NGO Freedom House still considers the country to 
have many constraints to civil liberties. As argued by many scholars, even after two 
decades Indonesia’s democracy is still a procedural rather than a liberal one.126 State 
policy that discriminates against religious minorities is still prevalent, and an 
increasing number of violent acts are committed.127 Given the above discussion, there 
is hardly any evidence to suggest that the democratic norm has shaped Indonesian 
political culture. While it can be argued that democracy has become Indonesia’s state 
identity, its aspiring role as a promoter is not a manifestation of a firm and coherent 
democratic political culture, which would be a permanent feature. Rather than as 
firmly established state identity, Indonesia’s democratic promotion should be seen as 
role conception articulated by foreign policy elites in the country’s quest for 
international prestige. Hence, by conceptually distinguishing between identity and 
roles, we can situate roles as a mediator between identity and foreign policy actions. 
So far, this chapter has conceptually situated roles within literature on identity, and 
established that roles could be both a function of the interaction between states in the 
international system and could constitute part of an identity. But how can we 
understand the change and continuity of role conceptions? Many role theorists within 
IR scholarship have tried to understand the conditions that make role conceptions 
constant or changing.128 There is abundant literature that draws from foreign policy 
analysis that concludes alterations of role conceptions are dependent on specific sets 
of circumstances, such as a change in: (1) the fundamental structural conditions; (2) 
strategic political leadership; or (3) a crisis of some kind.129 However, given that roles 
and identity are closely connected, I contend that to understand change and continuity 
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of role conceptions, we should also examine the notion of identity. As Chafetz et al. 
argue ‘the salience of any given role conception depends on the accessibility and fit 
of the identity to a social setting and the centrality and value of a given role to the 
actor's self-concept’.130 
How do the changes in and continuities of role conceptions link to state identity? To 
address such a link, I turn to growing ontological security literature to build an 
identity-based understanding of roles. While the notion of ontological security has 
been applied to a wide range of research questions in International Relations, there is 
a dearth of study aiming to apply the insight to the growing literature on role theory. 
Just like role theory, IR scholars borrow the notion from the works of sociologists, 
such as Giddens131 and Laing,132 to explain how states seek ontological security in 
world politics. Since its introduction to the field, ontological security has been 
increasingly applied within IR literature. The basic premise is that, just like an 
individual, the state has need for stable and consistent identity. Ontological security 
requires that the state has routines that develop as a basic trust system.133 Routines 
allow the state to project unitary identities and interests to pursue. In brief, the 
ontological security literature argues that the state, apart from pursuing physical 
security also seeks a secure sense of itself.  
There are two strands of ontological security within International Relations 
scholarship. Externally, a state seeking ontological security aims to maintain its self-
conceptions in international relations, especially regarding its interaction with other 
states. Here, the sense of inter-subjectivity and the process of socialisation are vital in 
understanding how states react to such external variables to maintain self-conceptions. 
Internally, the agency within the state seeks to maintain a particular notion of self-
identify in light of changes in both alter and ego expectations towards the state. Some 
literature has suggested that the notion of state identity relies not so much on its inter-
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subjective dimension but more on the state’s ability to tell ‘a convincing story about 
the self through autobiographical narratives’.134 In other words, as argued by Steele, 
agency within the state can justify particular policy choices ‘by reasoning what such a 
policy means or would mean about their state’s respective sense of self-identity’.135 It 
is necessary for the state to justify their action in identity terms because ‘only in the 
telling of the event does it acquire meaning, the meaning that makes such events 
politically relevant’.136 
IR literature usually mobilises the ontological security concept to critique the 
traditional understanding that prioritises physical security and shifts the debate to 
understanding how states need to secure stable identity. However, as argued by 
Browning and Joenniemi, a sense of ontological security ‘entails an ability to tolerate 
and cope with uncertainty by reconstituting self-biographies and routines in view of 
unfolding developments’.137 Hence, ontological security should not only be framed as 
a matter of state’s need to maintain its sense of identity stability, but can also be 
applied to how the state actor could manage change and uncertainty by developing, 
altering, and maintaining the biographical narrative. 
According to Giddens, biographical narrative refers to ‘narrative of the self: the story 
or stories by means of which self-identity is reflexively understood, both by the 
individual concerned and by others’.138 Steele substantiates this as a way for the state 
to justify their actions despite acting against existing international principles. 
Furthermore, a biographical narrative should be coherent to be socially powerful. 
However, creating a coherent biographical narrative could be a challenge, given the 
contestation within domestic political actors over which narrative should dominate.139 
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While many studies on ontological security use a biographical narrative as an 
instrument states employ to justify their actions, this chapter suggests that actors 
within the state may treat the need for coherent biographical narratives as a strategy to 
fundamentally change domestic politics as a part of state identity. In order to reflect 
this, particularly towards international audiences, the agency within the state mobilises 
role conceptions as an instrument to maintain a sense of coherent biographical 
narrative. In this case, role conceptions are likely to continue after they serve the 
overall biographical narrative while ceasing to exist if they can no longer be used as 
justification by the state.  
Sustaining biographical narratives serves to defend the very core identity of the state. 
Role conceptions are enacted to emulate the normative foundation of the state’s 
formation, in this case, anti-colonial spirit and pre-colonial history are likely to be 
persistent compared to other role conceptions. This is particularly true for a post-
colonial state from the Global South like Indonesia. This is because the experience of 
struggle against colonialism became an integral part of the state identity building.140 
In this case, the early formative years of the state are crucial for an overall biographical 
narrative that shape foreign policy of the Global South. It also means that role 
conceptions enacted from early formative years is strategically enacted to sustain the 
continuity of state’s biographical narrative to both an international and domestic 
audiences. 
In the case of Indonesia, as further substantiated in Chapter 3, the change and 
continuity of Indonesia’s current role conceptions cannot be separated from its need 
to maintain a biographical narrative as a leader among developing countries and in the 
region. These biographical narratives may be rooted in the legacy of Indonesia’s 
struggle for independence, and even further back in, the pre-colonial era.141 
For instance, as suggested in Weinstein’s seminal work on Indonesian foreign policy 
in the transition period from Sukarno to Suharto, the notion of voicing developing 
countries’ desire for independence, conceptualised by Indonesian founding fathers, 
                                                          
140 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in 
India and China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 
141 Jürgen Rüland, The Indonesian Way: Asean, Europeanization, and Foreign Policy Debates in a 




has become synonymous with its anti-Western agenda.142 This view is indeed the 
product of Indonesia’s history of struggle against Dutch colonialism.  
Another instance of Indonesia’s role being a part of its biographical narrative is the 
role of regional leader developed by Suharto’s regime. Under Suharto’s leadership, 
the emphasis was on the need to secure the centre by creating resilience in the 
periphery, which motivated Indonesia to pursue the role of regional leader. This was 
to maintain the stability of Southeast Asia from external powers. This in return 
nurtured the regional building identity. This is in line with Acharya’s reading of 
Southeast Asia’s regionalism, in which the normative basis for constructing 
regionalism was traced back to the existence of Mandala system, a pre-colonial polity 
in both the archipelagic and mainland Southeast Asia. 143  
Arguably, these two role conceptions represent efforts to sustain Indonesia’s core-
identity as a state with a long history of struggle against Dutch colonialism and a 
suspicion over the meddling of external powers in the region.144 Hence, one 
interpretation can be made that role conception functions as an instrument for the 
actors within the state to reflect the overall biographical narrative. Another 
interpretation could also be made, in which role conceptions enacted by the current 
government can be legitimised by linking them to reflect such biographical narrative.  
This section concludes that the incorporation of identity theory, ontological security, 
and symbolic interactionism into role theory literature provides a nuanced 
understanding of the nexus between role and identity. Roles are a constitutive part of 
identity formation, but they can also be a strategic instrument to maintain a coherent 
biographical narrative of the state. Moreover, this section shows that while the notion 
of identity implies a very rigid set of ideas and behaviours,145 roles imply more diverse 
and multifaceted relationships. Roles are driven by a specific combination of 
policymakers’ interpretations of their supposed behaviour, society’s expectations, as 
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well as the particular context in which the role is enacted. By applying role theory, the 
operationalisation of state identity in foreign policy can be seen, in the role 
conceptions enacted by the government in charge. Having discussed the nexus 
between role and identity, the next section will examine the condition in which enacted 
role conceptions conflict with one another.  
 
Role conflict and regional-global nexus 
Role conflict is one of the earliest key concepts of role theory literature. Much of the 
literature from Sociology, especially within the tradition of organisational role theory, 
concerns the study of role conflict.146 In this field, role conflict appears in a condition 
where others do not hold a consensus over expectations for a person’s behaviour.147 
In a straightforward definition, role conflict can be defined as ‘the concurrent 
appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the behaviour of a person’.148 
One of the basic factors that may cause role conflict is ambiguity. Role ambiguity is a 
condition in which there is a lack of necessary information regarding expectations and 
methods for fulfilling the role.149  
Furthermore, role conflict may appear due to an abundance of choices for the actor. 
The structural symbolic interactionist perspective conceptualises choice as ‘reflecting 
constraints which operate on any given set of identities’.150 Given that the actor has 
multiple roles to positions within a particular set of networks and relationships, there 
is ‘a role choice’ that requires the actor to meet expectations of one role rather than 
another. The act of choosing one role within a particular social setting may lead to a 
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decreased performance of other roles. This could lead to the emergence of role 
conflict. 
As suggested by role theory literature, states may have multiple roles in the 
international system, and the salience of each depends partly on how many they have. 
The value of the role also depends on how well-suited the social setting is to the 
actor.151 Since distinct roles can coexist at the same time, there is a possibility that 
they might contradict each other. A contradiction among the roles that a state holds 
will lead to role conflict.  
Building upon sociological literature on role conflict, Harnisch suggests four different 
patterns of role conflict. Role conflict is likely to appear if: (1) role expectations from 
others are vague or inconsistent; (2) there is a lack of resources to fulfil the role; (3) 
states face diverging norms and expectations; and (4) there is an incompatibility 
between the interests of the state and its external expectations in international 
relations.152 
We should note that role conflict may not result in a change of state identity. As argued 
in the previous section, while identity can be a manifestation of a firm and coherent 
domestic political culture, role conceptions can also be treated as a manifestation of 
how states maintain their overall biographical narrative. Thus, role conflict is not the 
outcome of contestation over state identity. Rather, role conflict could be seen as 
contestation on how the identity should be presented. The concept of role conflict 
enables students of IR to analyse the potential conflicts between the different roles 
enacted by a state in manifesting the expectations of others during interactions or the 
state’s self-understanding of roles coming from domestic actors.  
In the case of Indonesia, the notion of role conflict provides a nuanced understanding 
on how the enactment of a certain role conception might be hindered by the enactment 
of other roles, particularly between a recently enacted role conception and a historical 
one. For instance, Indonesia’s post-authoritarian role conception as an advocate of 
democracy and human rights norms may be in conflict with its historical role as a 
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voice for developing countries. This is because the latter role might be operationalised 
through solidarity with other developing countries that may not adhere to democracy 
and human rights norms. 
However, the role conflict between the two role conceptions does not necessarily 
change Indonesia’s identity as a developing country. Rather, the role conflict shows 
negotiation and contestation within Indonesian domestic discourse on how the 
government positioned itself in international level. Thus, the seemingly ambivalent 
Indonesian foreign policy agenda of democracy promotion can be understood through 
the notion of role conflict. I will discuss this case in a great detail in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5. 
In terms of level, two types of conflict may emerge from the enactment of multiple 
roles, inter-role (conflict between roles) and intra-role conflict (conflict within the 
role).153 Inter-role conflict may occur when states find themselves in two or more 
competing positions. This contradictory role enactment occurs when one particular 
role reduces the other’s salience.154 Intra-role conflict can occur when domestic and 
international audiences contest a particular enactment of a role.155 While international 
audiences such as great powers and institutions may have the ability to alter particular 
roles that states enact, the domestic audiences have more influence in what roles the 
states enact.156 Through the concept of role contestation, role theory provides an 
analytical tool to understand the reluctance of foreign policy elites to enact a particular 
national role conception in response to disagreement among domestic actors. By 
analysing inter-role and intra-role conflict, role theory provides a better understanding 
of how the projection of a particular identity through enacting a specific role might be 
hindered by conflicts from the other roles. 
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To better understand role conflict, we need to focus our attention on the source of 
expectation itself. In this section, role conflict can be contextualised in terms of the 
audiences, that it is alter-expectation driven and ego-expectation driven. To further 
understand this contextualisation, we need to unpack both international and domestic 
audiences.  
Roles are partly generated from the expectations of international audiences, which 
could cover vast numbers of actors with different ordering principles. So far, the 
application of role conflict within IR scholarship is situated within the literature on 
international institutions, which can be broadly defined as ‘general pattern or 
categorisation of activity’ and ‘a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally 
or informally organised’.157  
Given that roles are primarily generated by membership in particular institutions, role 
conflict may appear where ‘the actor exists in two different institutions that 
simultaneously demand that it express contradictory behaviour’.158 Drawing heavily 
from symbolic interactionist theory, which puts more emphasis on the agency, 
Harnisch further clarifies alter expectations by distinguishing them as tangible actors. 
States, or international organisations, are seen as the leading socialising agent to the 
self (significant others) and more abstract terms such as democracy or human rights 
as generalised others.159  
I advance the application of role conflict within IR scholarship by arguing that it 
should also consider the different levels of international audiences, both regional and 
global. By doing so, conflict not only occurs due to different expectations between 
domestic and international institutions but also due to incongruent role enactment at 
regional and global levels. The need to substantiate role conceptions at these two 
different levels is important given that the state behaves differently due to dynamics 
that occur at both levels. For emerging middle powers, the difference between regional 
and global are significant. This is particularly true for states that are not considered 
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superpowers, which have wide-ranging interests and massive capabilities that the 
distinction between regional and global may be less compelling.160 As argued by Lake, 
the ordering principles of international relations may vary widely across regions and 
thus create distinctive regional orders.161 Therefore, arguably, this also affects how 
states conceptualise and perform roles at the regional and global level.  
The source of role conflict due to the difference at the regional and global level can be 
attributed to three conditions. First, there are different material constraints between the 
levels which prevent the state from incorporating alter expectations into their role 
conceptualisation. Second, there is the structural difference between regional order 
and global order, which structurally affects the expectations and patterns of behaviour 
of the state. Third, there is the difference in the degree of norm diffusion, which then 
affects the degree of performance of roles. 
The literature on regional order has established that the end of the Cold War created 
space for states to actively participate and  become willing to play a more significant 
role in the international system.162 As suggested by Hurrell, due to proximity and the 
limitations of power projection, either through normative or material capabilities, 
states are more likely to maintain influence in their respective regional order.163 
Moreover, the states are more likely to engage in interaction that shapes their roles 
preferences at the regional level, over the global level, given that such interaction may 
have more meaning to the states. This incentivises states to treat the region as an arena 
for a more significant interaction, in which alter and ego expectations are more likely 
to be incorporated into role conceptions. 
Secondly, the structural difference between regional and global order may also lead to 
disparity in how the state responds to the expectations of the audience. This may be 
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due to different actors that dominate the regional and global order.164 For instance, the 
proliferation and strengthening of regional institutions after the Cold War has provided 
a new arena for small and medium-sized state to play a greater role at the regional 
level. While globalisation has created a more interdependent world, the difference in 
the arrangement of regional institutions may create a different set of social settings for 
states to enact roles. This could also be attributed to a different level of 
institutionalisation that takes place within global and regional levels. Thus, arguably 
the behaviour of the states may be also different at regional and global levels due to 
the different expectations towards them at both levels.  
The third condition is the difference in norm diffusion between regional and global 
levels. It has been widely studied that the degree of norm diffusion and the way states 
respond at the global level may differ with response at the regional level.165 
Furthermore, the norm being adhered to may also differ. This is because a region is 
not only defined in terms of geographic contiguity but also in terms of collective 
identities or normative underpinning internalised within the region. For instance, 
within regional orders in the Global South, the notion of sovereignty with its norm of 
non-interference has become the most critical aspect of the interaction of states. On 
the contrary, at the global level, there is softening of the traditional understanding of 
sovereignty that leads to normalising international intervention.166 Hence, there is a 
disparity in the widening normative scope and deepening normative scope, which in 
turn may provide different expectations of the state. 
Besides, a regional level could be a dynamic arena for contesting, resisting, localising 
and accepting norms that are widely accepted at the global level.167 This is particularly 
true for regional order outside of the Western world where liberal norms are contested 
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before being diffused. When the region has a strong presence of regional institutions 
that could also serve as actors in a mediating role between global norm entrepreneurs, 
by providing a different set of social interactions for the states in the region.168 This is 
without mentioning the emergence of regional advocacy networks that may more 
successfully emulating particular norms than at the global level. This is due to an 
institutional density of regional advocacy that has an impact on the effectiveness of 
networks in diffusing norms.169 This, in turn, affects the degree to which states react 
and incorporate the alter expectations. 
In the context of Southeast Asia, ASEAN has become an arena for contesting, 
resisting, localising and accepting Western norms widely accepted at the global level. 
In the case of human rights norms, there is a tendency for Southeast Asian countries 
to rhetorically pursue a liberal agenda within ASEAN.170 At the same time, as 
suggested by Davies, despite a growing number of global human rights treaty 
ratifications by Southeast Asia, some states have reservations and resistance when it 
comes to implementing such treaties.171 Clearly this shows the different dynamics at 
play between regional and global levels that lead to different states’ behaviour.  
Drawing upon the discussion above, there are two types of role conflict stemming 
from differences between regional and global levels. The first type appears when one 
particular role manifests differently at regional and global levels. In this case, foreign 
policymakers face a different audience with a mismatched set of norms giving a 
distinct meaning to the role. As a result, the roles being enacted might be the same, 
but the performance and rhetoric might be different. The second type of role conflict 
appears where one particular role is highly performed and treated as a part of state 
identity at one level but is contested and utterly disregarded in the other level. Thus, 
where the enactment of one particular role could be a manifestation of state identity at 
one level but a potential threat to country’s core interest at the other. 
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Role conflict and state transformation 
Having unpacked international audiences into two distinct levels and how their 
differences may lead to role conflict, I turn my discussion on unpacking domestic 
audiences. Role conflict could also be conceptualised as an outcome of domestic 
contestation stemming from a disagreement within domestic actors on what roles the 
state should play. Growing literature on role theory in IR has addressed the issue.172 
Furthermore, while ego as well as alter expectations are important in the construction 
of role conceptions, they are primarily assumed as stable and unitary actors that 
represent the self within the society of states. As argued by Cantir and Kaarbo, since 
the incorporation of the sociological role theory approach in understanding states’ 
behaviour, the role theory literature in IR tends to black-box the state and treat it as a 
unified actor.173 This is because of the prevalence of structural approach in 
International Relations that ignores the dynamic process within the state.174 
The assumption of the unitary ego creates a parsimonious understanding of role theory 
in International Relations. In reality, this assumption cannot hold true in democratised 
states where the making of a role conception involves not only policymakers but other 
domestic actors. This condition has made it impossible to rule out domestic audiences’ 
influence on role conceptualisations. Hence, role conceptions articulated by 
policymakers are often contested domestically.  
Domestic role contestation may appear when role conceptions enacted by foreign 
policymakers are not widely supported by domestic audiences, including political 
parties, significant non-governmental organisations, bureaucratic agencies, and public 
opinion. Drawing from foreign policy analysis, Cantir and Kaarbo have provided a 
general overview of role conflict emerging from domestic contestation. Role 
contestation can occur from a disagreement between governing elites and political 
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opposition, among multi-party coalitions, in small groups and leader-advisory 
relations, and across bureaucratic agencies.175 In this thesis, I aim to contribute the 
discussion on domestic-driven role conflict, caused by disagreement across 
bureaucratic agencies, by engaging with the literature on state transformation. 
For this thesis, the state transformation approach is one that assumes that states are 
institutional apparatuses developed by historically evolving conflicts among socio-
political forces ranging from classes and class fractions, ethnic and religious 
groupings, and state-based actors, etc. These conflicts, which reflect past struggles to 
(re)structure states, systematically favor certain interests and agendas.176 Much of the  
literature engaging with this state transformation agenda is found in ‘Murdoch school’ 
writings that specifically focus on how this process is fundamentally linked to 
capitalist developmentalism and class formation/factionalism.177 This thesis differs 
from such dominant understandings of state transformation by broadening the 
understanding of conflict within the state to  also include ethnic and religious 
groupings and state-based actors with different interests and agendas (as suggested by 
other literatures).178 By doing so, the state transformation approach can also explain 
how  contestation shapes not just domestic or economic governance, but also in other 
realms of foreign policy agenda making such as human rights. 
As established by many studies, many emerging middle powers from the Global South 
can be characterised as undergoing transformation from within.179 The state 
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transformation process may broaden the range of internationalised actors involved in 
the foreign, security, and economic relations, as well as fragmenting the strict coherent 
Weberian notion of the state. Three primary processes have been identified that 
constitute state transformation: a further fragmentation of the state, decentralisation of 
state power, and internationalisation of state agencies that directly deal with 
international issues. Thus, as put by Hameiri and Jones, state transformation would 
create a condition in which: 
Different state apparatuses, allied with different nonstate forces, may well 
pursue different, even contradictory, agendas and be differentially integrated 
into transnational economic and security regimes. Central authorities may have 
difficulty coordinating these various elements, making their state’s ‘rise’ 
potentially conflict-ridden and difficult for outsiders to interpret.180 
Moreover, as Jayasuriya put it, state transformation has led to: 
the breakdown of traditional diplomatic domains and activities but also the 
creation of new actors, new arenas, and new fields of diplomatic activity… 
[Foreign ministries are] increasingly unable to act authoritatively on behalf of 
various domestic agencies, which not only have a degree of institutional 
autonomy but also may have [different] diplomatic agendas… just as public 
power is fragmented so are diplomatic functions, which are now not just 
concentrated in a traditional Ministry of Foreign Affairs but dispersed among 
a wide array of independent sites of public power.181 
In the case of Indonesia, the three processes have transformed the state. The most 
important characteristic of the Indonesian state in the post-authoritarian regime is 
decentralisation. The decentralisation resulted in district and municipal governments 
holding a near majority of the authority in their territory. Political and fiscal 
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decentralisation processes left the central government with few responsibilities, 
namely security and defence, foreign policy, justice and religious affairs.182 
Besides decentralisation, in the post-authoritarian era the Indonesian state has 
fragmented further due to the absence of the ordering principle built by Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime, which put the regime above society. According to Aspinall, on a 
political level, fragmentation appears due to the democratisation process creating ‘a 
marketplace of potential patrons and enabling them to compete with one another 
without being constrained by a supreme patriarch, as they were under Suharto’.183 
Thus, within a democratic landscape, each particular bureaucratic agency within the 
state can be mobilised by political and economic elites to influence overall state policy 
to benefits their agendas. This sometimes results in incoherent policy on particular 
issues. 
Lastly, the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime also led to the reorganisation of 
state and market relations. As argued by Robinson and Hadiz, the predatory state under 
Suharto’s regime was able to survive and accommodate the neoliberal agenda of the 
global market.184 Thus, despite undergoing neoliberal reform, Indonesia’s economic 
outlook still shows its predatory character, where the illiberal mode of economic 
governance still triumphs through the cemented clientelist networks.185 
In the case of a state undergoing transformation, the state may have different focal 
points for the different transnational issues being discussed: such as security, trade, 
finance, environment, and developmental aid. This may add an additional source of 
role conflict. While indeed, there might be synchronisation and coordination among 
state apparatuses, in practice, the roles taken by particular state agencies may not line 
up those being enacted by foreign policymakers. Unlike state identity that may well 
be represented without any conflict arising from state transformation role conception 
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could be affected by the state enacting multiple roles. This provides a malleable 
condition for state agencies to enact different roles at the same time. 
Drawing from literature on state transformation, I focus specifically on the second 
aspect of state transformation, that is, the fragmentation of the state. Building upon 
such premise, role conflict appears in three stages. The first stage of role conflict may 
occur due to the fragmentation of the state, which enables different bureaucratic 
agencies to conceptualise their role with greater power to represent the state in the 
international arena. In this stage, the contestation emerges at the beginning of the 
conceptualisation of the role. Each state agency has the same amount of authority in 
their respective scope of transnational issues, which creates a strong but contradictory 
standpoint that may be difficult to interpret for both international and domestic 
audiences.  
In the second stage, role conflict may appear where conceptualisation of roles by one 
particular state bureaucratic agency is contested and even resisted by another state 
agency. This contestation is due to different international objectives stemming from 
different domestic objectives that need to be fulfilled to sustain a particular domestic 
constituency. The contestation is likely to weaken the role conception to the point 
where the conceptualisation by one particular agency is vague, and enactment is 
constrained. The vagueness of the conceptualisation is a deliberate move to reduce 
further contestation from other state agencies.  
In the third stage, in the event that contestation has been won by a particular 
bureaucratic agency, the role has been implemented and enacted within an 
international arena where another agency has more power to represent the state. 
However, the enactment of the roles through international commitment have not 
traversed into domestic policies due to the reluctance of another agency to implement 
such commitment. This has created a rhetoric-performance gap between commitment 




Table 2.1 Degree of domestic-driven role conflict 




1 Two equal roles 
produced  
Each agency devises 
and enacts roles in their 
respective arenas  
Strong contradictory 
standpoints held by the state 
that are difficult interpret for 




Roles are crafted by one 
agency while the others 
resist enactment of the 
roles 
Vague conceptualisation of 
roles 
3 One role 
dominates the 
other 
Roles are crafted and 
enacted by one agency 
while other agencies 
follow with some 
caveats 
Rhetoric-performance gap 
between commitments made 
at the international level and 
policy at the domestic level. 
Source: Author 
 
Role legitimation and domestic contestation 
The discussion above shows how role conflict could emerge due to the different 
natures of international audiences that make the state agency articulate different role 
conceptions at the regional and global levels. Furthermore, the nature of an emerging 
middle power that undergoes state transformation enables the state apparatus to enact 
their conceptualisation of roles, which affects how international audiences interpret 
the state’s role conceptions. As shown in the previous discussion on role conflict, 
domestic contestation may lead to role conflict. The question is, how does state agency 
represented by government resolve domestic role contestation? To answer this, we 
need to examine the extent to which roles being enacted relate to perceived legitimacy. 
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This section aims to develop a new concept to help analyse how government resolves 
potential role contestation from domestic audiences. 
To reduce the domestic role contestation while still subscribing to ego and alter 
expectations, the state agency, particularly the Minister of Foreign Affairs, may need 
to legitimise their role conceptions to domestic audiences. Surprisingly, the discussion 
on policymakers’ need to legitimise their role conceptions and enactments remains 
relatively unexplored within role theory literature. This thesis suggests the notion of 
role legitimation to capture this process. Role legitimation can be defined as a social 
process in which policymakers aim to avoid the likelihood of domestic contestation 
by strategically justifying their enactment of role conceptions for reluctant domestic 
audiences.  
Building upon literature on ontological security and norm diffusion, this thesis puts 
forward two social mechanisms through which role legitimation is performed. The 
first is reframing the historical role of the state from a specific period, while the second 
is reproducing alter expectations in domestic political discourse. 
The first mechanism focuses on how historical experience affects the salience of 
particular roles. Policymakers might invoke certain historical experiences to legitimise 
their foreign policy agenda, warranting societal acceptance.186 The process is called 
historical self-identification. Harnisch argues that historical self-identification might 
be related to role salience. While states have multiple roles, each role may have 
different salience.187 As suggested by many social psychologists, roles are 
hierarchically organised by the likelihood of action being taken from that role.188 
Arguably, historical roles are more likely to be at the top of the hierarchy and 
consequently are more likely to be re-enacted due to strong self-identification with 
past experience. 
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The historical experiences from a specific period may be attributed to the most 
common well-accepted understanding of states’ role that is widely championed by 
domestic audiences. As a consequence, foreign policymakers need to make reference 
to specific historical roles which domestic audiences understand need to be revived. 
Thus, enacting historical roles from critical periods to pursue a particular status would 
reduce domestic contestation. 
The reason for this is two-fold. First, historical reference has been widely established 
as a powerful tool for political discourse due to its ability to create a sense of identity 
through sustaining collective memory. As previously discussed in the section 
regarding ontological security, role conceptions could be a reflection of ‘collective 
memory’ being built and sustained by the government through foreign policy rhetoric. 
Second, the historical roles constructed in the early formative years of the state are an 
inalienable historical feature of the state. This is because it is usually enshrined as 
myth, which used by nationalists, to simplify, dramatise and selectively narrate the 
story of a nation’s past and its place in the world, a story that elucidates its 
contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past.189 Historical reference then 
provides a compelling narrative for the government to utilise for their foreign policy 
agenda. 
Given that states’ national role conception can be traced back to early or formative 
experiences, which may shape the role conceptions in the years to come,190 the state 
could make coherent sense of itself over time and thus create a sense of continuity of 
roles by invoking historical roles. The sense of continuity of current roles conception 
with the historical roles would be necessary for reducing domestic contestation. This 
is because the emergence of new role conceptions provides an opportunity for 
domestic actors to scrutinise it. 
Although the historical roles might be revived and continued, the enactment of such 
do not necessarily have the same objective. Some historical roles would not serve the 
same purpose as the roles that are currently being enacted. This is due to a different 
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period that may have a different ego, as well as alter expectations which lead to a 
different set of objectives for the enactment of such roles. In other words, the meaning 
of the historical roles is redefined for a particular objective that suits the current 
situation. 
The second mechanism captures how policymakers justify the creation of role 
conceptions to accommodate the alter expectations by reproducing them in domestic 
political discourse. Reproducing alter expectations can also be seen in what Thies calls 
the role location process.191 The role location process is ‘where role expectations of 
the self and other, role demands of the situation, and cues from the audience all come 
together to produce a role for the actor and set the conditions for its appropriate 
enactment’.192 In general, the role location refers to a process where the international 
actors locate a suitable role for particular states in the system. I prefer to call this 
process as role localisation rather than role location process. As defined by Acharya, 
localisation is a process in which foreign ideas have been translated into indigenous 
traditions and practices.193 While the role location process seems to emphasise how 
the international structure forces the state respond to the alter expectation, role 
localisation focuses on how a role is negotiated and mobilised for domestic audiences. 
In her study on Turkish policy towards the EU, Hintz argued that foreign policy may 
be used by elites as an arena for contesting state identity when their proposed identity 
is blocked at the domestic level.194 However, the reverse might also be true for the 
case of Indonesia, in which norm and identity from outside that is less likely to be 
accepted within the domestic realm, can be localised in the foreign policy arena 
through the enactment of roles. Therefore, role localisation could also be a strategy 
employed by an agency of the state to provide evidence of the norm localisation 
despite the norm not being fully embraced. However, through role localisation, 
expected norms can be seen by outsiders as if it was accepted.  
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Furthermore, foreign policymakers take alter expectations into account by reproducing 
them as the inherent social qualities that need to be projected abroad. Foreign 
policymakers create a case for projecting these qualities as a way to enhance 
government’s domestic political objectives. By doing so, the incorporation of alter 
expectations into role conception is less likely to be seen as state submitting to the 
pressure from other foreign actors. Rather, foreign policymakers do this as a domestic 
imperative. As a result, the foreign policy establishment can legitimise the enactment 
of particular roles driven by alter expectation without creating domestic contestation. 
By incorporating Acharya’s notion of norm localisation, reproducing alter 
expectations could also be a mechanism in which policymakers develop a particular 
domestic norm in line with alter expectations while reducing the possibility of 
contestation by a domestic audience. In this case, policymakers localise the 
expectations, as if they are inherently part of the domestic norm by making alter 
expectations more congruent with the domestic audiences’ prior beliefs and practices. 
Furthermore, reproducing alter expectations can also be a strategy for foreign 
policymakers to utilise them for domestic political purposes. Borrowing from 
Moravcsik’s lock-in argument,195 foreign policymakers try to legitimise a certain alter 
expectation by locking-in the expectation as an instrument to keep particular societal 
values from being contested domestically. Thus, enacting a particular role conception, 
the current government aims to not only fulfil alter expectation but also utilise it as a 
strategic instrument to frame contested values as an inherent quality of the current 
domestic political environment.  
The notion of role legitimation developed above can explain how foreign 
policymakers from emerging middle powers such as Indonesia legitimise their 
enactment of role conceptions. As a country from the Global South, foreign policy has 
not been seen as a priority in Indonesia compared to other domestic issues. This 
condition provides flexibility for foreign policymakers to incorporate alter 
expectations that may not align with the expectation from domestic audiences.  
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In the case of Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy and human rights, through 
the role legitimation process, foreign policymakers can legitimise the role despite the 
existence of contestation over the underlying norm of such role conception. The notion 
of role legitimation can also explain how Indonesia could enact the role as a regional 
leader in the regional trade governance that required it to agree to further liberalisation 
of its economy despite substantial domestic contestation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has established the theoretical framework for the analysis of empirical 
materials in the following historical chapter and four empirical chapters.  Role theory 
mobilised in this thesis focuses on how states behave based on their respective social 
identities and situation manifested through roles. By synthesising both structural and 
symbolic interactionist role theory scholarship, there are two main processes through 
which roles are constructed. These are, ego understanding of the self (ego expectation) 
and other expectation of the self (alter expectation).196 This enables us to 
comprehensively analyse the state’s foreign policy by combining structural-driven and 
agency-level analysis. 
There are three main contributions that this chapter puts forward in advancing role 
theory literature. Firstly, the chapter has incorporated the literature on identity theory 
and ontological security in the discussion on role theory literature. In doing so, it has 
situated the notion of roles not only as a crucial part of identity as suggested by identity 
theory but also as a part of efforts to maintain states’ biographical narrative, as 
suggested by ontological security literature. By linking roles with states’ biographical 
narrative, it sheds lights on the salience and continuity of roles throughout the time.  
Secondly, international audiences and domestic audiences are unpacked in order to 
further advance the application of role conflict within IR scholarship. This chapter has 
shown, at a great length, how role conflict would provide us with a nuanced 
understanding of states’ behaviour by juxtaposing two different levels of the ordering 
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principle, the global and the regional. Moreover, the incorporation of state 
transformation literature into the discussion of domestic audience enables us to 
develop three processes of domestic contestation that emerge from a disagreement 
between state agencies.  
Lastly, this chapter has developed a new concept within the literature on role theory, 
role legitimation, to understand how a state agency legitimises role conception towards 
potential contestation from domestic political actors. The chapter that follows will 
substantiate how roles can be a reflection of state’s biographical narrative, by looking 






















The making of biographical narrative: the evolution of 
Indonesia’s role conceptions  
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the changes in and continuity of Indonesia’s national role 
conceptions by analysing the historical context of the country’s foreign policy since 
its independence in 1945. Doing so also allows us to understand why some of 
Indonesia’s current roles, which were constructed decades ago, are still profoundly 
entrenched, while some newly constructed ones are quickly ignored. It should be noted 
that this chapter does not aim to provide a comprehensive account of Indonesia’s 
history. Rather, it provides a glimpse of a truncated version of history that serves the 
interests of foreign policy elites in Jakarta. This is because, as I have stated in the 
introductory chapter, the notion of role conception emphasises foreign policy-makers’ 
perceptions of their states’ position in the international system. 
This chapter contends that changes in ego and alter expectations are significant to the 
construction of Indonesia’s role conceptions. Domestic political changes drive ego 
expectations while the changes in the international system cause alter expectations. 
However, despite the domestic political changes, Indonesia’s historical role 
conceptions are hardly abandoned. Instead, role conceptions enacted from previous 
regimes are merely reframed and recast with different objectives. This chapter further 
argues that the continuity of role conceptions could be attributed to the need for a post-
colonial state like Indonesia to have a sense of stable identity. This chapter thus asserts 
that role conceptions have become an articulation of Indonesia’s biographical 
narrative, which once incepted, needs to be sustained as a part of biographical 
continuity. 
Overall, this chapter conceptualises Indonesia’s national role conceptions under 
President Yudhoyono into four overarching roles that can be distinguished based on 
their target audience; (1) the role as a voice for developing countries, which is the 
representation of Indonesia’s interest as a part of the developing world; (2) the role as 
a regional leader, which represents Indonesia’s material and geographical positions; 
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(3) the role as a bridge-builder, which serves Indonesia’s growing interest in being a 
moderating voice amid different actors in the international community; (4) and the 
role as an advocate of democratic and human rights norms, an articulation of 
Indonesia’s aspiration to become a norm entrepreneur in the international system. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised around three time periods. The periodisation 
is determined by the fundamental changes within Indonesia’s domestic political 
environment, namely the communist purge in 1965 and the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime in 1998. The first period started in 1950, a year after the transfer 
of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia, which culminated during Sukarno’s 
guided democracy in the early to mid-1960s. The second period began with the purge 
of Indonesian communists in 1965, which lasted until the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime in 1998. The third period started in 1999 during the 
democratisation. Discussion on the third period will be divided into two sub-periods. 
The first is the early reform period from 1999 to 2004, a time of consolidating 
Indonesia’s democratic transition. The second is the period of consolidated democracy 
started by the leadership of President Yudhoyono. 
The next section examines the construction of Indonesia’s role conception as a voice 
for developing countries and how Sukarno’s regime enacted this during the Cold War 
period. The third section investigates the persistence of the role, and how it has been 
framed to create an auxiliary role as an advocate of country development. This section 
also examines the emergence of Indonesia’s role conception as a regional leader and 
how Suharto’s regime enacted that role. The fourth section discusses the genesis of 
Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy and bridge-builder in the post-
authoritarian period. The fifth section analyses the enactment of the four overarching 
role conceptions by Yudhoyono’s administration. 
 
Indonesia’s role conceptions under Sukarno’s leadership (1949 – 1965) 
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on role theory establishes that a 
state’s national role conception can be traced back to the early formative experiences, 
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of the state, which shape the role conceptions in the years to come.197 The historical 
narrative of a state’s formative experience can also be invoked by policymakers to 
legitimise their strategic choices to enact specific roles while avoiding domestic 
contestation. While Indonesia’s assertion to play a greater role at the global level might 
have been firmly established during President Yudhoyono’s leadership, the underlying 
vision of this ambition can be traced back to the legacies of the early era, right after 
Indonesia gained its independence. Thus, it is not surprising that current policymakers 
always invoke the historical idea of revitalising Indonesia’s rightful position, just like 
when it was actively involved at the global level in the early years of independence. 
At the beginning of its sovereignty, Indonesia was plagued by poverty. Lacking the 
resources to project its foreign policy, it was deemed as one of the underdeveloped 
countries. However, this did not stop the founding fathers envisioning Indonesia as a 
global leader. Like many other post-colonial states, Indonesia’s independence was the 
result of a political, diplomatic, and military struggle against colonialism.198 The spirit 
of anti-colonialism is preserved in the Indonesian Constitution: ‘Independence is the 
inalienable right of all nations, and therefore colonialism must be erased from the face 
of the earth because it is incompatible with conditions of humanity and justice’.199 As 
argued by Roeslan Abdulgani, Indonesia’s vision of a world without colonialism can 
only be achieved through active involvement in pushing for a new pattern of world 
order that favours the oppressed.200 The vision of Indonesia’s role in international 
order can be seen from the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution, which says that 
the objective of the Indonesian state is ‘to participate in maintaining world order based 
on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice’.201 
Since its early formative experiences, Indonesia’s aspiring role as a global player has 
been pursued through the enactment of its role as a voice for developing countries 
against colonialism. Indonesia’s first effort to take on this role began with hosting and 
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organising what is illustriously remembered as ‘the first intercontinental conference 
of coloured peoples in the history of mankind’.202 The Asian-African Conference, 
widely known as the Bandung Conference, was held in 1955 and is now a landmark 
in the history of International Relations. At the conference, Asian and African 
countries that had recently undergone the process of decolonisation gathered for the 
first time to discuss the arrangement of the new world order.203 Organising such an 
event was not without its hurdles given that the world was highly divided between the 
US and the Soviet Union’s spheres of influence. Many countries like India and China 
were surprised that Indonesia could persuade 29 countries, comprising half of the 
world’s population, to attend the conference given its limited diplomatic resources.204 
Despite being woefully neglected by the mainstream literature of International 
Relations, the Asian-African Conference, without a doubt, shaped the course of 
international politics for the entire Cold War era. Although it was seen as an anti-
Western gathering, the Conference was a hallmark for the articulation of human rights, 
as well as the advancement of national independence throughout Asia and Africa.205  
The idea for the Conference can be traced back to the initiative taken by the Ceylonese 
(Sri Lankan) Premier John Kotelawela that invited four other newly independent 
Asian states to the Colombo Meeting in 1954. At the time, the idea was to unite the 
voice of Asia, to be heard in the councils of the world, particularly in the United 
Nations (UN). Thus, in the beginning, the idea of the conference was more about 
regionalism. It was Indonesia’s Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamijoyo, who had the wider 
vision of an Afro-Asian meeting in anti-colonial solidarity.206 
                                                          
202 Sukarno, “Let a New Asia and New Africa Be Born: Speech of H.E. President Sukarno at the 
Opening of the Asian-African Conference, 18th April 1955” (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic of Indonesia, 1955). 
203 See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African 
Conference for International Order (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008). 
204 Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region, Cornell 
Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
205 Amitav Acharya, “Who Are the Norm Makers? The Asian-African Conference in Bandung and 
the Evolution of Norms,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
Organizations 20, no. 3 (July 1, 2014): 405–17. 
206 Anthony Reid, “The Bandung Conference and Southeast Asian Regionalism,” in Bandung 
Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, ed. See Seng 




During this period, Indonesia did not intend to be a regional leader. As a result, 
creating a regional institution and cooperation was mostly neglected during Sukarno’s 
presidency.207 In fact, it was the Federation of Malaya208 and the Philippines, led by 
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and President Carlos P. Garcia respectively, 
that conceived of creating a regional grouping in early 1959. Sukarno did not support 
their idea. To enhance cooperation, then Indonesian foreign minister, Subandrio, 
declared his government’s preference for bilateral agreements rather than regional 
ones.209 Thailand responded positively to this idea. These three countries went on to 
create Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961.210 As argued by Anthony Reid, 
there are two main reasons why Indonesia did not pursue creating regional 
cooperation. First, Indonesian foreign policy elites at the time believed that it would 
be through an alliance of Asian and African states that the voice of developing 
countries could be heard. Secondly, Indonesia’s nationalist elites at the time saw 
ideological alignment as more important than geographical proximity, when 
establishing deeper cooperation.211 
At the beginning, Indonesia’s aspiration to take the role as the voice of developing 
countries in the bipolar world was translated into a more neutral tone, which engaged 
both the Western and Eastern Bloc. However, Indonesia’s approach towards the 
international order changed slightly over time to be more revisionist and revolutionary, 
and closer to the Eastern Bloc. From 1950 to late 1957, Indonesia’s stance towards 
US-led liberal order was characterised as non-confrontational. The domestic politics 
played an important role in this outcome. During this period, Indonesia could be 
characterised as a liberal parliamentary democracy, in which foreign policy was driven 
by political parties in charge of the Cabinet. Thus, arguably, Sukarno’s anti-Western 
point of view might have had less impact on Indonesian foreign policy.  
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The declaration of martial law abolished parliamentary government in 1959, denoting 
the second part of Sukarno’s regime would be left-leaning and authoritarian. During 
this period, Indonesia’s national role conception was starting to be characterised by a 
more revisionist and confrontational approach towards US-led global governance. 
This was seen in Indonesia’s increasingly critical approach towards the UN. President 
Sukarno’s major address delivered before the 15th United Nations General Assembly 
session entitled ‘To Build the World Anew’ in 1960, can still be interpreted as part of 
Indonesia’s aspirational national role as a voice for developing countries in mediating 
the conflict between Western and Eastern Bloc. In implementation, however, 
Indonesia’s international position shifted to lean towards the Eastern Bloc. A year 
later, in his speech in front of the UNGA, Indonesian foreign minister Dr. Subandrio 
elucidated Sukarno’s revolutionary idea by stating:  
We are revolutionary in thought and in action. We must be, to catch up with 
developments and to emancipate ourselves socially and economically after 
centuries of omission and domination. While we do not expect others, who do 
not share our urgency and need, to share our revolutionary approach within 
their particular national sphere. We do ask everyone to look at the world as one 
of transition, convulsed with revolutionary outlook—and if not to accept it, 
then to understand it. At least do not obstruct this process of emancipation 
towards a new world order.212 
In this speech, it is clear that the Indonesian government had fully incorporated 
Sukarno’s revolutionary ideas. Hence, in the early 1960s, Indonesia’s role enactment 
as the voice for developing countries in the bipolar world gradually shifted to become 
more revisionist and revolutionary. The revolutionary idea from Sukarno can be seen 
from its distinction of new emerging forces (NEFOs) and old established forces 
(OLDEFOs). NEFOs were defined as a group of progressive post-colonial countries. 
However, later on, this also included the Eastern Bloc countries. NEFOs can be seen 
as Indonesia and the communist and socialist countries while the OLDEFOs were seen 
as the Western Bloc. Thus, under Sukarno’s regime in the early 1960s, Indonesia was 
unofficially allied with communist and socialist states. The immediate implementation 
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of this new policy began with improvement in Indonesia’s relations with the Eastern 
Bloc, demonstrated by establishing the Conference of New Emerging Forces 
(CONEFO) by Sukarno. This group was envisioned as a counter-organisation to the 
UN.  
The idea of establishing the CONEFO received strong support from China, which 
provided financial aid to build the headquarters in Jakarta. Other communist countries, 
such as North Korea and North Vietnam later joined the CONEFO. Subsequently, the 
core of CONEFO was the axis of Jakarta-Hanoi-Pyongyang-Beijing, fuelled by anti-
Western rhetoric and orientation.213 The establishment of the axis was Indonesia’s 
direct challenge to the US-dominated status quo. While the revisionist tilt towards 
Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries could be attributed to Sukarno, it 
was also influenced by the dominance of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 
the domestic politics. 
However, the foreign policy shift as shown in the speech above was not merely about 
the changes in Indonesian elites’ perspective concerning Indonesia’s role in world 
politics. It is also an example of government negotiation and the contestation between 
Indonesia’s foreign relations with its domestic political and economic concerns. Under 
Sukarno, Indonesia’s relations with the US were characterised by negotiating and 
contesting US influence on Indonesia. Indonesia usually used the Soviet Union card 
to obtain concessions from the US, especially in regard to trade demands.214 In 1964, 
Sukarno launched an anti-American campaign with the infamous statement ‘Go to hell 
with your aid’. This campaign was in response to the US slashing funding to Indonesia, 
as well as its support for Malaysia’s bid to be a non-permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council. At the same time, the Soviet Union began to provide greater 
aid to Indonesia, strengthening relations between the two. 
Sukarno’s revolutionary ideas influenced revisionist tendencies in the articulating 
Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries. The increased dominance of the 
Indonesian Communist Party in the domestic political constellation also had 
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influence.215 Indonesia’s revisionist approach can be understood as a part of a nation-
building project by Sukarno. Its aim was to divert entangled domestic issues that 
threatened the integrity of the nation. For instance, rather than welcoming the Malaya 
Federation as a newly formed neighbour within Indonesia’s sphere of influence, 
Sukarno fiercely accused the newly independent country of being a British neo-
imperialist project. Indonesia’s arrogance strongly affected its small neighbouring 
country, Singapore. During his visit to Indonesia in 1960, former Singapore 
Ambassador to Indonesia Mr. Lee Khoon Choy noticed how Sukarno behaved towards 
the delegation led by Lee Kuan Yew. Mr. Lee Khoon Choy wrote that:  
He (Sukarno) was serious and brief when speaking to Lee Kuan Yew. They 
spoke in Bahasa for about twenty minutes, then he got up, shook our hands and 
walked back to the room without observing the courtesy of sending us to the 
door. My impression of Sukarno from this experience, therefore, was that he 
was arrogant, treating us as delegates from a small country paying him a 
tribute.216 
The quote above gives us a glimpse of how one of Indonesia’s closest neighbours 
perceived Sukarno’s leadership. The perception shows that despite Indonesia’s 
articulation of the idea that it provided a voice for developing countries, its neighbours 
seems to be threatened rather than emancipated by Indonesia’s behaviour and rhetoric 
at the global level. To an international audience, the role was rather seen more in terms 
of Indonesia’s shift towards the Eastern Bloc. Hence, even though foreign 
policymakers expressed a belief that Indonesia enacted the role of providing a voice 
for developing countries (which certainly became a part of Indonesia’s biographical 
narrative), this was mainly articulated as a part of a wider nation-building agenda to a  
domestic audience.  
Hence, in this period, Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries could be 
understood more as an articulation of a strategic national myths’ rather than as an 
actual role that fundamentally explained foreign policy choices. It is not surprising 
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that the enactment of this role conception was unsuccessful, due to the negative nature 
of it as well as domestic contestation from significant political actors.  
Not only did Sukarno attack the Western powers, but he attacked the UN, which he 
saw as merely a tool of Western imperialism.217 His cynical view of the UN might 
have been justified, given its inability to resolve the impact of the Cold War on the 
developing countries. However, his radical revisionism went too far, and he caused 
Indonesia to be shunned by a majority of countries at the time. This led Indonesia to 
withdraw from the UN. It comes as no surprise that his interpretation of Indonesia’s 
role conception was highly contested by domestic political actors, especially from the 
military and Islamic groups. The increasing contestation was complicated by 
Sukarno’s failed economic policy. Inflation had reached 650%, and the budget deficit 
was greater than the entire country’s revenue.218 
Eventually, Sukarno’s regime collapsed. The change from Sukarno to Suharto was 
marked by the extermination of communist-leaning socio-political actors in Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s national role conception changed radically in the aftermath of the bloody 
regime changes during 1965-1967. As will be discussed in the next section, the next 
regime would try to abandon Sukarno’s anti-colonial rhetoric by translating the role 
as a voice for developing countries into rhetoric on economic development.  
Despite being enacted for a very short period, Indonesia’s role as a voice for 
developing countries would continue to dominate the country’s role conception for 
years to come. This is because the role has become Indonesia’s biographical narrative. 
The reason for this was that the role as a voice for developing countries fit with 
Indonesia’s formative identity as a post-colonial state. This can be attributed to the 
widely accepted notion of anti-colonialism among Indonesian political elites in the 
late 1940s to mid-1960s, known as 1928 generation and 1945 generation. The majority 
of 1928 generation’s Indonesian educated class that later became nationalist leaders 
against Dutch colonialism were hugely influenced by anti-colonial literature, 
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especially Marxist writings.219 The 1945 generation that became Indonesian leadership 
in the 1960s also engaged heavily with Marxist ideas in world politics. In other words, 
the 1928 and 1945 generations, were inclined towards revolutionary ideas. 
Thus, being a part of a broader group of developing countries has become Indonesia’s 
core biographical narrative, as a result of its anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch 
and its positioning in the early years of its independence as closer to the non-Western 
Bloc in the Cold War international order. Arguably, this role conception as a voice for 
developing countries then becomes a reflection of Indonesia’s self-identity, which 
needs to be maintained by the foreign policy of coming regimes. This biographical 
narrative, later, will be invoked by policymakers to justify their particular foreign 
policy agenda. 
 
Indonesia’s role conception under Suharto’s leadership (1966 – 1998) 
The salience of Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries was reduced due 
to Suharto’s inward-looking approach, which focused more on domestic stability and 
development.220 However, Sukarno’s articulation of the role is deeply entrenched in 
Indonesia’s biographical narrative. Although, under Suharto’s leadership known as the 
New Order, Indonesian foreign policy abandoned its anti-Western rhetoric, it still 
framed its foreign policy agenda by continuously enacting the role as a voice for 
developing countries. During the transition period, it was evident that Indonesia’s role 
conceptions still emphasised its struggle against colonialism and imperialism. This 
was reflected in Indonesian delegate’s speech before the UNGA in 1966, a year after 
the collapse of Sukarno’s regim in which Adam Malik, Indonesia’s foreign minister 
under Suharto, stated that the Indonesian government would continue to pursue its 
traditional policy of non-alignment. As argued by Leifer, Indonesia’s experience in 
attaining its independence left a distinctive imprint on its anti-colonial foreign policy, 
which still needs to be articulated.221 Thus, the role as a voice for developing countries 
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through rhetoric against colonialism, in all its forms and manifestations, was still 
dominant in Indonesian foreign policy discourse. 
Besides adhering to the rhetoric of anti-colonialism, Indonesia also voiced concern 
regarding the need for the stabilisation and development of its economy. In the first 
five years of Suharto’s regime, the role as an advocate of development and as a 
regional leader were increasingly articulated by Indonesia in the international order. 
Being an advocate of development was as auxiliary to the broader role as a voice for 
developing countries. 
As stated by Adam Malik before the UNGA in 1968:  
If previously the question of colonialism was merely a matter of releasing the 
colonised from the grasp of the coloniser, now a new element has further 
complicated the issue…. we must begin to make the necessary preparations for 
entering a new era of development and decolonisation.222 
This statement shows how Suharto’s regime framed this historical role, by 
emphasising the need for developing countries to focus on their domestic economic 
development. However, Foreign Minister Malik did not want to instantly withdraw 
the rhetoric of colonialism in the early days of Suharto’s regime. The speech shows 
that there is a shifting in how the regime placed itself as well as its role in Cold War 
world politics to be closer to the US and reject the spread of communism in the region. 
This led Indonesia to strengthen the cooperation among Southeast Asian countries 
which had been destabilised by Sukarno’s revolutionary foreign policy. 
In August 1966 Suharto laid out his vision of ‘a cooperation Southeast Asia’. The 
project aimed to make the Southeast Asian region as ‘the strongest bulwark and base 
in facing imperialism and colonialism’.223 This vision was translated into the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The founding of ASEAN in 1967 
was the result of Suharto’s ability to convince Indonesia’s neighbours of the 
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importance to form a cooperation against external interference that might improve the 
stability and security of the region.224 
To achieve these two domestic goals, Suharto’s authoritarian regime pursued a 
national role conception as a regional leader, which had not been sought by his 
predecessor. Enacting a role as a regional leader was an essential part of Indonesia’s 
strategy to create a stable environment and win back the trust of its neighbours which 
were alienated by Sukarno’s confrontational policy. Indonesia’s aspiring role as a 
regional leader was also profoundly influenced by the US disengaging from Vietnam 
in the late 1960s and the Sino-US rapprochement in the early 1970s.225 Furthermore, 
the growing Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia, with Vietnam becoming 
increasingly closer to the Soviet Union while the Khmer Rouge occupied Cambodia 
with the support of China, created strategic uncertainty in the region.226 
The regional strategic uncertainty became a threat to Suharto’s idea of national 
resilience. National resilience refers to an inward-looking security concept that 
focuses on establishing orderly, peaceful and stable conditions against any subversive 
elements or infiltration, from either within and without.227 ASEAN was seen as an 
instrument to promote Indonesia’s national resilience. In his own words, Suharto said:  
Our concept of security is inward-looking, namely to establish an orderly, 
peaceful and stable condition within each individual territory, free from any 
subversive elements and infiltration, wherever their origins might be from… It 
is mainly for this purpose that we ought to constantly promote our respective 
national resilience which in turn will be conducive to the creation of regional 
resilience.228 
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Given that strategic uncertainty can endanger Indonesia’s national resilience, 
Indonesia articulated its regional leadership by organising a conference of Asian 
Foreign Ministers on the question of Cambodia in Jakarta in 1971. The outcome of the 
conference was a joint statement with four demands; (1) the withdrawal of all foreign 
troops, facilitating the cessation of hostilities; (2) respect for the sovereignty, 
independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of the countries concerned; (3) the 
reactivation of the International Commission for Supervision and Control; (4) and the 
convening of an international conference similar to the Conference on the Problem of 
Restoring Peace to Indo-China, which met in Geneva in 1954.229 
Therefore, in Suharto’s view, ASEAN was an extension of Indonesia’s pursuit of 
national resilience. It is no wonder that during his leadership, ASEAN became a 
cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. For over three decades of Suharto’s 
leadership, Indonesia’s role conception as a regional leader was enacted by taking 
greater responsibility in the institutional building of ASEAN, setting its code of 
conduct, consultation mechanisms and the regional scope for the member states 
through the first Bali Concord in 1976. The Bali Concord strengthened ASEAN’s 
political solidarity by ‘promoting harmonisation of views, coordinating positions and, 
where possible or desirable, taking common action’.230 The summit made Indonesia a 
key player in Southeast Asia. Through ASEAN, Indonesia seemed comfortable 
playing a more significant role at the regional level. It was after the Asian economic 
crisis in 1997, which led to the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, that 
Indonesia seemed to lose its regional leadership for a short of a period. 
The rise of Suharto showed a shift to a friendlier approach towards US global order 
and abandonment of Indonesia’s close relations with China. As shown by Suryadinata, 
the policy to cut diplomatic ties was driven by the regime’s view that the external 
threat to the security of the Southeast Asian region came from the hostility of China.231 
Suharto’s perception of China as a threat was due to the latent domestic threat of the 
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Indonesian communist party and the communist movement.232 This is evident from 
Suharto’s statement in his 1967 State Address: ‘China’s involvement in the 1965 coup 
and continued support for the Indonesian communists had resulted in an abnormal 
relationship between the two countries’.233 On another occasion in 1973, Suharto said 
that: ‘Indonesia will improve relations with China if China is showing a friendly 
attitude and “quit” providing assistance to former PKI leaders’.234 As argued by 
Sukma, under Suharto’s leadership, ‘instead of developing its political-security 
relations with China directly, Indonesia preferred to deal with China within a 
multilateral framework, through either ASEAN or the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF)’.235  
Despite being firmly aligned with the US, Suharto’s regime aimed to make Southeast 
Asia’s regional security free from external intervention, including the US. This is 
because, since its post-colonial existence, Indonesia has always viewed the presence 
of extra-regional powers as a destabilising factor in the region. This view is highly 
influenced by Indonesia’s experience in securing its independence, which in turn 
created strong nationalist sentiments as part of the country’s biographical narrative. 
Moreover, the internal turbulence in the first two decades, the 1950s to 1960s, was due 
to internal separatist movements backed by foreign countries such as the US while the 
Indonesian Communist Party grew with help from China. This experience made 
Suharto’s authoritarian regime perceive external powers as detrimental to Indonesia’s 
internal security.236 
Given Indonesia’s closer economic relations with the Western powers, during 
Suharto’s leadership, the role as a mediator had also emerged in the country’s foreign 
policy agenda. This role can be seen as auxiliary within Indonesia’s overarching role 
as a regional leader. The role was enacted with Indonesia’s active involvement in 
mediating conflicting parties in the region. This was a response to Indonesia’s growing 
relations with the US, as well as its need to maintain the role as a voice for developing 
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countries enacted by Sukarno. Indonesia’s role as a mediator in the region was evident 
from its willingness to supervise the peace process for Vietnam by hosting the 
International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) during the visit of 
President Nixon to Indonesia in July 1969. US policy in Southeast Asia endorsed 
Indonesia’s role as a mediating force, while at the same time, leading Vietnam to view 
Indonesia as a potential regional partner instead of a natural adversary.237 
Under Suharto’s leadership, Indonesia also enacted the role of an advocate of 
development to reflect its focus on domestic economic improvement. In order to 
restore Indonesia’s economy after the disaster caused by Sukarno’s failed economic 
policy, Suharto’s pro-development regime needed support from the Western countries, 
especially vast capital investment in the country. Sukarno’s strong anti-colonial and 
anti-Western rhetoric was slowly replaced by a friendlier foreign economic policy. As 
a result, the Suharto’s government received financial support from various Western 
countries and the support was used by the New Order government to develop 
Indonesia’s domestic economy.  
Furthermore, to tap the Western powers’ economic aid, the Inter-Governmental Group 
on Indonesia (IGGI) was established in 1967, as a multilateral cooperation entity that 
provided long-term financial assistance with low-interest rates for development 
projects. The IGGI members consisted of two groups; the first one being creditor 
countries such as The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Japan, 
the Netherlands, West Germany, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and 
Canada. The other included international and regional financial bodies, such as the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the European Economic Community (EEC). With backup from Western 
capital, since the 1980s, Indonesia succeeded in becoming a Southeast Asian country 
with high economic growth.238 In the last decade of Suharto’s leadership, many 
international economic observers referred to Indonesia as the next Asian tiger, due to 
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economic development which influenced Suharto’s foreign policy to be more 
assertive.239 
In the first two decades of Suharto’s leadership Indonesia still focused on its domestic 
economic development and security issues in the region. With the war in Indochina, 
Indonesia’s engagement in international order still needed to be framed as a 
continuation of its role as a voice for developing countries. Consequently, the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) occupied a special position in the foreign policy of 
Indonesia. From the beginning, Suharto saw NAM as being of great importance 
because Indonesia played a significant role in its establishment.240 Other than NAM, 
Indonesia was also an active member of the G77, a loose coalition of developing 
nations designed to promote its members’ collective economic interests and create 
enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations.241 
In contrast to Sukarno’s regime, Indonesia under Suharto tended to voice its 
international engagement by focusing the debate on the imbalances in economic 
development between the north and south, rather than the ideological conflict between 
the west and east. While the NAM, at its inception, was positioned as a movement to 
counter the conflict between the Western and Eastern Blocs, Indonesia tended to frame 
the NAM as a platform to engage more with economic issues.242 In the early 1970s, 
through G77 and NAM, developing countries challenged the economic pillars of 
international order by establishing the New International Economic Order (NIEO), 
which aimed to create a binding institutional framework, systematically restructuring 
north/south and core-periphery disparities, altering the post-1945 world economic 
order. At the beginning, Indonesia seemed more sympathetic to the objectives of the 
NIEO that focused on development.243 Although rhetorically sympathetic towards all 
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the goals of the NIEO, it seemed cautious with the overall objective, particularly on 
the nationalisation or expropriating foreign property on conditions favourable to 
developing countries. The head of Indonesia’s delegation to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) refused to push these objectives. 
Unlike other developing countries, such as India, that were highly supportive towards 
NIEO objective, Indonesia warned that the unrealistic expectations could be 
dangerous for developing countries. In fact, since the beginning, Indonesia refused to 
contribute to the proposed Special Fund, established under the Programme of Action 
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.244 Its approach to 
development emphasised the importance of a stable international capital market and 
the confidence of international lenders. Despite its overall rejection of the idea, 
Indonesia was supportive of the notion of debt relief, on a case by case basis, primarily 
to help the most impoverished countries. 
Although Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives focused on Southeast Asia, in the last 
decade of Suharto’s leadership, it moved towards playing a significant role at the 
global level. Indonesia had expressed interest in being a chairman of NAM since the 
late 1980s, which was finally realised in 1992 until 1995. During its chairmanship, 
Indonesia took the lead on international economic cooperation and enhancing the 
economic potential of NAM members by increasing South-South cooperation 
(SSC).245 NAM members agreed on the Jakarta Message that would redefine the aim 
of the organisation to move away from the Western and Eastern Bloc confrontation 
and towards bridging the North-South gap. This vision was enacted through enhancing 
South-South cooperation among NAM members to boost their economic potential. 
The discussion above shows how its role conception as a voice for developing 
countries has been deeply entrenched in Indonesia’s historical narrative since it was 
first enacted during the crucial nation-building process after its independence. The role 
has also become a reflection of Indonesia’s biographical narrative as a force of anti-
colonialism, which is part of the state’s foundation. 
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Indeed, since 1965, the US has increasingly become a significant other for Indonesia, 
which required the state to abandon its anti-Western agenda and its pursuit of 
leadership in developing countries. However, rhetorically the voice for developing 
countries persisted as Indonesia’s national role conception during Suharto’s 
leadership. This is because the role has become an essential aspect of Indonesian 
foreign policy further supporting the nation-building process. To maintain a sense of 
stable biographical narrative, policymakers under Suharto’s regime recast Indonesia’s 
role as an advocate of development. This auxiliary role is the continuation of 
Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries that prioritised Indonesia’s 
domestic economic development 
Furthermore, Suharto’s regime conceptualised and enacted the role of a regional leader 
as a response to the need for regional resilience, which in turn would provide internal 
regime security. This role conception was articulated through Indonesia’s leadership 
in making Southeast Asia a communist-free region, which was in line with the US 
interest in the region. At the same time, Indonesia also led the endeavour to solidify 
non-interference in Southeast Asia to keep external power interference out from the 
region. The role as a regional leader in Southeast Asia demonstrated Indonesia’s need 
for a stable regional environment to support its internal security objective, maintaining 
its fragile territorial integrity. Hence the role as a regional leader also provided 
Indonesia under Suharto with an arena to articulate its active foreign policy while at 
the same time serving its domestic security concern.  
Given the above discussion, this chapter argues that the two role conceptions, voice 
for developing countries and as a regional leader, could not be separated from 
Indonesia’s broader biographical narrative that maintains a sense of stable identity. 
Although Indonesia’s role conception as a regional leader under Suharto’s regime 
reduced the salience of its role as a voice for developing countries, Indonesia’s strong 
historical self-identification with the role during Sukarno’s regime meant it did not 
dissolve quickly. In fact, the role could be re-enacted again by the next regime, even 
though the motivation to enact such roles might be different.  
Besides its role as a voice for developing countries, its role as a regional leader was 
institutionalised for three decades under Suharto’s regime, which also defines 
Indonesia’s biographical narrative. Both have become historical roles for Indonesia, 
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which compels future policymakers to enact such roles to sustain Indonesia’s 
biographical narrative. In his first foreign policy speech, President Yudhoyono 
reiterated the importance of these two national role conceptions in his current foreign 
policy by stating: 
We will stay our course with ASEAN as the cornerstone of our foreign policy. 
And our heart is always with the developing world, to which we belong. These 
are the things that define who we are, and what we do in the community of 
nations.246 
Yudhoyono’s speech, thus, is more than just reiterating the importance of the two role 
conceptions as Indonesia’s strategic national myths but also his endeavour to 
strategically invoke these two role conceptions to justify his middle power foreign 
policy agenda. As I will further discuss in the next sections, these two national myths 
have been reproduced and reinterpreted by Yudhoyono to fit with his own foreign 
policy agenda. 
 
Indonesia’s role conception in the early post-authoritarian era (1998 – 2004) 
The year 1998 was a crucial time that became the cornerstone of Indonesia’s state 
identity in the international community. Suharto’s authoritarian regime, which had 
been in power for more than thirty-two years, collapsed after massive protests against 
the 1997 monetary crisis, which turned into a political crisis that reached its climax in 
May 1998. Indeed, as argued by Kivimaki, the hegemonic structure of Cold War 
international relations protected Indonesia's authoritarian elite from the pressure of 
democratisation.247 However, with the end of the era, Indonesia’s authoritarian 
practice was under the spotlight, especially its handling of several separatists’ 
movements in Aceh, Papua, and more importantly East Timor. Thus, in the last decade 
                                                          
246 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Speech by H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the 
Republic of Indonesia before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA)” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, May 20, 2005), 
https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/pidato/presiden/Pages/Speech-by-H.E.-Dr.-Susilo-Bambang-Yudhoyono-
President-of-the-Republic-of-Indonesia-before-the-Indone.aspx. 
247 Kivimäki, “U.S.—Indonesian Relations During the Economic Crisis.” 
91 
 
of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, Indonesia was pressured internationally to 
democratise.  
The collapse of the Suharto regime marked the start of a new era for democratic 
Indonesia, which is widely known as the reformasi era. However, at the beginning, 
from 1998 – 2004, Indonesia suffered from large-scale ethnic and religious conflict, 
which claimed around 10,000 lives.248 In the same period, Indonesia also experienced 
political turmoil characterised by several short-lived leadership.249 During this five-
year period Indonesia went through three national leadership changes. Coinciding with 
the rise of the War on Terror initiated by the US, Indonesia also became fertile ground 
for Islamic radicalism.250 Due to the weak response of the government, there were 
seventeen bombings associated with radicalism in the first five years of 
democratisation. The country’s slow economic recovery further exacerbated 
conditions, although the economy did finally return to the before crisis levels in 2004. 
It is not surprising that many observers predicted that after the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime Indonesia would experience balkanisation, which might generate 
intense ethnic nationalism leading to civil war.251 
Although Indonesia was still undergoing a fragile democratic consolidation from 1999 
– 2004, in October 2001 at the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents’ Club, Hassan 
Wirajuda, the country’s foreign minister from 2001 to 2009, who became the architect 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy during the reformasi era, asserted that:  
For a long time, the Indonesian public did not see human rights the same way 
that the international public did. This discrepancy in perception became a 
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constraint in the development of our foreign relations, we will do our best to 
remove that perception gap.252 
Wirajuda’s speech was an initial indicator that Indonesia would change its national 
role conception to line up with the expectation from the international community that 
it would be a new democratic country. Thus, his speech was not a statement of fact 
about current Indonesian foreign policy on democracy but rather reflected his desire 
to shift Indonesia’s foreign policy to be supportive to democracy.  A month later, in 
front of other delegations in the United Nations General Assembly, Wirajuda declared: 
‘Indonesia today stands proud as the third-largest democracy in the world’ and ‘we 
Indonesians have a natural affinity to democracy’.253 His claims showed the shift in 
Indonesian foreign policy elites’ interpretation of the country’s aspirational new 
identity. Since then, Indonesia has continued to use the identity as the world’s third-
largest democracy in many international fora and platforms. At the time, Wirajuda as 
Foreign Minister enacted Indonesia’s new role conception as an advocate of 
democracy. However, the change in identity it articulated to an international audience 
did not reflect the conditions at the domestic level, since at the same time, Indonesia 
was struggling with the impact of democratisation, which caused various ethnic 
conflicts and increasing support for separatism in various provinces. Thus, arguably, 
rather than reflecting the state’s embrace of the democratic norm, the proposed role 
conception was driven by Indonesian foreign policymakers’ willingness to fulfil the 
perception of the international community. 
Although the aspiration to reflect democratic identity into Indonesia’s role conception 
was established during Megawati Sukarnoputri’s presidency, due to the domestic 
problems Sukarnoputri had less ambition and fewer resources to enact such a role 
conception. In her state address on August 16, 2001, Megawati stressed that her 
government would implement a foreign policy that focused on ‘recovering the state’s 
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and nation’s dignity, returning the trust of foreign countries, including international 
donor institutions and investors to the government’.254 
Furthermore, during Megawati’s leadership, there was a growing domestic 
dissatisfaction with Western global economic institutions, which were seen as a cause 
for Indonesia’s economic crisis and socio-political problems. For instance, Indonesia’s 
domestic audience both within the elite circles and the grassroots groups, saw 
Indonesia’s dependence on the IMF as a political burden which needed to be stopped. 
While under Suharto’s regime, Indonesia was also dependent on foreign aid. However, 
in the post-authoritarian period, the dependence on Western powers, both individually 
and through multilateral institutions, were seen by many in the nationalist camp as an 
insult to Indonesia. As a result, efforts to get out of dependency on Western institutions 
became one of the primary targets of all administrations in the reformasi era. 
This emergence of anti-Western economic institutions was rooted in Indonesia’s 
increasing foreign debt, which was due to the constant bailing out from the IMF in 
efforts to recover Indonesia from the crisis. The presence of the IMF brought 
consequences in the form of conditions that Indonesian government had to fulfil. There 
was a widespread belief among Indonesian domestic actors that the IMF was a tool of 
Western powers, used to instil their interests in countries assisted.255 Thus, within this 
period, the role as voice of developing countries with anti-Western rhetoric, re-
emerged in Indonesia’s domestic political discourse, which later was recast by 
Indonesian policymakers under Yudhoyono to play a greater role at the global level. 
While Indonesia’s roles as a voice for developing countries and as a regional leader 
were conceived during Sukarno’s and Suharto’s regimes, the roles of advocate for 
democracy and bridge-builder were primarily driven by the changes in the domestic 
political environment in the post-authoritarian period. The process of democratisation 
also attracted growing expectations from the international community, particularly 
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from the Western countries, for Indonesia to be a role model for successful 
democratised states from developing countries. Hence, the process started soon after 
the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, provided an opportunity for 
Indonesia to craft new role conceptions that could be utilised to take a more active role 
at the global level. 
As shown above, although the idea of using a democratic identity existed since 2001, 
the national role conception to project democratic identity had not entirely gained 
momentum. There was a lack of real foreign policy action to put the identity into 
practice. Given her lack of foreign relations experience, as well as the domestic 
political situation at the time, President Megawati had yet to make a foreign policy 
agenda one of her top priorities, and she still preferred to focus on domestic issues. As 
a result, Indonesia did not set up a clear objective for its new national role 
conception.256 As a consequence, during her leadership, Indonesia had a low profile in 
terms of its foreign policy in the international system.257 
In addition to solving domestic problems like terrorism and rebellion in Aceh, there 
were efforts from Megawati’s government to take a leading role within ASEAN. The 
effort to revive ASEAN was inseparable from the role of Indonesia as a chairman in 
2003. To rejuvenate ASEAN after the Asian economic crisis, during the 9th Summit 
in Bali, October 12, 2003, all member countries signed the Bali Concord II, as a re-
statement of ASEAN’s objective for a more integrated Southeast Asia. During the 
summit, ASEAN members also agreed to create a community supported by three 
pillars: political and security cooperation through the establishment of ASEAN 
Political-Security Community (ASC), economic cooperation through the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) and socio-cultural cooperation through the ASEAN 
Socio-Culture Community (ASCC).  
Furthermore, during the Megawati Presidency, Indonesia seemed to have succeeded 
in playing its role in various vital issues within ASEAN, such as enlarging the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) towards other partner countries such as India, China, 
Japan, and Russia. Indonesia was also successful in establishing cooperation between 
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ASEAN and the European Union in fighting global terrorism within the UN 
framework. As argued by Kai He, Megawati’s attempt to play a more significant role 
in ASEAN was not solely driven by the need to restore Indonesia’s position in the 
region. It was mainly driven by the need to use foreign policy as well as the ASEAN 
institution to help her government solve domestic issues and provide political 
legitimacy.258 By leading the construction of security, economic, social and cultural 
communities in ASEAN, Megawati’s administration aimed to strengthen the internal 
consolidation and revival of ASEAN, countering external pressures regarding 
Indonesia’s political domestic conditions.  
Indeed, during six years of democratisation, Indonesia faced several challenges that 
stemmed from both problem of political legitimacy at the domestic level and pressures 
from the international community.259 However, with the election of Yudhoyono in 
2004, the first elected President in Indonesian history, policymakers started to create 
a more coherent national role conception that utilised assets it had from the 
democratisation process. The new role was conceptualised in order to fulfil the 
expectations of the international community. Hence, democratisation arguably 
changed Indonesia’s foreign policy direction after the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime. 
 
Indonesia’s role conceptions under Yudhoyono (2009 – 2014) 
In contrast to his predecessors in the early reformasi era, who focused heavily on 
domestic issues, the Yudhoyono administration made a strategic move by making 
democracy part of Indonesia’s state identity to project abroad.260 The consolidation of 
democracy was still at an early stage when Yudhoyono took the office from Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, and there were still many domestic issues that challenged 
democratisation. It was under his presidency that projecting a democratic identity to 
the international community became an official objective for Indonesia. The Mid-
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Term Development Plan 2004-2009 stated that the country’s main goal in the area of 
foreign policy was ‘strengthening and expanding the national identity as a democratic 
country in the international society’.261 In operationalising this target, Indonesia 
focused on ASEAN to project its democratic identity. 
Projecting a democratic identity moved to the next level during the second period of 
the Yudhoyono administration (2009- 2014). During his second term, the goal was 
further operationalised through Indonesia’s greater involvement in advancing 
democracy and human rights in multilateral fora and international organisations. The 
official Mid-Term Development Plan 2009-2014 established ‘the recovery of an 
important position—Indonesia as a democratic state that is characterised by the great 
success of diplomacy in the international forums’ as the main goal of the Indonesian 
foreign policy agenda.262 Moreover, it stated that one of the main targets of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy was to ‘promote a positive image of Indonesia through the advancement 
of democracy and human rights’.263 In other words, the focus of the second five-year 
term of the Yudhoyono administration showed the importance of international 
audience in shaping Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy both at the regional 
and global levels. 
Arguably, Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy and human rights can be 
linked to Indonesia’s auxiliary role as an advocate of economic liberalisation. This is 
because a neoliberal reform agenda, a part of Indonesia’s state transformation in the 
post-authoritarian period, led to the greater urge to internationalise Indonesia’s market. 
This reform created two opposite forces within Indonesia’s trade discourse concerning 
further regional economic integration projects, the liberalisers, mainly economic 
technocrats, that championed greater regional integration and openness, versus the 
nationalists’ camp ranging from politicians to small and medium enterprises to farmers 
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and labours’ unions that preferred a protectionist approach and were sceptical towards 
the notion of regional integration and economic openness.  
Although many domestic political actors framed the neoliberal reform as a Western 
attempt to paralyse the Indonesian economy, for many Indonesian economic 
technocrats, the neoliberal reform agenda aimed to break Suharto’s crony capitalists 
and interest groups that were holding the country back from being competitive in the 
global market.264 Many of Yudhoyono’s cabinet ministers were part of a technocratic 
group that pushed for more liberalising force within the Indonesian economy. For 
instance, many figures considered as pro-market and pro-openness filled posts for the 
Ministry of Finance as well as the Ministry of Trade. With many senior bureaucrats 
within the Ministry, Mari Elka Pangestu, Indonesian Minister of Trade (2004-2011) 
was seen as a liberalising force. Moreover, Gita Wirjawan (2011-2014) was seen as 
an internationalist, put in place by President Yudhoyono to implement his liberal and 
international agendas. While the former was an economic technocrat, the latter was an 
Indonesian banker whose previous role in Yudhoyono’s Cabinet was as Head of 
Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM). 
Indeed, the impetus for neoliberal reform was not limited to Indonesia. The post- Asian 
financial crisis economic policies led to a greater liberalisation of Southeast Asian 
economies to avoid another crisis, which partly stemmed from the collusive 
relationship between banks, governments, and business, sustaining networks of 
cronyism.265 Thus, the external economic environment pressured Indonesia to 
liberalise its economy following the collapse of Suharto’s regime. Despite being 
widely seen as a destructive force by many domestic actors, the structural power of 
foreign capital and the need to internationalise the domestic market significantly 
influenced post-authoritarian economic elites to opt for a greater regional integration 
project. Within Southeast Asia, this liberalisation project translated into efforts to 
establish a cohesive regional economic community that integrated ASEAN into a 
single market. As a result, the struggle between the liberalising camp that focused on 
the general welfare gains offered by greater international openness and the 
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protectionist camp, which focused on the notion of economic nationalism to protect 
their domestic interests, shaped the evolution of ASEAN’s regional economic 
integration.266 As I will argue in Chapter 6, these struggles eventually lead to growing 
domestic contestations especially in regard to Indonesia’s role as a regional leader in 
regional trade governance.  
The changes in Indonesia’s domestic political economy also led to increased 
expectations of Indonesia’s role at the global level. During Yudhoyono’s presidency, 
Indonesia’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the expectations of the 
international community. This can be explained by the need for Indonesia to restore 
its position at the international level after the economic and political crisis. When 
Yudhoyono took office, Indonesia was praised by the international community for its 
success in managing democratic consolidation and avoiding further social and political 
tension. Given that Indonesia is the most populous secular and moderate Muslim 
country in the world, its democratic consolidation was seen as a living model of how 
Islam could be compatible with democracy. Furthermore, the increased tension 
between the Islamic and Western world, characterised by the rise of Islamic radicalism 
and epitomised by the War on Terror, has created a role demand from the international 
community for Indonesia to bridge what is perceived to be a civilizational gap. 
Therefore, Indonesian foreign policymakers have utilised its unique secular 
democratic Muslim identity as an asset in the role as both an advocate for democracy 
and a bridge-builder.  
During Yudhoyono’s administration, Indonesia aspired to take a role as a promoter of 
human rights and democratic norms. Throughout his presidency, the aspiration to 
become a regional leader was central to many statements made by critical actors within 
the Indonesian foreign policy establishment. This role can be seen as a continuation 
of the one institutionalised by Suharto’s regime. Since 1998, Indonesia’s leadership 
position declined, due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as well as Indonesia’s internal 
struggle to unite the country after the collapse of the Suharto regime.267 Hence, the 
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main objective of Indonesian foreign policy in the post-authoritarian regime was to 
tackle one problem, the waning of Indonesia’s leadership role in Southeast Asia. 
Under Yudhoyono’s presidency, Indonesia did not aim to re-enact its role as a regional 
leader per se but did further use its leadership role in the region to pursue middle power 
status at the international level.  
Within Southeast Asia, due to its material capabilities, strategic position and identity 
change from an authoritarian state to a democratic one, Indonesia was regarded as a 
primus inter pares both by countries within the region and external actors.268 With this 
position, Indonesia was expected to play the role of an active regional leader by 
keeping ASEAN important and relevant in Southeast Asia. However, the notion of a 
regional leader was subtler when it came to Indonesia’s role. Although Indonesia is 
the most prominent country in Southeast Asia, it carefully crafted its leadership as 
more of a regional representative to the broader international community. Thus, rather 
than being a dominant player, Indonesia’s diplomatic strategy emphasised the need for 
consensus with every decision made in ASEAN. 
Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s regional leadership vision is more 
directed towards intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership, focusing on providing 
objectives as well as shaping procedure and institutional frames.269 In the case of 
ASEAN, Indonesia conducts its leadership role by actively reforming ASEAN, 
providing it with new objectives, goals, and norms.270 Indonesia maintains its 
consensus-based approach, in which it tries to accommodate the interests of all 
countries in Southeast Asia. By doing so, Indonesia minimises the challenges from 
other ASEAN countries to its leadership in the region.271 As will be further examined 
in Chapter 4, Indonesia’s intellectual leadership is manifested in its role in 
institutionalising the democratic and human rights norms within ASEAN. However, 
the endeavour is not without challenges both from other ASEAN members as well as 
domestic actors within Indonesia. 
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During Suharto’s authoritarian regime, Indonesia’s aspiration to become a regional 
leader was primarily driven by the need to provide internal security by creating 
regional resilience through regional cooperation. Under Yudhoyono, the role 
aspiration was primarily driven by the ambition to play a greater role as an emerging 
middle power. In fact, there was a paradigm shift in how Indonesia sees ASEAN. 
During Suharto’s regime, Indonesia tried to keep external powers out of ASEAN 
affairs. During Yudhoyono’s tenure, Indonesia tended to perceive ASEAN as a 
platform for it to exercise a mediator role in East Asia by taking an actively shaping 
the regional architecture as well as ensuring the centrality of ASEAN in responses to 
initiatives to include external powers within regional development. Rather than 
keeping external powers out of the ASEAN regional architecture, Indonesia pushed 
the idea of intensifying institutional engagement with external major powers through 
strategic cooperation, such as with the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 
Indonesia’s regional leadership role is primarily conducted by providing ASEAN with 
intellectual leadership. Indonesia’s role as a regional leader in ASEAN manifests in 
two main areas. Firstly, Indonesia acted as a norm setter in the region by strengthening 
ASEAN’s democratic architecture through building principles like the ASEAN 
Charter and ASEAN Human Rights Declaration as well as institutions like the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Secondly, through building the 
East Asia regional architecture with ASEAN at its centre, Indonesia acted as a 
manager of systemic change in the Asian Pacific with the rise of China as the new 
great power. 
The embodiment of Indonesia’s aspiring role as a manager is shown by the idea 
promulgated by Marty Natalegawa, Foreign Minister in the second term of 
Yudhoyono’s presidency, called dynamic equilibrium. Dynamic equilibrium is 
Natalegawa’s reading of Indonesia’s role in managing the growing rivalry between 
status quo great powers like the United States and rising powers like China. The idea 
of dynamic equilibrium is to manage the structural change in the international system 
with the rise of China and respond by adapting and engaging with the country rather 
than refusing to accommodate the change in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. 
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In the economic realm, the inclination of President Yudhoyono towards a neo-liberal 
agenda within Indonesia’s overarching role as an advocate of democracy has been 
infused in its role conceptions as a regional leader. This is seen by Indonesia enacting 
its role as a regional leader, voicing its standpoint on the need to reduce the 
protectionism hindering free trade, as well as further strengthening ASEAN through a 
greater economic integration among members. Hence, regional economic integration 
projects have been used as a platform for Yudhoyono’s administration to advance its 
foreign policy agenda. In many speeches that detailed his foreign trade policy, 
Yudhoyono reiterated Indonesia’s willingness to get rid of protectionism in order to 
increase liberalisation. In his speech before the opening ceremony of the APEC CEO 
Summit, Yudhoyono stated that: 
We all need to do our part to prevent protectionist policies and continue on our 
path of trade liberalisation, in ways that uplift the well-being of all our citizens. 
We must also ensure that our trade relations are not only strong but balanced.272 
However, Yudhoyono’s remarks above should not be seen as his government’s unified 
position on enhancing trade liberalisation. On the contrary, the statement does not even 
capture Yudhoyono’s trade policies that, at the time the speech was made, were 
becoming more protectionist. In fact, it shows the incoherence between his stance and 
his trade policies. Yudhoyono’s remarks show that the President himself was in favour 
of enhancing the role conception as a regional leader through advocating trade 
liberalisation in the region. In reality, the ministries responsible for trade-related issues 
resist in implementing such conception. Thus, his speech can be interpreted as, what I 
will discuss further in Chapter 6 and 7, evidence of fragmentation in Indonesia’s 
enactment of an auxiliary role as an advocate of liberalisation. 
In 2008, Rizal Sukma, one of Indonesia’s prominent strategic thinkers argued for the 
need to go beyond ASEAN as the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy.273 This 
critique has resonated within Indonesia’s foreign policy circles given that the 
country’s role at the global level is somehow restricted by its preoccupation with 
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ASEAN. To further enhance Indonesia’s role, in the second term of Yudhoyono’s 
presidency, Indonesia did not prioritise being a regional leader but further used its 
regional leadership role to pursue emerging middle power status at the global level. 
Indonesia has increased its leverage as an emerging middle power in several important 
forums. In the G20, for instance, Indonesia always acts as a representative of the 
ASEAN countries. In 2009, it proposed the establishment of the ASEAN G20 contact 
group to consolidate ASEAN member countries’ interests, which Indonesia then 
brought to the discussion in the G20 forum. 
Furthermore, under Indonesia’s chairmanship in 2011, ASEAN adopted the Bali 
Concord III, which transformed the organisation into an international actor. As argued 
by Natalegawa, the change in the direction of ASEAN to be a global actor is a 
reflection of Indonesia’s aspiration to be a regional power with global interests.274 
However, to do that, given its historical experience which forces Indonesia not to 
downgrade ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, Indonesia took ASEAN 
cooperation to a higher level through the Bali Concord III adopted in 2011. The Bali 
Concord III enhances ASEAN’s engagement as an international actor in the UN 
framework and substantiates its representation in the G20 as well as other international 
bodies and processes, including APEC, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO.275  
In the broader Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia is expected to maintain the balance of 
power, given the systemic changes caused by the rise of China and the decline of the 
US in the region.276 To do this, Indonesia pursues a strategy that involves embracing 
external actors within ASEAN-centred multilateral initiatives, such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting (ADMM), and the latest, the East Asia Summit (EAS).277 
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The literature on middle power behaviour tends to characterise them as more global-
minded.278 This might be true for traditional middle powers, which tend to have 
entrepreneurial capacity and technical skills to exercise their niche diplomacy at the 
global level.279 However, in the case of emerging middle powers like Indonesia, 
enacting a leadership role in the region is key to increasing their leverage at the global 
level. As argued by Nolte, ‘while traditional middle powers are first and foremost 
defined by their role in international politics, the new [emerging] middle powers are, 
first of all, regional powers and in addition to middle powers on a global scale’.280 
Thus, emerging middle powers tend to exercise their middlepowermanship through 
the role of a regional leader. In the case of Indonesia, this is a result of its historical 
experience. Its role as a regional leader has become Indonesia’s historical role, 
institutionalised during thirty-two years of Suharto’s authoritarian regime (1968-
1998). This historical role needs to be enacted by Indonesia even though it aims to 
play a more significant role at the global level. Thus, to avoid role conflict, Indonesia’s 
middle power status must be achieved through this role.  
Given its historical identification as a regional leader, Indonesian foreign 
policymakers can legitimise the aspiration to play a greater role at the global level 
through enhancing ASEAN as a regional organisation that actively tackles global 
issues. Overall, its success in strengthening ASEAN’s role in East Asia’s regional 
architecture, as well as its capability as a mediator in the context of great power rivalry, 
shows how Indonesia’s aspiration to be a global player can be achieved through the 
enactment of the role of regional leader.  
In a nutshell, we can see how the same role conceived during Suharto’s authoritarian 
regime has been recast by Yudhoyono’s administration to serve its aspiration to be an 
emerging middle power. Instead of departing from its role as a regional leader, 
Yudhoyono’s administration enacts the role conception in a way that does not follow 
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what it was conceived as at the beginning. Given that role conception as a regional 
leader has been a signature of Suharto’s regime for almost 32 years, it has become one 
of Indonesia’s historical role conceptions, along with the role as a voice for developing 
countries.  
As stated in Chapter 2, even though the historical roles might be revived and 
continued, the enactment of such will not necessarily have the same objective. In this 
case, Yudhoyono’s administration was able to mobilise a historical role to fit with its 
current foreign policy agenda. Its role as a regional leader was defined differently due 
to expectations both from ego and alter, particularly the need for Indonesia to enhance 
its democratic norm, neoliberal agenda, and manage China’s rise. The analysis of 
Yudhoyono’s enactment of the role of regional leader shows that the role conception 
has become Indonesian state’s biographical narrative and that there is a need to uphold 
it as Indonesia’s biographical narrative. 
Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia also strengthened its role as a voice for developing 
countries. The role as a voice for developing countries refers to Indonesia’s 
engagement in global level forums and activities emphasising solidarity among 
developing countries, support over the struggle for independence of nations, rejecting 
colonialism in all forms and enhancing national independence and cooperation. Within 
this context, Indonesia’s role in global governance focuses on efforts to solve global 
problems that are more in line with the conditions of developing countries through 
policies or products of global policies that are more in favour of the interests of 
developing countries and accommodate domestic conditions in developing countries. 
As previously argued, the role of a voice for developing countries has been entrenched 
as a crucial reflection of the historical experience of early state formation which 
became Indonesia’s biographical narrative. In many of his speeches, President 
Yudhoyono stated that Indonesia’s greater role in global governance was a part of its 
continuing effort to be the voice for developing countries. For instance, Indonesia co-
initiating the Asia-African Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77 were 
used to illustrate the prior enactment of its role conception.  
During the Yudhoyono’s presidency, Indonesia tried to revitalise its role in enhancing 
the South-South Cooperation (SSC) as a way to re-enact its role as a voice for 
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developing countries. In 2005, Indonesia hosted the second Asian-African Conference 
to commemorate the golden jubilee of the historic 1955 Asian-African Conference. 
Although mainly ceremonial, the commemorative conference adopted the joint 
declaration, the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership, which aimed to create closer 
cooperation between Asian and African countries. Through this initiative, Indonesia 
aims to increase its leadership role in fostering the SSC agenda. During this meeting, 
Indonesia officially re-enacted its role as a voice for developing countries. 
Moreover, as will be discussed later on in Chapter 7, under the Yudhoyono presidency, 
Indonesia also took a greater role as a voice for developing countries in the Doha 
Development Round in the WTO by maintaining its leadership role in G-33. The 
continuation of the enactment of the role as a voice for developing countries could be 
explained through the notion of biographical narrative, in which Indonesia foreign 
policymakers’ need to enact the historical role as to sustain Indonesia’s stable identity.  
In the second-half of Yudhoyono’s presidency, the development of South-South 
cooperation became important, with the inclusion of Indonesia to be a part of the G20. 
Membership in this G20 giving Indonesia a greater voice to represent developing 
countries with other emerging powers. Yudhoyono government included South-South 
cooperation agenda as one of the priorities in the medium-term national development 
plan of 2010-2014. Prioritising the SSC agenda in the medium-term national 
development plan demonstrates a new endeavour for policymakers to make the 
Indonesian foreign policy agenda reflect the role as a voice for developing countries. 
Under Yudhoyono presidency, the main discourse for Indonesia’s greater role in 
South-South cooperation can be attributed to Yudhoyono’s outlook that this area 
enhanced Indonesia’s position at the international level and could give a positive 
image of Indonesia in the eyes of international community.  
Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia also aspired to take a role as a bridge-builder. The role 
has become one of the overarching national role conceptions enacted by Yudhoyono’s 
presidency in pursuing middle power status. The role as a bridge-builder was identified 
during the Cold War era, in which it was defined by Holsti as ‘acting as a translator or 
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conveyor of messages and information between peoples and different cultures’.281 
Furthermore, the middle power literature has established that bridge-builder is one of 
the key roles in middle power diplomacy.282 At the end of the Cold War, the emergence 
of multi-polarity with the relative decline of the US, as well as the War on Terror 
which increased tension among Islam and the West, made the role of bridge-builder 
increasingly relevant for the emerging middle powers. Given this condition, Indonesia 
is not the only emerging middle power enacting the role. For instance, due to its 
geopolitical position, Turkey has enacted the role of bridge-builder between Islamic 
and western civilisations.283 Due to its economic growth, Brazil has also pursued the 
role by contextualising itself as a bridge between the north and the south.284 
Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder is translated into the 
Indonesian government position which continues to push for a mediation approach in 
bridging the sharp differences in positions between key countries, in various 
international forums from the WTO to the UN Security Council. In enacting its bridge-
builder role, Indonesia focuses on its moderate views on global issues. In his speech, 
Marty Natalegawa, a former Indonesian foreign minister, stated ‘in any international 
forum, including ASEAN and the G-20, Indonesia will bridge different visions of 
nation-states and show Indonesia’s moderate and strong views’.285 Just like Turkey, 
Indonesia’s role is mainly to build a bridge between the Western world and Islamic 
civilisation in light of the current tension between the two. In terms of its foreign 
policy agenda, the enactment of this role can be seen in Indonesia’s greater role in 
mediating conflict in the Muslim world. For instance, it hosted the Sunni-Shiite 
Conference in the city of Bogor to help foster dialogue and peace between the two 
factions of Islam in Iraq. Similarly, Indonesia is actively participating in the UN 
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peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. Since 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with 
some national Islamic organisations, have actively promoted Indonesia’s moderate 
Islamic identity by organising an interfaith dialogue with other western countries in 
both Indonesia and abroad. 
To establish itself as a country that can take on the role of bridge-builder in the 
international order, President Yudhoyono justified the enactment of the role by 
invoking the largest Muslim population, which makes Indonesia a natural bridge-
builder between Islam and the West. In his speech, President Yudhoyono said: 
[T]hroughout our history, the cultures of the three Oriental, Islamic and 
Western civilizations have found a home in Indonesia; we have been given a 
new role. We have come to be regarded as the natural bridge between the 
Western world on the one hand and the Islamic and Oriental worlds on the 
other.286 
The speech above shows Yudhoyono’s attempt to create a new strategic national myth 
for Indonesia to justify recent Indonesia’s bridging role in world politics. However, as 
suggested in the speech, Indonesia’s role as a natural bridge between the Western and 
the Islamic world is not necessarily motivated by Indonesia’s domestic aspiration. 
Rather, the enactment of the role is driven by alter expectations from the international 
community particularly from the Western countries. Yudhoyono ‘s administration 
only mobilised the feature of Indonesia being the largest Muslim country to justify the 
enactment of the role as a bridge-builder. 
Thus, although Indonesia became the country with the largest Muslim population in 
the world long before Yudhoyono became president, it was under his leadership that 
the notion became an attribute used by Indonesia in its foreign policy agenda. 
Indonesia has repositioned itself as a Muslim-majority country, while at the same time 
adhering to secular democratic principles at the core of western civilisation. By doing 
so, Indonesia can legitimise its role as bridge-builder by invoking this inherent quality, 
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which has never been utilised before, to capture change in the international order with 
the increasing tension between the Islamic and the Western world. 
In his first speech on foreign affairs, President Yudhoyono stated that:  
...We are a proud nation who cherish our independence and national unity; We 
are the fourth most populous nation in the world; We are home to the world’s 
largest Muslim population; We are the world’s third-largest democracy; We 
are a country where Islam, democracy, and modernity go hand-in-hand.287 
The quote from Yudhoyono’s speech above was typical of official speeches often 
given by high-ranking Indonesian officials in international fora. His speech is more of 
a statement of strategic objective rather than just a statement of fact.  The notions that 
Indonesia is the largest Muslim population, as well as the third largest democracy, 
have been strategically mobilised to justify Indonesia’s aspiration to fulfill the role as 
a bridge-builder.   
Furthermore, the enactment of a role as a bridge-builder also serves political 
objectives. Given the War on Terror waged by the US, there is increasing radicalism 
within Indonesia’s Muslim community that undermines secular and moderate Islamic 
values. Thus, there is a need for policymakers to deal with the contested value of 
moderate norms at domestic level. Enacting role as bridge-builder would lock in and 
preserve Indonesia’s moderate Muslim identity. As revealed in interviews with high-
ranking Indonesian foreign policymakers, enactment of a role as an advocate of 
democracy and bridge-builder by articulating democracy and moderate Muslim values 
empowers moderate Islamic groups to have a platform for their views and engage with 
Indonesia’s public diplomacy.288 
The idea of Indonesia as a bridge-builder became deeply entrenched during the 
Yudhoyono administration. The role as a bridge-builder, however, is not only enacted 
in relations to Indonesia as a part of the Muslim world. As the largest Muslim 
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democratic country and an emerging economy, there is a growing perception within 
the foreign policy establishment that Indonesia has a unique position. This allows 
Indonesia to bridge the interests of developed and developing countries, North and 
South, democracies and non-democracies, as well as Western and Muslim-majority 
countries. As a result, Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder was also extended to 
security, human rights, and economy. Through this role, President Yudhoyono sought 
to utilise the realities of Indonesian domestic change to revitalise its position at the 
regional and global levels.  
In his first foreign policy speech in May 2005, Yudhoyono reinterpreted Indonesia’s 
Cold War Doctrine, known as the Independent and Active Foreign Policy, into a 
foreign policy that emphasises Indonesia as a bridge-builder. Indonesia’s aspirational 
role can be seen in Yudhoyono’s foreign policy motto, ‘A million Friends, Zero 
Enemies’.289 During his ten years, Yudhoyono’s government continued to enact the 
role of a bridge-builder in all aspects of Indonesian foreign policy, at both the regional 
and global levels. Indonesia sought to represent the voice of developing countries to 
promote dialogue between the North and the South as well as between the West and 
the Muslim world.290 This can be seen in Indonesia’s active role as a bridge-builder in 
many international platforms such as UN Human Rights Council and the WTO which 
will be examined further in this thesis.  
Overall, this section shows that in the post-authoritarian period, two recently enacted 
role conceptions emerged, the role as an advocate of democracy and human rights 
norm and bridge-builder. In economic issues particularly trade, the role as an advocate 
of democracy was also translated into an auxiliary role as an advocate of trade 
liberalisation. Both the role as an advocate of democracy and bridge-builder is 
constructed in light of the reconfiguration of Indonesia’s state identity as democratic 
due to the change in domestic politics and the changes within international order 
characterised by a power transition. Although these two role conceptions are 
constructed in response to both the changing of ego and of alter expectations, unlike 
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the previous two historical roles, these two main roles, are more likely to be challenged 
by domestic audiences. This is because these two role conceptions are yet to be a part 
of Indonesia’s biographical narrative despite the policymakers’ efforts to frame them 
as such. Thus, this chapter contends that the stability of role conception may not be 
explained only by the temporal dimension but also due that it should be able to reflect 
state biographical narrative rather than merely to articulate ego or alter expectations 
that are captured by foreign policymakers. 
Given this discussion, we can conceptualise Indonesia’s overarching role conception 
through the table below.  
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This chapter reviewed at great length the construction of Indonesia’s historical roles 
throughout time. While ego and alter expectations indeed drive the construction of 
roles, this chapter showed that role conceptions are also closely related to the notion 
of biographical narrative within the literature on ontological security. The notion of 
biographical narrative provides insight on the need for foreign policymakers to always 
link role conceptions with state historical reference to provide a coherent self-identity. 
This chapter, thus, showed that the incorporation of the literature on ontological 
security, particularly the notion of biographical narrative, into role theory literature 
has provided an insightful understanding of the continuity and persistence of role 
conceptions despite the changes in ego and alter expectations. 
In the case of Indonesia, this chapter highlighted that four main role conceptions were 
simultaneously enacted under Yudhoyono’s presidency, namely the role as a voice for 
developing countries, regional leader, advocate of democracy, and bridge-builder. 
These four national role conceptions have been enacted to establish Indonesia’s status 
as an important global player. 
By tracing the construction of Indonesia’s roles, it is evident that the role as a voice 
for developing countries developed during Sukarno’s regime and the role as a regional 
leader developed under Suharto’s regime are entrenched as a part of Indonesia’s 
biographical narrative. The enactment of these two roles articulates Indonesia’s sense 
of stable identity. The roles as an advocate of democracy and a bridge-builder which 
stemmed from the current ego and alter expectations, arguably, are yet to be a part of 
Indonesia’s biographical narrative. However, this chapter showed that Yudhoyono’s 
administration aimed to frame Indonesia’s newly constructed role as a reflection of 
societal qualities and thus be able to legitimise the enactment of such roles in order to 
pursue middle power status at regional and global levels.  
After examining the construction and the continuity of role conceptions, the next four 
chapters examine how these role conceptions are strategically utilised as a way for 
Indonesia to play a greater role at regional and global levels. The next chapter 
discusses the dynamics of Indonesia’s role enactments at the regional level, 





































In the two decades since the economic crisis of 1998, Indonesia has experienced a 
drastic shift from an authoritarian regime towards a democratic state. In the 1990s, 
resisting international pressure for democratisation was one of the dominant features 
of Indonesian foreign policy. Then, Indonesia’s official standpoint towards democracy 
was sceptical as it stated that the value was incompatible with ‘Asian values’. Now, 
Indonesia emerges as a state that actively advocates the values and principles of 
democracy in Southeast Asia.291 Its role as an advocate of democracy can be seen in 
Indonesian foreign policy agenda at the regional level. Indonesia is the dominant 
driving force in establishing a political-security community in Southeast Asia. It has 
set the agenda for the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region. Since 
2008 Indonesia has initiated the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) as a platform to 
promote democracy through inter-governmental dialogue and partnership in the Asia-
Pacific. Furthermore, since 2010, Indonesia has been actively involved in democratic 
capacity building as well as democratisation in Myanmar. 
However, as argued in Chapter 3, in the post-authoritarian period, Indonesia has 
enacted roles other than an advocate of democracy namely voice for developing 
countries, regional leader, and bridge-builder. This chapter aims to analyse how the 
enactment of Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy has been hindered by the 
emergence of role conflict with other roles enacted by Yudhoyono’s administration. 
Furthermore, it aims to examine to what extent its role as an advocate of democracy 
at the regional level has been successful. 
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Many studies of Indonesia’s role in promoting democracy take for granted that 
democracy has indeed become part of Indonesia’s new state identity.292 Thus, they 
widely assume that Indonesia’s democracy promotion agenda is a function of 
Indonesia’s democratic identity. This chapter challenges this conviction by 
demonstrating that a constructivist-based explanation is rather incomplete in 
understanding Indonesia’s policy in promoting democracy. While we can argue that 
democracy has become Indonesia’s state identity, it does not necessarily drive 
Indonesia’s democracy promotion agenda. This chapter argues that Indonesia’s 
aspiring role as an advocate of democracy is not solely a manifestation of a firm and 
coherent democratic political culture, which is more likely to be a permanent feature 
of states. Thus, rather than seeing it as firmly established state identity, instead, 
Indonesia’s greater engagement in promoting democratic norms should be seen as a 
part of the enactment of role conception articulated by foreign policy elites in their 
aspiration to be emerging middle power. Moreover, its role as a democracy promoter 
has enabled Indonesia to enhance its other roles conceptions such as a regional leader 
as well as a bridge-builder in ASEAN. However, this chapter further argues that the 
inter-role conflicts arising from Indonesia’s enactment of multiple roles has hindered 
its role as an advocate of democracy. 
To substantiate this argument, this chapter analyses Indonesia’s role as an advocate of 
democracy at the regional level in three case studies which will be discussed in 
separate sections. First is Indonesia’s role in mainstreaming human rights norms in 
ASEAN’s principles and mechanisms. Second is Indonesia’s democracy promotion 
through the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). The last one is Indonesia’s democratic and 
human rights capacity building in Myanmar. The three case studies presented can also 
shed light on how Indonesia employs different strategies for different audiences as an 
aspiring democracy promoter. The first case shows Indonesia’s effort to promote 
democratic norm in ASEAN core values. The second case elucidates Indonesia’s effort 
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to promote democracy through providing a platform for democratic socialisation 
among democratising and aspiring countries. The last case demonstrates Indonesia’s 
attempt to promote democracy and human rights by gaining trust from Myanmar’s 
military junta. This chapter concludes with an assessment of the extent to which 
Indonesia has been successful in projecting its role as a democracy promoter in the 
region despite the constraints imposed by the emergence of role conflict. 
 
Mainstreaming democratic norms in ASEAN 
In 2003, Indonesia for the first time held the ASEAN chairmanship as a newly 
democratised country. During its chairmanship, Indonesia aimed to exercise its role as 
a regional leader in reviving ASEAN as a regional institution. At the time, ASEAN 
was perceived to have lost its relevance due to its inability to make Southeast Asian 
countries cooperate with each other to solve the 1997 Asian financial crisis that hit the 
region. In June 2003, during an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, under Wirajuda’s 
leadership, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a bold proposal for 
the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), later renamed the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). This proposal was expected to give a 
new direction for ASEAN to maintain its relevance in the 21st century.293 
Many would argue that Indonesia’s choice to play the role of democracy promoter 
through pushing the agenda of democracy and human rights in ASEAN stems from 
Indonesia’s changing democratic environment at home.294 However, there is hardly 
any evidence that Indonesia’s aspiration to project its democratic identity in ASEAN, 
which started in 2003, was the result of civil society pressure or other domestic 
political actors. At the time, projecting a democratic identity was not a top priority in 
Indonesia, which was still undergoing democratic consolidation and had many 
domestic political problems that needed to be addressed. Indeed, the Centre for 
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Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an Indonesian think tank, had advocated 
Indonesia’s greater role in putting the agenda of democracy at the heart of ASEAN. In 
fact, it was a policy paper written by Rizal Sukma, the then Executive Director of CSIS 
that was adopted by Indonesian foreign policy elites to be used as a background for 
Indonesia to establish the ASC.295 However, the think tank is widely known to have 
close relations with the Indonesian government compared with other think-tanks 
operating in foreign policy circles in Indonesia. Thus, CSIS arguably could be seen as 
the intellectual source behind Indonesia’s strategy to pursue a more democratic 
ASEAN rather than a non-governmental pressure group.  
Indeed, the impetus to promote democracy motivated by foreign policymakers’ pursuit 
to restore Indonesia’s role as a regional leader in Southeast Asia might not be directly 
attributed to the greater civil society involvement in foreign policy-making. However, 
the role of civil society is by no means unimportant in the project to create a more 
democratic ASEAN. As a result of the Asian financial crisis, regional NGO networks 
began to discover the relevance of regional governance.296 This change of attention – 
before the focus was mainly directed at the global level – also had repercussions on 
Indonesian NGOs. After all, Indonesian NGOs also participated in the ASEAN 
People’s Forum (APA), convened in 2000 by ASEAN-ISIS think tanks on the 
Indonesian island of Batam.297 Thus, it can be interpreted that civil society has 
positively received foreign policymakers’ choice to enact the role as an advocate of 
democracy through putting the agenda of democracy at the heart of ASEAN without 
any substantial contestation at the beginning of its enactment.  
Indonesia, which devised almost major components of the APSC, aimed to transform 
the ASEAN approach to solving problems, which is highly informal, into a more 
formal mechanism.298 In doing so, Indonesia introduced an institutional change that 
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would transform ASEAN into a rules-based organisation that adheres to a specific set 
of values. Indonesia unilaterally defined the specific set of values as the values of 
democracy and human rights. In 2006, Hassan Wirajuda reemphasised that:  
We know that [ASEAN is] a group of ten diverse countries, some democratic, 
some half democratic and some military juntas, but we must envision an 
ASEAN that is democratic and respects human rights.299  
Although finally endorsed during the ASEAN Summit in October 2003, the proposal 
to create the APSC stirred much opposition from other ASEAN countries.300 The 
reason for this was the agenda of democratisation and the promotion of human rights 
as the core of the proposal brought to the table by Indonesia. 301 The consequence of 
Indonesia’s proposal to create a more rules-based organisation for ASEAN was the 
need for the Association to have a charter as an essential instrument that established 
new ASEAN goals and objectives as well as the institutional framework for achieving 
them. At the 11th ASEAN Summit in 2005, for the first time, proposals on the ASEAN 
Charter, which would transform ASEAN from a loose regional association into a rules-
based organisation, were announced.302 The emergence of this idea cannot be 
separated from Indonesian diplomatic efforts to exercise its role as a regional leader 
by giving ASEAN a new legal entity as well as new dynamism to cope with new 
challenges in the 21st century. 
The formulation of the ASEAN Charter was a battleground for Indonesia in its efforts 
to include democracy and human rights in ASEAN’s professed values. During the 
formulation of the Charter, Indonesia played a very active role in pushing for the 
incorporation of the principles of democracy and respect for human rights in the 
Charter’s preamble. Indonesia maintained its insistence on making democratic values, 
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respect for human rights, and freedom fundamental principles of ASEAN.303 The 
principles were incorporated into the recommendation made by the Eminent Person 
Group (EPG), which initially drafted the Charter. A High-Level Task Force – a group 
of ASEAN state representatives – finalised the EPG’s recommendation and the final 
draft of the ASEAN Charter was produced.304 
Moreover, during the formulation of the ASEAN Charter, Indonesia, represented by 
Dian Triansjah Djani, the then Director-General of ASEAN cooperation, tried to push 
other ASEAN countries to accept the importance of ASEAN with regard to having a 
regional mechanism for the protection of human rights. The push for the creation of a 
formal regional mechanism shows Indonesia willingness to enhance ASEAN as an 
institution that has the capacity to ensure the compliance of member states with the 
principles and agreements made by ASEAN.305 
However, Indonesia failed to convince other ASEAN members, especially the new 
ones - Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam - to agree to create a more concrete 
mechanism for ASEAN to be able to uphold the principles. The new member countries 
of ASEAN rejected the idea to establish a robust ASEAN Human Rights Body 
promoted by Indonesia.306 They viewed Indonesia’s initiative to make human rights a 
core value of ASEAN with suspicion, believing that Indonesia would bully other non-
democratic ASEAN countries to follow the same values that it promoted.307 Despite 
its failure, at least, Indonesia managed to incorporate Article 14 of the Charter, which 
requires the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) as a regional human rights mechanism in Southeast Asia.  
Indeed its name clearly shows that the Commission is mainly representing states rather 
than being an independent commission to monitor states’ action in protecting human 
rights. However, from its inception, Indonesia voiced that ASEAN Intergovernmental 
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Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) would not only be an advisory forum, which 
is only talking about the promotion of human rights, but also an institution that has the 
ability to protect human rights in ASEAN.308 Nevertheless, despite its effort to instil a 
more powerful institutional framework, Indonesia has accepted that the idea to create 
robust mechanisms and institutions to promote and protect human rights cannot be 
fully realised within ASEAN governance. 
In the discussion of its term of reference, ASEAN members finally agreed that AICHR 
would have no mandate to open complaint mechanisms, investigation, and respond to 
cases of human rights violations. In addition, due to its form as an inter-government 
body, many ASEAN countries were proposing their former high-ranking officials as 
a commissioner. This has made AICHR into an institution that is subordinate to 
states.309 The absence of the secretariat of the commission and the lack of support have 
become a further hindrance for AICHR.310 Given the lack of institutional mandate, the 
AICHR has yet to have a precise formulation regarding the mechanisms to protect 
human rights, and its activity was limited to promoting human rights rather than 
protecting them. It is not surprising, after nearly five years of AICHR’s inception, the 
Commission is reaping much criticism especially its inability to protect human rights 
in Southeast Asia.311 
As shown above, through its role in mainstreaming democratic values in the region, 
Indonesia was able to gain a role as a regional leader in Southeast Asia by transforming 
ASEAN to embrace democratic values. However, it was also due to its effort to play 
a role as a leader in maintaining ASEAN’s cohesiveness that Indonesia became less 
well-positioned in promoting democracy and human rights in the region.312 
Indonesia’s democratic projection in ASEAN’s mechanism has been hindered by its 
aspiration to become a regional leader. As a region builder that emphasises a 
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consensus building approach, Indonesia could not deny the position of new member 
countries of ASEAN, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam (CMLV). Those 
countries were still reluctant to embrace the new values introduced by Indonesia even 
though several founding members agreed to embrace values that fit with the twenty-
first-century reality. These countries did not readily accept Indonesia’s efforts to foster 
new values for ASEAN by introducing democratic norms and values. As a result, 
Indonesia had to be satisfied with a condition where these values, on paper, are part of 
the ASEAN principles and goals but there is no formal mechanism to ensure that 
ASEAN member states follow these values. 
Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia continues to emphasise the importance of the role 
of advocating a particular norm, in this case, democracy. This stems from the 
conviction that through the role of an advocate of democratic norms, Indonesia can 
also show its role as a regional leader that puts forward intellectual and normative 
power rather than material strength. However, as suggested by the analysis above, 
while the role has not attracted significant domestic contestation, it attracted 
significant negative expectation from the regional audience. The hindrance for 
Indonesia to enact its role as an advocate of democracy in ASEAN is the negative 
expectations from the CLMV countries particularly Myanmar. During the discussion 
to institutionalise ASEAN through the ASEAN Charter, Myanmar posed a challenge 
towards the plan since Indonesia proposed to solve the crisis by engaging Myanmar 
with ‘ASEAN enhanced interaction’ approach in light of the junta’s ban on the major 
opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and the arrest of its 
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. The approach was proposed to enable ASEAN to provide 
a dispute resolution instrument regarding the internal crisis in Myanmar. For 
Myanmar, this move was seen as a way for ASEAN to intervene in Myanmar domestic 
issues. Cambodia and Laos were supportive towards Myanmar’s stance showing the 
fundamental philosophical divisions within ASEAN concerning democracy and 
human rights.313 These countries are increasingly assuming that the democratisation 
agenda in the region undertaken by Indonesia can threaten the position of their regimes 
that still faced domestic problems, especially about human rights enforcement. Despite 
being the regional agency that pushes a greater acceptance of human rights norm in 
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Southeast Asia, the expectation to be a regional leader that could maintain the 
cohesiveness which is needed to strengthen ASEAN unity required Indonesia not to 
be seen as an aggressive promoter of the norm. Not to mention the well-established 
non-interference norm which has been long internalised within ASEAN relations 
among its member also reduces Indonesia’s effort to advocate democratic and rights 
norms and mechanisms in ASEAN. 
Indeed, there is relatively insignificant domestic contestation towards the enactment 
of Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy and human rights norms at the 
regional level. However, the state transformation process undergone in Indonesia 
could not be ignored in affecting the enactment of such roles. The state transformation 
process with a more significant voice for other domestic actors over foreign policy has 
provided diverging expectations from the domestic realm. In the case of Indonesia’s 
role conception as an advocate of democracy, a few inter-agential conflicts occurred 
due to the state transformation process. This is because the issue of democracy and 
human rights was dominated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that commands all the 
policy planning as well as policy-making. However, although there is a lack of inter-
agential conflict, democratisation has made the foreign policy-making process more 
pluralistic and democratic as confirmed by many studies on Indonesian foreign 
policy.314 Domestic actors such as parliamentarians and civil society organisations 
could influence and change the direction of Indonesian foreign policy through their 
public and political pressure or conduct their own second track diplomacy that 
advances their agenda that may not be in line with the foreign policy conducted by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.315  
In the case of Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy in ASEAN, more active 
parliamentarians in foreign policy arena have become significant actors in raising the 
ego expectations towards role conceptions enacted by Indonesian foreign 
policymakers. Although Indonesia’s role enactment as an advocate of democracy has 
met with little domestic contestation, pressure from domestic actors was primarily 
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focused on Indonesia’s position in advocating a more robust institutional mechanism 
for promoting and protecting human rights. Indonesia’s preferences to reduce the 
enactment of an advocate of democracy in light of its other expectations to be a 
regional leader that focuses on maintaining ASEAN cohesiveness has been criticised 
by Indonesian domestic actors particularly parliamentarians which pressure Indonesia 
to be more active in advancing its role as an advocate of democracy in the region. 
This can be seen in the House of Representatives (DPR) refusal to ratify the ASEAN 
Charter. The DPR refusal to ratify the ASEAN Charter was based on two grounds 
namely procedural and substantial flaws. Procedurally, given the ASEAN Charter was 
concerned with the public interest, the Indonesian government was deemed not to have 
consulted with the DPR’s foreign committee as a legitimate representative of the 
public interest. This was reflected in the lack of public consultations and hearings with 
the people and the civil society for the draft charter. Thus, the House of 
Representatives considered the ASEAN Charter to have abandoned civil society and 
contradicted the spirit of the ASEAN Charter which has been forged by the 
government, which is oriented to the interests of the people. 
Substantially, the ASEAN Charter is considered to show no significant progress for 
the ASEAN community precisely because ASEAN’s relationship with the people is 
not clearly defined in the Charter. ASEAN has become too detached from the broader 
public debate. Thus, ASEAN is only relevant for the elites in the government, 
particularly the foreign policy establishment. Moreover, the ASEAN Charter makes 
ASEAN an overly conservative organisation in terms of the decision-making process 
because all decisions must be made through a consensus of all members. Lastly, the 
roadmap for the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Board is not explicitly 
regulated, only vague, and not assertive given that the Article 14 of the Charter is not 
imperative and binding. These conditions would make the ASEAN Charter seen as a 
paper tiger against human rights violations by ASEAN member states. Despite the 
contestation, the parliament finally ratified the ASEAN Charter which made Indonesia 
the last ASEAN member country to ratify the ASEAN Charter. This was done after 
the government committed to continue its initiatives to continue making ASEAN a 
regional institution that promotes democracy and human rights in the region.  
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As shown above, Indonesia’s democracy promotion by institutionalising democratic 
and human rights norms within ASEAN framework was framed as an instrument for 
Indonesia to enact its role as a regional leader. In exercising its leadership role in the 
region, Indonesia’s choice to play the role of democracy promoter by pushing the 
agenda of democracy and human rights in ASEAN could be seen as an appropriate 
strategy given that the role taken would not attract contestation from the domestic 
audience. This was the reason why Indonesia hesitated to take an active role in the 
efforts to revitalise ASEAN through regional economic integration. In fact, the 
revitalisation of ASEAN through the ASEAN Economic Community was initiated and 
supported by other ASEAN members such as Singapore. Such an active role would 
not have been supported by Indonesia’s domestic audience and would most likely have 
created a significant domestic contestation as will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
Given its vast domestic market and the low competitiveness of Indonesia’s domestic 
economic actors, many feared that Indonesia would only be the market for products 
from other ASEAN countries. It is no wonder that many Indonesian domestic 
stakeholders are sceptical about the benefit of implementing the ASEAN Economic 
Community for the Indonesian economy.316 Under Yudhoyono administration, 
although rhetorically it supported market integration within ASEAN, Indonesia has 
significantly increased non-tariff measures (NTMs) to limit imports to protect its 
domestic industry, especially after the global financial crisis.317 Some high-ranking 
Indonesian officials even talk about pushing back against the implementation of the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) reforms.318 By contrast, taking a leadership 
role in making ASEAN embrace democratic values would not have triggered a 
negative response from Indonesia’s domestic audience due to the absence of 
significant actors that actively reject the role enactment. Having no domestic 
contestation in doing so, Indonesia’s foreign policy elites could efficiently mobilise 
all available resources to push this idea in an attempt to restore the leadership role of 
Indonesia in the region. This thesis will further discuss and examine the issue of 
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domestic contestation of Indonesia’s role in regional economic governance in Chapter 
6. 
Our analysis above is in line with Emmers’ finding which shows that Indonesia’s 
leadership has been limited to the political and security realms while other countries 
such as Singapore have taken a more active role in other realms such as the 
economy.319 While Indonesia’s incomplete and sectoral leadership might stem from 
its unwillingness to provide public goods in realms other than politics and security, 
this explanation is rather partial. The effort to reduce domestic contestation also drives 
Indonesia’s tendency to play an intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership role in 
political and security issues. Its attempt to exercise leadership by promoting 
democratic values in ASEAN, however, cannot be considered entirely successful. This 
is because, despite being stated as a normative value of ASEAN, the norm has had 
little impact on the domestic governance of ASEAN members. Recent events in 
Thailand where the military again took control of the government in 2014 might 
suggest that democracy is a receding force in the region. 
Another interesting point within Indonesia’s efforts in enacting the role as an advocate 
of democracy in the region is the strategic importance of the role to enhance both 
Yudhoyono’s domestic and foreign policy objectives to pursue international status as 
an emerging middle power. Although Indonesia was still struggling to consolidate its 
democracy and internalise democratic norms, Indonesian foreign policy elites had 
already envisioned the value of democracy and human rights in the Southeast Asia 
regional order.320 This shows that the role as an advocate of democracy is rather a new 
role devised to accommodate international expectations, mainly from the Western 
powers on Indonesia’s transformation to a democratic state.  
Indonesia’s significant efforts to enact the role as an advocate of democracy in the 
region despite the volatile democratic transition at home can be attributed to two main 
factors. First, for a domestic audience, Indonesian policymakers during Yudhoyono’s 
administration aimed to further lock in Indonesian democratic transition through the 
enactment of such roles. By building a foreign policy that adheres to a democratic 
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agenda, it is less likely for the next government to return to an authoritarian tendency. 
Hence, Yudhoyono’s tenure could be seen as the period which stabilised Indonesia’s 
democratic transition. Second, for an international audience, given that, in the 
beginning, the democratic norm was not fully embraced within Indonesian domestic 
political discourse, Indonesian policymakers, especially within Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, aim to localise the alter expectation within foreign policy arena. By doing so, 
although the Indonesian democratic transition may not have led to the advancement of 
democratic norms within a domestic context, the Yudhoyono administration could 
frame the foreign policy agenda that promoted democracy as a proof of the success of 
Indonesia’s democratic transition to the international audience. This could enhance 
Indonesia’s relations with Western powers such as the United States and provide assets 
for Indonesia to play a more significant role at the global level as an emerging middle 
power. 
 
Sharing democracy through the Bali Democracy Forum  
Besides its efforts to instil democratic and human rights norms in ASEAN’s 
mechanisms and objectives albeit with many constraints, Indonesia also demonstrated 
its aspiration to become a leader in the promotion of democracy in the Asia-Pacific by 
initiating the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) in 2008. The BDF is the first 
intergovernmental forum in the Asia-Pacific that focuses on regional cooperation in 
the field of democracy and political development. The BDF is not only a platform to 
promote democratic norm but also emerges as an important platform for the promotion 
of human rights. The forum is a response to the absence of a regional mechanism to 
promote democracy in the Asia-Pacific region.321 Compared with other regions such 
as Latin America and Africa, surprisingly, Asia still lags behind in its efforts to 
promote political development and democracy through regional partnership.  
As stated by Yudhoyono, cooperation and integration of the region at various levels – 
especially in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific – are more focused on economic aspects, 
                                                          




namely the efforts to overcome the development gap.322 However, in reality, there is 
an urgent need to overcome the ‘political development gap’. While Asia is also home 
to another democratic emerging power, India, it tries to avoid framing its foreign 
policy in terms of supporting democracy due to geopolitical considerations.323 
Indonesian foreign policy elites have observed that Indonesia’s initiative for regional 
partnership can fill this gap. 
Indeed, Indonesia was not the only country that had such an initiative for the Asia-
Pacific region. In mid-2007, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Summit, then US President, George W. Bush proposed a new regional partnership in 
the Asia-Pacific to foster cooperation in enhancing the agenda of democracy.324 The 
idea of regional democracy partnership was to counter the growing impact of the 
Beijing Consensus as an alternative model of political and economic development, 
promoted by China.325 This new regional democracy partnership crystallised in the 
form of the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership (APDP), which was fully backed by 
the United States.  
From the beginning, Indonesia was invited to join the US-led regional democracy 
partnership in the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia was one of twelve initial members of the 
APDP and even attended the first APDP Senior Official Meeting in October 2008 in 
Seoul, South Korea. Although normatively Indonesia supported the US initiative, it 
appears that it did not respond enthusiastically to the formation of the APDP.326 
Indonesia’s lack of enthusiasm might have been due to the substantial US involvement 
in initiating the forum and setting up the agenda of the new regional partnership. For 
Indonesian policymakers, the agenda was seen as being too Western in its bias; 
treating democracy narrowly as an electoral and procedural democracy. Furthermore, 
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Indonesia’s reluctance to play an active role in the APDP was also caused by the 
exclusivity of the grouping, reflected in the fact that the majority of its members were 
US allies in the region.327 Indonesia feared that this exclusive grouping would merely 
become an instrument to isolate China from the architecture of regional cooperation. 
In this case, we see a clear manifestation of Indonesia’s national role conception as a 
bridge-builder which drives its foreign policy to include China and the US in various 
initiatives for regional mechanisms. Given the waning of America’s image during the 
Bush administration, Indonesia’s initiative gained a more positive response from 
countries in the Asia-Pacific. 
Indonesia’s initiative in creating the regional mechanism for promoting democracy 
through the BDF shows its willingness to scale up its efforts to promote democracy 
from Southeast Asia to a broader Asia-Pacific.328 Given the limitations it faced in the 
promotion of democratic values in ASEAN as well as its rising status in the 
international arena, Indonesia has enabled the BDF to play a more prominent role 
outside of the confines of ASEAN. Although intended as cooperation among countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region, BDF meetings are attended by countries not only from the 
Asia-Pacific but also from the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America. 
The Western powers have strongly supported Indonesia’s initiative to launch the Bali 
Democracy Forum. The United States, through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
supported Indonesia’s leadership in supporting democratic values through organising 
the forum. Australia even provided material support to this Indonesian initiative. 
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd once mentioned in the Bali Democracy Forum 
that Australia is ‘proud to support Indonesia in this important regional initiative’. 
Prime Minister Rudd in his post as co-chair in 2008, also stated that Australia should 
be dealing with the extent of democracy in this expanded region, and that building and 
consolidating democracy is also ‘a strategic agenda’ for Australia.329 
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Unlike the ASEAN Political-Security Community, President Yudhoyono and Foreign 
Minister Wirajuda did not envision the BDF as a formal and highly institutionalised 
mechanism for democracy partnership in the Asia-Pacific. Instead, it was designed to 
be a very loose mechanism in which countries in the Asia-Pacific could share their 
experiences and thoughts about democracy comfortably without having to follow a 
specific unilateral standard of democracy.330 The reason for making the BDF a loose 
mechanism was due to Indonesia’s circumspection not to be perceived as a country 
that pushes the agenda for a specific democratic model. 
In practice, the BDF is a place for member countries to share experiences and best 
practices in efforts to find the best way to strengthen the democratisation process in 
each country. The BDF stresses the importance of equal, constructive dialogue, mutual 
respect and understanding to enhance cooperation and promote democracy in the 
region.331 In the inaugural Bali Democracy Forum in 2008, which had the theme 
‘Building and Consolidating Democracy: A Strategic Agenda for Asia’, President 
Yudhoyono stated that the idea of the BDF was not to impose a particular model of 
democracy, nor to discuss a standard definition of democracy. The idea behind the 
forum was to share experiences, thoughts and ideas to improve the cooperation of 
democracy, no matter what political system developed. The President also stressed 
that there is no perfect democracy; democracy is never ending and still growing.332  
Thus, from the beginning, Indonesia did not articulate its approach and definition of 
the ideal democracy that it supposes to promote through the BDF. Rather, Indonesia 
conceptualised it as an inclusive forum for countries that have become democratic as 
well as countries having an aspiration to become democratic to share their best 
practices in promoting democracy within their national political systems. While 
designing the BDF, Indonesian foreign policymakers did not see democracy 
promotion as the imposition of Indonesia’s state interests and historical experiences 
on others.333 On the contrary, democracy promotion is understood as an opportunity 
                                                          
330 Author’s personal interview with former senior Indonesian diplomat, 11 August 2015. 
331 Pribadi Sutiono et al., eds., “Speeches and Proceedings Bali Democracy Forum: Building and 
Consolidating Democracy : A Strategic Agenda for Asia : Bali, Indonesia, 10-11 December 2008” 
(Departmen of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia : Institute for Peace and Democracy, 2008). 
332 Sutiono et al. 
333 Halans, Michaël and Danitsja Nassy, “Expert Seminar Report: The Bali Democracy Forum and 




to provide a condition for democratic learning and socialisation among countries that 
have an aspiration to be democratic or that are undergoing the process of 
democratisation.  
The inclusivity of the BDF, which also embraces authoritarian regimes, is one of the 
characteristics that distinguish it from the democracy promotion initiatives set up by 
Western countries. It is no wonder, given its inclusivity, that the BDF has been 
criticised for inviting non-democratic countries. As argued by Carothers and Youngs, 
the BDF is seen by many critics as a forum that gives ‘autocrats a platform to extol 
the virtues of their political models without facing any serious pressure to meet 
universal democratic standards’.334 
While many critics see the inclusivity of the BDF as its weakness, Indonesian officials 
see it as one of the strengths of the BDF. As stated by President Yudhoyono, the BDF 
is not a forum for debating ‘a commonly agreed definition’ but one that aims to outline 
a ‘set of issues relevant to democratic development’.335 Through the inclusivity of 
BDF, Indonesia can play a greater role in bridging the differences in perceiving 
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East Asia and the 
Pacific  
17 16 20 16 13 20 
Middle East 7 6 12 14 11 14 
South and Central 
Asia  
8 13 12 8 14 11 
Central and 
Eastern Europe  
 1 5 12 18 12 
Western Europe  10 14 14 13 15 
South America 
and the Caribbean  
  2 4 3 4 
Africa   2 6 3 8 
North and Central 
America  
 2 2 3 2 3 
International 
Organization 
  2 4 7 8 
Total 32 48 71 81 84 95 
Source: Institute for Peace and Democracy, http://www.ipd.or.id/bdf  
 
Table 4.2 Number of high-ranking officials attending BDF  












Head of States  4 5 5 9 15 3 
Ministerial Level 
Official and Head of IO 
13 25 25 14 24 22 




The above tables show an increase in the number of participants in the BDF and an 
increase in the number of high-ranking officials and heads of state who were present 
at the BDF. For the Indonesian government, this demonstrates the growing support of 
the international community from various regions of the world for the BDF. Many 
high-ranking officials in Indonesia believe that the Forum has successfully brought a 
change in several countries undergoing a democratisation process in which Indonesia 
has built long-term cooperation to improve their democracies such as in Myanmar and 
Fiji.336 For Indonesia, through the BDF, countries that had been reluctant to talk about 
democracy have begun to open up. This is evident in the statements delivered by 
several governments, including Myanmar and Qatar, in which they emphasised the 
problems they faced in an attempt to make the government more open and responsive 
to political democracy.337  
Indonesia’s choice to create a multilateral forum for its endeavour to promote 
democracy rather than having bilateral cooperation has indicated Indonesia’s 
willingness to be seen as the non-Western leader in promoting democracy in the Asia-
Pacific in which the US has failed to do so. This multilateral strategy also shows 
Indonesia’ aspiration for middle power status which emphasises on multilateralism. 
Through multilateralism, Indonesia can exhibit its capability to enact the role as a 
bridge-builder that it has developed along another role as an advocate of democracy. 
To further demonstrate its commitment for promoting democracy, in addition to 
initiating the Bali Democracy Forum, the Indonesian government also established the 
Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD) as the implementing agency for the agenda 
agreed at the Bali Democracy Forum. This government-sponsored non-governmental 
organisation that is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National 
Education aims to implement various programs in the field of democratic development 
in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific. IPD is quite active in providing training on the 
strengthening of democracy for countries in the Asia-Pacific such as training for 
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members of election commissions in Myanmar and training activities to assist in the 
establishment of democratic institutions in Fiji. In fact, not only in the Asia-Pacific 
region, but the agency was also active in conducting dialogues and share the 
experience with Egypt and Tunisia.338 IPD activities are mainly organising 
discussions, workshops, training, and conversation as the main agenda in sharing 
experiences. From 2013 Indonesia has done more programs that are of direct support 
to the process of democratic development. For example, in the case of Myanmar, IPD 
helped empower the Myanmar election commission and the national commission of 
human rights through a variety of training that will provide benefits to the institutions 
in the country.339 
Indeed, the fact that the number of relevant participants has been on the rise is not per 
se a persuasive argument that Indonesia is successfully promoting democracy. On the 
contrary, the BDF tends to confirm the view of those who argue that the forum with 
its vague conceptualisation of democracy gives authoritarian countries or hybrid 
regimes an excellent forum for legitimising their non-democratic practices. However, 
the increased number of participants shows that indeed Indonesia can play a bridge-
builder role and there is an acceptance by the international community of Indonesia’s 
aspiring role to be a new player in promoting democracy in the Asia-Pacific. 
Despite the criticisms regarding the lack of a direct impact of the forum on 
democratisation in Asia-Pacific countries, Indonesia’s initiative through the BDF can 
be regarded as the implementation of an alternative way of promoting democracy by 
a so-called emerging democratic power. As argued by several scholars,340 the 
emergence of new democratic powers has created an expectation from the 
international community, especially Western countries, for them to fill the gap in 
democracy promotion, which cannot be filled by Western countries due to the 
differences in the trajectories of their democracy and that of many non-Western 
countries. Through the BDF, Indonesia has shown that democracy promotion is not 
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exclusively the agenda of Western countries. The BDF can provide an alternative 
platform for discussing the importance of building a home-grown democracy rooted 
in tradition and the values of non-Western society. 
The inclusivity of the BDF arguably is the reflection of Indonesia’s aspiring role as a 
bridge-builder. Rather than treating democracy promotion as a tool for the regime or 
domestic political change, Indonesia sees promoting democracy as a way to provide a 
platform for countries with the different domestic political environment to understand 
their progress and development as well as issues faced. As argued by Briggs et al., 
Indonesia’s initiative to promote democracy through Bali Democracy Forum shows 
Indonesia’s domestic struggle to navigate unity with diversity.341 Indonesia’s 
democratic transformation as a part of broader state transformation occurring with the 
collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime has put Indonesia in a complicated position.  
While Indonesia, indeed, has moved forward to be more democratic despite some 
caveats and has been increasingly reflected in its international status, the foreign policy 
posture that has been influenced by role conception as a voice of developing countries 
making it at odds with liberal western expectations. On the one hand, to capture both 
Indonesia’s domestic changes as well as international expectation as a result from such 
changes, foreign policymakers aimed to elevate Indonesia’s role as an advocate of the 
norm, in this case, an advocate of democracy to increase its international status. On 
the other hand, Indonesia needs to sustain a role conception of voice for developing 
countries that require it to not fully embrace Western liberal norm that has long been 
seen suspiciously by Indonesia in particular and developing countries from the Global 
South in general.  
This also cannot be separated from the notion of democracy as a hegemonic instrument 
used by the West and has become the top priority for the US foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era. US hegemony and the promotion of democracy continue to go hand in 
hand. Many nationalist elites from developing countries persist in seeing the global 
goal of promoting democracy is to achieve US hegemony. By integrating the 
promotion of democracy with various economic, social and cultural policies, arguably 
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the US has sought to strategically penetrate not only the state but also the civil society 
and then exercise control in it.342 
To redeem such a role conflict that may create incoherent in Indonesia’s biographical 
narrative, Indonesia’s initiative to promote democratic and human rights norms has 
been framed to increase Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder. In this context, the 
enactment of a role as a bridge-builder would lessen the potential conflict between 
Indonesia’s new role as an advocate of democracy and its long-standing role as a voice 
for developing countries that have been entrenched as Indonesia’s biographical 
narrative. 
Thus, the BDF has become an essential platform for Indonesia to perform its role as a 
bridge-builder between democratic countries and countries that are in the process of 
democratisation and even countries that do not adhere to a democratic system. 
However, due to its nature as a bridge-building forum, the BDF only serves as a talking 
shop for democracy rather than a place to implement the practical agenda of 
democracy promotion. Even though Indonesia could demonstrate an alternative model 
in promoting democracy through emphasising democratic socialisation and learning 
as its central methods, the BDF is hardly likely to have a direct impact on countries 
undergoing democratisation. 
However, unlike Indonesia’s democracy promotion within ASEAN framework that 
can be framed as an instrument for Indonesia to enact its role as a regional leader and 
thus has attracted less domestic contestation, Indonesia’s role in democracy promotion 
through BDF has invited domestic contestation from several political actors in 
Indonesia especially civil societies and parliamentarians. Many critics find Indonesia’s 
democratic projection becomes worthless since it has no impact on the condition of 
democracy and human rights agenda back home. As argued by one parliamentarian:  
Bali Democracy Forum is only a project to boost the image of the government 
in the international community. It fails to improve life nationwide because the 
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government seems to only focus on international affairs in such an event 
instead of promoting our national interests.343  
This domestic contestation of Indonesia’s role as democracy promoter is believed to 
contribute to the strengthening of Indonesia’s democratic consolidation at home. This 
is evident from the Yudhoyono administration’s response in addressing the domestic 
issue regarding the efforts by several major political parties to eliminate direct 
elections which are regarded as a threat to Indonesia’s democracy. By the end of the 
Yudhoyono administration, political parties that are forming the ruling coalition in the 
Yudhoyono administration, including the political party led by him, approved the Law 
No. 17/2013 on Community Organizations and Law No. 22/2014 on local elections. 
For civil society, the laws are considered to restrict the freedom of democracy in 
Indonesia, particularly Law No. 22/2014 which abolished direct elections of regional 
heads.344 
When the government was preparing Bali Civil Society Forum, which is part of the 
Bali Democracy Forum, in 2014, eleven out of the 14 civil society organisations 
invited refused to attend. Moreover, the majority of non-government organisations that 
focus on enhancing democratic agenda in Indonesia refused to attend the 7th Bali 
Democracy Forum (BDF) in Nusa Dua, Bali, 2014. They considered the forum 
initiated by the Indonesian government to be nothing more than a ceremonial event 
without significant benefits for the development of democracy given the recent law 
enacted by Yudhoyono’s government. According to civil society representatives, since 
its first forum held on 10-11 December 2008, the BDF that the government of 
Indonesia has stood for as an intergovernmental democracy building forum in the 
Asia-Pacific region has been criticised for not involving civil society. 
Moreover, civil society criticises that Indonesia’s democracy is failing due to several 
moves by major political parties. Less than a month before the Bali Democracy Forum, 
Yudhoyono finally rejected the new law approved by parliament by issuing 
Government Regulation substituting the Law No. 1/2014 to restore the direct election 
                                                          
343 the Jakarta Post, “4 Years on, Democracy Forum ‘Brings Significant Change,’” The Jakarta Post, 
November 8, 2012,  
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/11/08/4-years-democracy-forum-brings-significant-
change.html#sthash.hve0yjZS.dpuf. 
344 Author’s personal interview with democracy activist, INFID, 20 July 2016. 
136 
 
system. Many democracy activists believe that although the party he leads also 
supported this law, Yudhoyono response by annulling the law is mainly driven by to 
the existence of democracy promotion agenda in Indonesia's foreign policy. Civil 
society representatives see that projecting the identity of democracy to the 
international community has created moral consequences for Indonesian policymakers 
to safeguard Indonesian democracy.345 Thus, incorporating a democratic identity in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy can have an unintended consequence in locking in 
Indonesia’s democratic development and keeping it on track. 
 
Indonesia’s engagement in Myanmar’s democratisation 
Given the need for Indonesia to exercise its role as democracy promoter, efforts to 
assist the democratisation process in Myanmar have become one of the most critical 
agendas in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indonesia’s success in managing its democratic 
consolidation and its similar historical path with Myanmar has given Indonesia 
credibility in playing a role in the transition of Myanmar.346 Moreover, Indonesia has 
been expected by the international community to play a more significant role in the 
democratisation process in Myanmar. In 2008, the United Nations (UN) officially 
asked Indonesia to play a more significant role in maintaining communication with 
the leadership of Myanmar, as well as in following up the democratisation process in 
the country. Then UN Secretary-General General Ban Ki-Moon called President 
Yudhoyono and asked Indonesia to contribute to realising democracy in Myanmar.347  
This expectation has, to some extent, driven Indonesia’s active involvement in 
Myanmar’s democratisation. Indonesia’s role is also becoming more important due to 
two factors. First, compared with other regions such as Africa and Latin America, 
Southeast Asia is one of the regions that had a democratic deficit in its regional 
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mechanisms that require a more bilateral approach to dealing with a country 
undergoing democratisation. Although Indonesia has initiated the APSC and the BDF 
as a platform for promoting democracy, in the case of Myanmar, those two platforms 
are not sufficient for the democratisation process due to the lack of a specific 
mechanism to enforce the values of democracy and human rights. Secondly, the 
United States and international non-governmental organisations that have campaigned 
for democratisation in Myanmar have realised that their approach to pushing Myanmar 
through sanctions and international isolation have not resulted in progress regarding 
democratisation in Myanmar.348 In fact, this only made the military junta regime in 
Myanmar lose confidence in the international community. This has resulted in the 
junta’s increasing antipathy and suspicion towards the international community’s 
efforts to help the process of democratisation in Myanmar. 
Indonesia’s strategy in dealing with Myanmar’s military junta is somewhat different 
from that commonly employed by Western countries, which usually use a naming and 
shaming approach. Indonesia has tended to enact its role as a bridge-builder between 
isolated Myanmar and the international community. Since taking office in 2004, 
rhetorically, the Yudhoyono administration has always defended Myanmar’s 
authoritarian regime from the pressures of the international community. Every time 
Western powers have put pressure on Myanmar with regard to primarily human rights 
issues, the Indonesian government has always asked the international community to 
be patient about the democratisation process in Myanmar although it also continues to 
keep asking the government of Myanmar to prove its achievements in the 
democratisation process.349 
In approaching Myanmar’s military junta, Indonesia stresses the merits of a quiet 
diplomatic approach rather than megaphone diplomacy, which serves as a diplomatic 
instrument to persuade Myanmar to move towards democracy. As argued by See Seng 
Tan,350 it was persuasion rather than coercion that worked best to engage Myanmar 
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constructively. In order to persuade the military regime, periodically President 
Yudhoyono conducted personal correspondence with top military junta leaders in 
Myanmar. In that correspondence, the Indonesian president always asked about the 
progress that has been made by the military government in the promotion of 
democracy in Myanmar. Furthermore, Indonesia has, several times, sent a former 
reformist general, Agus Widjojo, as a special envoy to Myanmar. The assignment of 
a former general as a special envoy is intended to make the military junta feel 
comfortable to communicate with Indonesia.351  
As a former military leader himself, President Yudhoyono understood that while 
democratisation should be conducted, it must not harm territorial integrity or internal 
stability within Myanmar. Indonesia’s experience of democratisation, which almost 
led to its disintegration, has shaped Indonesia’s approach to Myanmar 
democratisation, which emphasises Myanmar’s territorial integrity and stability. Due 
to Indonesia’s approach, Myanmar saw Indonesia under Yudhoyono’s leadership as a 
close friend that contributed constructively to the process of democratisation in the 
country.352 
When ethnic unrest in Myanmar that led to the killing of ethnic minority Rohingya 
Muslims erupted in June 2012, unlike the international community, which 
immediately strongly condemned the incident, the Indonesian government asked the 
government of Myanmar to allow Indonesia to participate in solving Myanmar’s 
internal conflict. The initial step taken by Indonesia was to provide assistance in the 
form of basic commodities valued at US$1 million to the Myanmar government. This 
assistance was used to reinforce the goodwill of Indonesia in assisting Myanmar to 
solve the problem of communal conflict and human rights violations committed 
against Rohingya Muslims. Given the high-level of confidence that Myanmar had in 
Indonesia, Indonesia became the only country allowed to send a delegation to enter 
the conflict area and see first-hand the conditions of the conflict on the ground. 353 
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Indonesia also played an important role in bridging the Organization for Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) with Myanmar’s military junta. Indonesia criticised the OIC over 
its handling of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar, which often makes a 
strong statement without acting significantly to resolve the problems faced by the 
Rohingya. This approach has made the Myanmar’s military regime distrusts the OIC. 
In bridging this distrust, Indonesia tried to communicate directly with the Myanmar 
government regarding the importance of the international community in monitoring 
the situation relating to the Rohingya.354  
The junta finally considered Indonesia's proposal to allow representatives of the UN 
and the OIC to come and witness the conditions in Myanmar as well as allowing a 
dialogue with the Myanmar government.355 Due to Indonesia’s bridging role, the OIC 
appreciates the role of the Indonesian Government on this issue and hopes that 
Indonesia can give direction to the OIC to contribute constructively to the settlement 
of the Rohingya issue. In this context, Indonesia plays a significant role in bridging 
the gap between isolated Myanmar and the international community. 
While it did not happen quickly, as in Indonesia, the changes towards more democratic 
measures in Myanmar were indeed gradually and carefully implemented. One of the 
crucial changes in Myanmar politics, among others, is the issuance of the Law on 
Freedom of the Press. With the enactment of the Law, Myanmar entered a new phase 
of the democratic transition, especially in the context of freedom of the press, which 
is one of the essential pillars of democracy. Freedom of the press in Indonesia has 
become a reference for the Myanmar government, and Indonesia helped Myanmar in 
its efforts to design its law regarding this issue through several capacity building 
programs. The Myanmar Law on the Press heavily adopted some of the law on the 
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press and broadcasting in Indonesia, namely Law No. 40/1999 on Press and Law No. 
32/2002 on Broadcasting.356 
Indonesian foreign policy that did not follow Western outcry to condemn human rights 
atrocities in Myanmar and instead enacted its role as a promoter of democracy through 
its bilateral democratic cooperation has been praised by U Thein Sein then chief of the 
Myanmar junta. He considered Indonesia under President Yudhoyono as a true friend 
who fully understood the situation faced by Myanmar in the international arena and 
often gives suggestions for the improvement of democracy in Myanmar.357 This 
suggests that the Myanmar military junta has well received Indonesia’s role as an 
advocate of democracy.  
Indonesia’s role as a promoter of democracy has been well received not only by the 
junta but also by the international community. United States Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, expressed her appreciation to President Yudhoyono for his role in ensuring 
the progress of the reform and democratisation process in Myanmar. The US also 
appreciated Indonesia's bridge-building role in responding to and addressing the 
internal conflict between the ethnic Rohingyas and Rhakines in Myanmar.358 
However, Indonesia’s bridging role in Myanmar has been contested by Indonesian 
domestic actors. Due to Islamic sentiment regarding human rights abuse against 
Rohingya people, many domestic actors in Indonesia expressed dissatisfaction with 
Indonesia government for its lacklustre support of significant change in human rights 
protection in Myanmar. For instance, Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) condemned 
all forms of violence against Rohingya Muslims in Burma and urged the Indonesian 
government to play an active role in resolving the issue. Some political conservative 
Muslim groups urged the Indonesian government to send a diplomatic protest note to 
the Government of Myanmar. Several Islamic organisations held a demonstration 
condemning the violence against Rohingya Muslims in front of Myanmar Embassy. 
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Furthermore, the Indonesian parliament also stated that the tragedy could be 
categorised as gross human rights violations and urged the Indonesian government to 
implement the responsibility to protect.359 This domestic contestation was not 
positively incorporated within Indonesian foreign policy agenda by policymakers 
given that in dealing with Myanmar, Indonesia want to keep enacting a bridge-builder 
role.  
Despite the domestic call, Indonesian foreign policymakers preferred to maintain its 
role as a bridge-builder for Myanmar by restraining themselves from putting pressure 
on Myanmar. Indonesia considered action against Myanmar, such as isolating or 
removing it from the membership of ASEAN was not a solution to resolve the 
problems experienced by ethnic Rohingya. As stated by the spokesman of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Armanatha Nasir, given the closeness of the relationship between 
Indonesia and Myanmar are as close as brothers, Indonesia should be involved in 
finding solutions rather than putting pressure on Myanmar.360 Thus, Indonesia’s role 
as a bridge-builder despite enabling Indonesia to play a more constructive role in 
assisting the process of democratisation in Myanmar tends to make Indonesia shield 
Myanmar’s abusive regime from regional and international scrutiny. 
Arguably, Indonesian policymakers’ rejection to condemn Myanmar could be 
attributed to Indonesia’s historical past particularly in dealing with East Timor which 
makes Indonesia careful in dealing with the human rights atrocities in Myanmar by 
not openly criticising Myanmar’s military junta. Not to mention that Indonesia’s 
current allegation of human rights abuse that may threaten its ontological security was 
also a consideration for policymakers to reduce its enactment of a particular role. As I 
will further substantiate in the next chapters that follow, the interaction between 
Indonesia’s enactments of particular role conception with its biographical narrative is 
a powerful explanation in understanding why particular roles are enacted in one case 
but not in the other and why some domestic contestation could not change the 
enactment of a particular role. 
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Given the discussion above, the chapter does not claim that democratisation happening 
in Myanmar is solely a result of Indonesia’s role in promoting democracy. A 
substantial domestic political shift, as well as other factors, are contributing to the 
improved condition in Myanmar. Instead, this chapter highlights how Indonesia’s role 
as a democracy promoter in Myanmar is enacted in light of Indonesia’s pursuit of a 
role as a bridge-builder and to some extent it arguably also constrains Indonesia’s role 
as an advocate of democracy in Myanmar. Some civil society organisations argued 
that Indonesia’s policy towards Myanmar has made Indonesia tend to shield 
Myanmar’s abusive regime from international scrutiny rather than contributing 
towards democratisation in Myanmar.361 Despite this criticism, Indonesian foreign 
policymakers continue to persist with the enactment of Indonesia’s role as a bridge-
builder towards Myanmar. Due to its bridge-builder role enactment towards Myanmar, 
Indonesia seems to have limitations with regard to using more concrete efforts to put 
pressure on Myanmar to demonstrate progress in democratisation and the protection 
of human rights.  
 
Conclusion 
As shown by the three case studies above, Indonesia’s role conception as a promoter 
of democracy was not merely the result of the institutionalisation of democratic norms 
at the domestic level. This is because when Indonesia started to make democracy its 
identity to be projected towards the international community, Indonesia was still 
undergoing a process of consolidation of its democracy in which democratic norms 
were not fully internalised at the domestic level. Instead, other than to enhance 
Indonesia’s international prestige, the role as an advocate of democracy is enacted to 
enhance other roles conceptualised by Indonesian foreign policymakers in the post-
authoritarian era. 
Firstly, as shown above, the role as an advocate of democracy has been utilised by 
Indonesia to play a greater role in the region by introducing the values into ASEAN’s 
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objective and mechanism. Secondly, its role as a democracy promoter has not only 
enhanced Indonesia’s international prestige but also enabled it to take the role as a 
bridge-builder in the international community and also as a regional leader in the 
region. Its aspiring role as a bridge-builder has encouraged Indonesia to have a unique 
strategy in playing the role of promoter of democracy. This can be seen in Indonesia’s 
initiative in the Bali Democracy Forum as well as in its active involvement in the 
democratisation of Myanmar. The analysis above also suggests that role expectations 
from the international community have also driven Indonesia's roles in initiating the 
Bali Democracy Forum as well as its active involvement in Myanmar.  
Thirdly, promoting democratic and human rights norms can be seen as a strategy to 
lock in Indonesia’s democratic trajectory so that the process of democratisation in 
Indonesia does not stop and Indonesia does not go back to its authoritarian past. Given 
that Indonesia is in the early stages of democratisation in which democratic values 
have not been fully internalised, the possibility that Indonesia could go back into a 
non-democratic era is still very likely. Efforts to use the democracy promotion agenda 
by inserting agendas strengthening democracy and human rights into Indonesia's 
foreign policy could be seen as a strategy to make sure that the process of democratic 
consolidation will not retreat backwards. 
This leads us to the discussion on the importance of the notion of role legitimation in 
understanding Indonesia’s enactment of the role as an advocate of democracy at the 
regional level. Given the need to sustain its historical role as a regional leader, 
Indonesian foreign policymakers can legitimise its aspiration to as an advocate of 
democracy and human rights through enhancing ASEAN as a regional organisation 
that promotes and respects democracy and human rights. In another word, Indonesia’s 
enactment of a role as an advocate of democracy and human rights is legitimised by 
linking the role enactment as part of Indonesia’s historical role as a regional leader. 
Moreover, given that democratic values may not have been fully internalised in 
Indonesia’s political culture, the possibility that Indonesia could go back to 
authoritarianism is still very likely. For this reason, the enactment of the role as an 
advocate of democracy and human rights is framed as a way for foreign policymakers 
to reproduce alter expectations as the inherent social qualities within the state that need 
to be projected abroad. In the case of Indonesia’s enactment of the role as an advocate 
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of democracy and human rights can also be seen as a way to enhance government’s 
domestic political objectives namely to sustain Indonesia’s fragile democracy. By 
doing so, the incorporation of alter expectations into role conception is less likely to 
be seen as a process in which the state responds to the pressure from other foreign 
actors, which might create domestic contestation. Instead, the foreign policymakers 
have a domestic imperative to incorporate alter expectations into role conception.  
To summarise, Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy serves its aspiring roles 
as a bridge-builder, voice for developing countries, and regional leader. However, 
there is also clear indication that its role as an advocate of democracy, in some cases 
conflicts with its role as a bridge-builder and regional leader. As a consequence of this 
inter-role conflict, Indonesia’s role in promoting democracy has been hindered by the 
other two roles that Indonesia’s policymakers choose to enact. In the case of projecting 
democracy in ASEAN, Indonesia’s aspiring role as a regional leader in maintaining 
ASEAN’s cohesiveness has hindered further proposals to create a mechanism to 
enforce democratic and human rights values within the institution. In the case of 
enacting its role as an advocate of democracy through the Bali Democracy Forum, due 
to its nature as a bridge-building forum, it only serves as a talking shop for democracy 
rather than a place to implement the practical agenda of democracy promotion. 
Furthermore, due to its bridge-builder role enactment in Myanmar, Indonesia seems 
to have limitations to use more concrete efforts to put pressure on Myanmar to 
demonstrate progress in democratisation and the protection of human rights.  
This chapter has shown the dynamics of enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions at 
the regional levels, particularly in democracy and human rights issues. The next 
chapter will further analyse the dynamics of the enactment of Indonesia’s role 
conceptions within global human rights governance. By doing so, the thesis provides 
comparative case studies on the differences in Indonesia’s role enactment at the 





Bound by domestic constraints: Indonesia’s role in global 
human rights governance 
  
Introduction 
As argued in the previous chapter, Indonesia, under the Yudhoyono administration, 
began to take the role as a country that champions the promotion of human rights 
issues and democracy at the regional level. This can be seen in the country’s regional 
diplomatic priorities, which emphasise the agenda of mainstreaming democracy and 
human rights norms as well as initiating several high-profile initiatives to project 
democracy abroad.362 In the Southeast Asia region, Indonesia has become a primary 
mover in making the issue of human rights and democracy central to the ASEAN 
objectives and mechanisms.363 Moreover, Indonesia is continuing its efforts to help 
Myanmar in consolidating its democratic transition through capacity building and 
sharing best practice experience. In the broader Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia acts as 
an emerging middle power that is pursuing an agenda of promoting democracy 
through its high-profile initiatives such as the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). 
Despite Indonesia’s efforts to play the role of an advocate of democracy, there is still 
a gap between Indonesia’s greater involvement in promoting human rights at the 
regional level and its normative approach at the global level. While normatively 
Indonesia is voicing the need to promote the democracy and human rights agenda as 
shared values to be adopted by all states, its policies in promoting these core values at 
the global level remain limited. Indonesia’s voting record on human rights-related 
resolutions does not seem to represent its aspiring role as an advocate of democracy 
and human rights. Indonesia is one of few states that have consistently voted against 
resolutions condemning the human rights abuses in Sudan, Myanmar, and North 
Korea.364 Why is Indonesia, despite its significant efforts to strengthen human rights 
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mechanisms at the regional level, still reluctant to strengthen global human rights 
governance and why does it tend to shield abusive regimes from international 
scrutiny? 
In addressing these questions, this chapter contends that two main considerations have 
created ambivalence in Indonesia’s effort in strengthening the global governance 
dealing with human rights. The first one is Indonesia’s scepticism towards global 
human rights governance due to unpleasant experience while protecting its territorial 
integrity from international scrutiny regarding its annexation of East Timor during 
Suharto’s authoritarian regime (1975 – 1999). The second one is Indonesia’s current 
domestic issue regarding the separatist movement in West Papua provinces365 in which 
the issue of human rights is being mobilised to gain international support.  
To sum things up, there is fear within the domestic political establishment that the 
issue of human rights at the global level might be used to undermine its territorial 
integrity in the future. Given these domestic issues, in the case of global human rights 
governance, Indonesia’s historical role as a voice for developing countries as well as 
its aspiration to be a bridge-builder have triumphed over its role as an advocate of 
democracy. More importantly, Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder has been translated 
to defend developing countries undergoing the international scrutiny of their human 
rights situation due to the need for Yudhoyono’s government to sustain Indonesia’s 
biographical narrative. 
To substantiate the argument, this chapter focuses on the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (HRC) as the primary global mechanism responsible for the promotion 
and protection of all human rights around the globe. Specifically, it deals with two 
areas of HRC, namely Indonesia’s participation in the institution-building phase of the 
Council and its stance in the country-specific discussions and resolutions within the 
Council. Indonesia’s point of view in the institution-building phase of the Council is 
crucial in assessing the extent to which Indonesia is reluctant to strengthen the 
institutional mechanism of human rights governance at the global level. Indonesia’s 
standpoint in relation to the country-specific discussion also sheds light on how 
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Indonesia’s domestic concerns related to its territorial integrity, its preference for a 
regional mechanism, as well its aspiration to be a bridge-builder have shaped its 
policies towards the promotion and protection of human rights in other developing 
countries. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. The next section provides 
an overview of Indonesia’s perception and engagement in global human rights 
governance. The third section discusses Indonesia’s role in the institution-building 
phase of the UN Human Rights Council. The fourth section examines Indonesia’s role 
in country-specific discussions in the UN Human Rights Council by explicitly looking 
at the resolutions on Sudan, Myanmar, and North Korea. These cases are chosen due 
to Indonesia’s significant role in defending the countries under scrutiny as well as 
significant disagreement among member states within the Council. The last section 
provides an overall assessment of Indonesia’s role in the UN Human Rights Council. 
 
Domestic political environment and global human rights governance 
Indonesia’s involvement in the UN Human Rights machinery is not a new 
characteristic of the country’s post-authoritarian foreign policy. Indonesia had sought 
active involvement in the UN Commission on Human Rights during the last decade of 
Suharto’s authoritarian regime (1990 – 1998). It was elected as a member of the 
Commission from 1991 to 2002 and was elected again in 2004 until the Commission 
transformed into the UN Human Rights Council in 2006.366 Indonesia’s pursuit of 
membership of the Commission was motivated by domestic problems related to its 
annexation of East Timor, which was being scrutinised by the international 
community. Indonesia’s membership of the Commission served two objectives: to 
improve the image of Indonesia in the international community especially in dealing 
with the accusation of human rights violations, as well as to block initiatives to put 
Indonesia under the international spotlight due to its alleged human rights violations 
in East Timor. Given its poor record on human rights protection in East Timor, 
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Indonesia can be considered as a country that used its membership of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights to protect its interest at the global level and thus 
weaken the credibility of the Commission.367 
With its success in dealing with its uneasy democratisation process from 1998 – 2004, 
after the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, Indonesia has been celebrated by 
the international community as a role model for newly democratised countries. The 
process of democratisation has thus encouraged Indonesia to engage deeply with 
various international human rights regimes.368 Domestically, Indonesia has undertaken 
several measures to strengthen its human rights institutions as well as developing 
national capacity for the promotion and protection of human rights as outlined in its 
National Human Rights Action Plan 1998 – 2003 and 2004 – 2009. During that time, 
Indonesia ratified a number of international treaties on human rights including six out 
of seven major Human Rights Covenants. Currently, Indonesia is a party to eight core 
international human rights instruments, two Optional Protocols to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and all of the core rights conventions of the International 
Labour Organization (see table 5.1). Indonesia is yet to become a party to the Optional 
Protocol of the Convention against Torture and the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming for the abolition of the 
death penalty. It is also yet to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of 
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Table 5.1 Indonesia and human rights core treaties 











International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
CESCR   NA 
23 Feb 
2006 (a) 
2 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 




International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 




Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 
CEDAW 29 Jul 1980 13 Sep 1984 
5 
Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance 
CED 27 Sep 2010 not ratified 
6 
International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families 
CMW 22 Sep 2004 
31 May 
2012 
7 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 




Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict 
CRC-
OP-AC 
24 Sep 2001 24 Sep 2012 
9 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the sale of children 




24 Sep 2001 24 Sep 2012 
10 Convention on the Rights of 







Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
CAT 23 Oct 1985 28 Oct 1998 
12 Optional Protocol of the 
Convention against Torture 
CAT-OP not signed not ratified 
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Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights aiming to 
the abolition of the death penalty 
CCPR-
OP2-DP 
not signed not ratified 
Source: UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commission. 370 
 
To reflect its growing interest to actively engage in human rights issues, Yudhoyono’s 
government decided to restructure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by creating a new 
directorate specialising in human rights and humanitarian issues.371 Furthermore, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, Indonesia’s greater involvement in human rights 
issues can also be seen in its efforts to create a regional mechanism within the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote and protect human 
rights. In addition to focusing attention and resources on the creation of a regional 
human rights mechanism, during Yudhoyono’s presidency, Indonesia also became 
increasingly active in the UN human rights machinery. In 2005, Indonesia proposed 
its senior diplomat, Ambassador Makarim Wibisono, to be nominated as a 
Chairperson of the 61st session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Makarim’s 
nomination was accepted due to the lobbying by the Asian regional group at the United 
Nations.372  
During Ambassador Wibisono’s tenure, the Commission started to seriously discuss 
the status of the proposed new human rights body that would replace the 
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Commission.373 However, in the beginning, Indonesia viewed the establishment of the 
Human Rights Council with scepticism as a project by Western countries to further 
impose their interests through the agenda of human rights. The Indonesian government 
consciously understood that the Commission on Human Rights had failed to become 
an instrument of the United Nations to protect human rights. Nevertheless, it felt the 
need to carry out a reform of the Commission instead of creating a new institution, 
which, in Indonesia’s view, might be designed to be more aligned with the interests of 
Western countries.374 While the proposal to reform the Commission came from then 
the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, it was the United States that 
demanded the Commission be replaced with a more efficient Human Rights 
Council.375 Thus, with the view that the newly established Council might serve as an 
instrument for Western countries to put pressure on other developing countries, from 
the very beginning, Indonesia was sceptical of the idea to create a more robust human 
rights mechanism at the global level. This is evident from its standpoint and orientation 
in the institution-building phase of the council. 
Indonesia’s scepticism of the more robust human rights mechanism at the global level 
could be attributed to its domestic political environment. Although Indonesia has 
transformed into a democratic country, the transformation has also opened a greater 
dilemma for Yudhoyono’s government when it comes to projecting its role conception 
as an advocate of democracy and human rights. While the Indonesian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has subscribed to the notion of Indonesia as an advocate of human 
rights and democratic norms, not all agencies within the Indonesian government 
subscribed to the same agenda. Thus, the role conception to promote democracy and 
human rights has been hindered by the difficulty for governments to be able to 
articulate the role conception consistently. As argued by a high-ranking official at the 
Directorate of Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign affairs, while democracy and 
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human rights are values that Indonesia aims to promote abroad, internally the 
Indonesian government is still working to socialise other state institutions focusing on 
security issues such as police and the military into the norm.376  
Moreover, the democratisation within Indonesian society also opened a chance for 
internationalisation of domestic issues by a coalition of domestic and international 
civil society that in return could affect how the policymakers enacted the role 
conception.377 This is due to the internationalisation of domestic issue that might 
challenge the narrative being built by the policymakers to international audiences. The 
case of internationalisation of domestic issue perceived as a threat to Indonesian 
sovereignty is evident in the issue of human rights abuse in Papua. Despite projecting 
itself as a democratic country, there are nevertheless significant restrictions within 
Indonesia’s Papua provinces when it comes to freedom of expression and freedom of 
the press. Indonesia’s criminal law, particularly article 106, 107, and 108 on treason, 
is usually used to suppress political rights to voice secessionist and independence 
aspiration. The treason articles have been mobilised to arrest Papuan political activists 
and restrict political freedom in Indonesia’s Papuan provinces. The use and ownership 
of the Morning Star flag, a symbol of Papuan nationalism and cultural unity, can even 
be the basis for arrest, interrogation and intimidation. According to the SETARA 
Institute report in 2016, Indonesia’s Papuan provinces were the worst provinces in 
regard to human rights violations in which 29 people were criminalised, 2,397 people 
were arrested during the protests, 13 were killed, and 68 were shot.378  
As revealed from the interviews with Indonesian diplomats, the Indonesian 
government is aware of the case of human rights issues in Papua and has a good 
                                                          
376 Author’s personal interview with official from Agency for Policy Review and Development, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 July 2015. 
377 For further reading onthe internationalisation of the state, see Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, 
“Rising Powers and State Transformation: The Case of China,” European Journal of International 
Relations 22, no. 1 (2016): 72–98, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115578952; Jim Glassman, 
Thailand at the Margins: Internationalization of the State and the Transformation of Labour, Oxford 
Geographical and Environmental Studies Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
378 Setara Institute, “Setara Institute: Pada 2016, Terjadi 107 Pelanggaran HAM di Papua oleh 
Aparat,” Setara Institute (blog), 2017, http://setara-institute.org/setara-institute-pada-2016-terjadi-
107-pelanggaran-ham-di-papua-oleh-aparat/.; “Preparation of the Report for UPR by Indonesian 






intention to solve the human rights abuse. However, the mainstream view held by 
policymakers in the government is that the case of Papua is seen as a case of limited 
human rights violations rather than a systematic case of human rights abuse. Hence, it 
does not require strong foreign and international interventions. Given the growing 
internationalisation of human rights abuse in Papua, there is a general perception 
within the central government, especially within the police and military establishment, 
that issues related to human rights violations in Papua have been used by certain 
groups both at home and abroad to enhance the agenda of Papuan independence. This 
issue has always been inflated for the political stage by those who want to widen 
international support for the referendum in Papua. The struggle of the West Papuan 
people to gain independence continues at the global level and has gained the attention 
of the international community especially from Melanesian states comprising 
countries such as Fiji, Vanuatu, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga and several other countries in the Pacific. Within the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG), the issue of Papua became a serious discussion. In this forum, some 
countries such as Vanuatu and Fiji often bring up the issue of human rights violations 
in Papua and the possibility for MSG to support self-determination by the people of 
Papua. Through several Pacific Islands countries, the issue of Papuan independence 
has been brought to many international platforms. In Indonesia’s view, the global 
human rights governance could be used as a platform for the internationalisation of 
the Papuan issue.  
International support for pro-independence groups in Papua has created serious 
complexity for the Indonesian government in diplomacy with foreign parties. Unlike 
East Timor in which its incorporation to Indonesia had been problematic in the eyes 
of international community due to Indonesia’s force integration through the invasion 
of East Timor, Indonesia has sought to assert a historical political legitimacy position 
over Papua since its Independence from the Dutch. However, Indonesia’s position is 
often under attack through the issue of human rights violations. This is because the 
issue of human rights violations is a global issue that is often used to measure the 
success rate of handling Papua’s problems.  
To counter the perceived internationalisation effort in relation to the issue of Papuan 
independence, press freedom in Papua has been limited by the Indonesian central 
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government. International journalists may cover anything freely in other parts of 
Indonesia, but not in Papua. There are layers of licensing that need to be fulfilled as 
an effort to restrict foreign journalists to cover issues occurring in Papua. This 
condition has indeed become an Achilles heel for Indonesia’s engagement in global 
human rights governance. 
Having situated the importance of Indonesia’s domestic political changes in regard to 
Indonesia’s behaviour regarding human rights issue at the global level, the next 
sections will further elaborate how state transformation and historical experience 
affect the way Indonesia enacts its role conception at the global human rights 
governance. The next section will examine Indonesia’s standpoint in the institution-
building phase of the newly established Human Rights Council. 
 
Indonesia in the institution-building phase of the Human Rights Council 
The UN Human Rights Council is an institution that was set up to replace the UN 
Commission on Human Rights through the issuance of the UN General Assembly 
resolution number 60/251. The establishment of the Council was a response to the 
increasing irrelevance of the Commission as a result of over-politicisation of its 
process and the lack of institutional infrastructure to support its work. As a result of 
over-politicisation, the Commission was accused by both Western and non-Western 
countries of applying double standards in conducting a review of human rights of the 
member and non-member states. Besides, the Commission had turned into a sanctuary 
for countries with a poor human rights record in order to avoid criticism. Thus, the 
Commission was experiencing a credibility problem in which more countries with a 
record of human rights violations were elected to be members resulting in the 
ineffectiveness of the Commission in dealing with human rights violations.379 
As a founding member of the Council, Indonesia, from the very beginning, has been 
actively involved in the formulation of the mandates and functions of the Council, 
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which were decided upon during the institution-building phase. During the phase, the 
Council decided and agreed on the agenda, the programme of work, its working 
methods, the rules of procedure, its complaint procedures, the framework of the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the Special Procedures, as well as the Advisory 
Committee. In general, the debates that occurred during the institution-building phase 
were dominated by the classic debate between efforts to develop an effective 
instrument for protecting human rights on the one hand and efforts to preserve national 
sovereignty on the other.380 
As suggested in Chapter 4, in Southeast Asia, Indonesia actively called for a more 
powerful ASEAN Human Rights Body, consisting of independent experts that had the 
function of promoting and protecting human rights in the region.381 However, its 
approach to the mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council shows its tendency to 
give more power to the state and less authority to the independent experts. This can be 
seen in Indonesia’s reluctance to give more role and authority to the Advisory 
Committee of the UN Human Rights Council to deal with the promotion and 
protection of human rights as well as its reluctance to support more powerful Special 
Procedures. In both cases, Indonesia showed fierce opposition to the ideas that would 
provide a newly established Human Rights Council with a more efficient mechanism 
to promote and protect human rights. As will be further substantiated in the following 
analysis, the reason for such differences could be attributed to the different nature of 
both regional and global audiences in which Indonesian policymakers aimed to enact 
role conceptions. 
 
Indonesia’s standpoint on the Advisory Committee 
The Advisory Committee is one of the newly established mechanisms within the UN 
Human Rights Council. It replaced the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights as the main subsidiary body of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights. In order to increase its capacity as an expert body of the Council, in 
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the beginning, it was envisioned that the Advisory Committee would give an expert 
assessment of the human rights situation around the world to the Council and have 
greater autonomy to initiate and conduct its own study related to human rights. 
Western powers such as the European Union, Canada and the United States tend to 
give more authority to the Advisory Committee to investigate human rights abuses.382  
In addition, there were proposals from developed countries to provide the Advisory 
Committee with authority to participate in the study and investigate country-specific 
issues, rather than just thematic issues. Furthermore, the proposal from Western 
countries also allows various entities other than states such as the High Commissioner 
and NGOs to nominate the candidate for the Advisory Committee and gives authority 
to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to screen out 
names proposed by these entities.383 
However, Indonesia, along with other Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)384 
countries, rejected the proposal to give greater authority to the Advisory Committee 
to investigate human rights abuses. Indonesia blocked the proposal to give the 
Advisory Committee the authority to identify protection gaps rather than just 
promoting human rights, arguing that identifying protection gaps was the prerogative 
of the Council.385 Thus, Indonesia supported the notion that the Advisory Committee, 
unlike its predecessor, the Sub-Commission, was not allowed to issue resolutions or 
decisions. Moreover, Indonesia also rejected the idea to authorise the OHCHR to 
screen out names proposed to be a member of the Advisory Committee and supported 
the mechanism in which the Council solely elected the experts on the Advisory 
Committee. 
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As a win-win solution for the selection of the Advisory Committee, it was finally 
agreed that for the nominations of the Advisory Committee, the states would be 
encouraged to consult their national human rights institutions as well as to include the 
names of NGOs that supported their candidates.386 It was also finally agreed during 
the institution-building phase that the work of the Advisory Committee would only be 
related to the implementation of decisions made by the Council. Its scope of work 
would be mainly in the area of thematic issues, and it would have no authority with 
regard to country-specific issues. Hence, as argued by Meghna Abraham, the new 
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee has been reduced to merely a mechanism 
without any authority to have initiatives.387 Bassiouni and Schabas further argued that 
the establishment of the Advisory Committee as a replacement for the Sub 
Commission for the promotion and protection of Human Rights was a negative reform 
as a result of the establishment of the UN Human Rights Council.388  
The impetus for Indonesia to support the limitations to the independence and 
autonomy of the Advisory Committee stemmed from its historical experience in 
dealing with a more independent Sub Commission. When it was still named a Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Indonesia 
had been under the scrutiny of the Sub-Commission due to its occupation of East 
Timor. In 1983, the Sub-Commission adopted resolution 1983/26, which reaffirmed 
the inalienable right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence.389 
Although the problem of East Timor was formally still listed as one of the items on 
the agenda of the UN General Assembly, since 1984, the substantive issue of East 
Timor had not been discussed in the UN. However, with the Santa Cruz incident in 
Dili, the capital of East Timor, on 12 November 1991, in which the Indonesian military 
opened fire on an East Timorese demonstration and killed roughly 250 people, the 
issue of the Right to Self-determination has been brought by the Sub-Commission to 
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be discussed in the UN.390 While Indonesia could influence the resolutions issued by 
the Commission given its membership of the Commission, the work conducted by the 
Sub-Commission could hardly be influenced by Indonesia’s membership of the 
Commission given its independence and autonomy. 
 
Indonesia’s view on Special Procedures 
Indonesia’s reluctance to assist the Council in creating a more powerful mechanism to 
investigate human rights situations can also be seen from its standpoint in the 
discussion on reviewing the mandates and mechanism of Special Procedures. Special 
Procedures is one of the most effective mechanisms in the UN Human Rights 
machinery. It has the task of examining questions and monitoring the situation of 
human rights in both specific countries and thematic issues.391 During the discussion 
in the Working Group on Review of Mechanisms and Mandates, it was evident that 
Indonesia still championed the idea of state sovereignty over the protection of human 
rights. Indonesia, from the beginning, supported the proposal that the election of 
mandate holders for Special Procedures be conducted entirely by the members of the 
Council in order to maintain the credibility of the mandate recipient. 
Many Western countries rejected the proposal since it would make the appointment of 
Special Procedures mandate holders highly politicised.392 The European Union, 
Australia, Canada, and the United States proposed the OHCHR to appoint mandate 
holders in order to ensure their independence and expertise. Indonesia rejected this 
proposal. Indonesian policymakers argued that while the OHCHR might comprise 
non-political actors, OHCHR is an independent actor that certainly has its agenda, 
which might be influenced by the Western countries.393 Thus, while many Western 
countries sought to give OHCHR the power to choose or appoint Special Procedures 
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mandate-holders, Indonesia opposed the idea and urged that the Council directly elects 
the mandate holders in order to maintain their credibility despite criticism that this 
would make the appointments highly politicised. It was finally agreed that the 
appointment of mandate holders would be similar to the previous mechanism in which 
the President of the Council would appoint the mandate holders on the basis of a 
recommendation from the Consultative Group, which is mainly composed of senior 
diplomats representing the states. The Council would finally approve the appointment. 
This final solution gives greater political control to the states in the appointment of 
mandate holders for Special Procedures.394 
During the working group discussion, the NGOs raised an important issue regarding 
the relations between Special Procedures and States. The ineffectiveness of the Special 
Procedures is due to the lack of a mechanism to enforce state cooperation with this 
UN human rights machinery. There are several limitations to activities conducted by 
the Special Procedures. Firstly, the mechanism relies heavily on the consent of the 
concerned states and states can easily block the mandate holders from performing their 
function by not granting them a visit. Secondly, there is no mechanism to follow up 
the findings made by the mandate holders by the concerned states.395 There were 
proposals to strengthen the mechanism for cooperation between Special Procedures 
mandate holders and the states. For instance, the Western countries proposed the need 
for all states that serve as members of the Council to issue a standing invitation to 
Special Procedures as the first step towards cooperation. Canada even proposed that 
state cooperation with Special Procedures be a requirement for membership of the 
council.396 
However, with regard to the problem of non-cooperation with states, many non-
Western countries including Indonesia preferred the status quo and did not want to 
create a new mechanism to address the problem faced by Special Procedures. In fact, 
during the discussion in the working group, Indonesia along with the African group 
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called for a stricter code of conduct to be followed by the Special Procedures mandate 
holders, especially during their visits and in their relations and communication with 
the media. The proposal for a code of conduct was perceived by many Western 
countries as a way to limit and even jeopardise the work of Special Procedures.397  
Indonesia’s rationale in keeping the problem of state cooperation with mandate 
holders unresolved is due to its fear that Special Procedures might jeopardise its 
sovereignty in the future. As already touched upon in the previous section, currently, 
Indonesia is facing accusations of human rights abuse in its eastern provinces of 
Papua. Due to its complex historical problems as well as the prevalent poverty in 
Papua, there is an increasingly strong aspiration among the Papuan indigenous peoples 
for independence. Many policymakers in Jakarta believe that Papuan pro-
independence activists are using the issue of human rights strategically as an 
instrument to get the attention of the international community with regard to their 
aspiration for independence.398 Many Western advocates of Papuan independence 
have been successful in putting Papuan human rights as an international issue, and the 
issue is successfully being used to justify the aspiration for Papuan independence.399 
Several Pacific countries that support the Papuan independence movement such as the 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu not only have talked about West Papua human rights 
issues within the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) but also have brought the issue 
to the international level through the UN General Assembly. 
In responding to this situation, Indonesia tends to perceive any international scrutiny 
of human rights issues in its Papuan provinces as part of the agenda for 
internationalising the Papuan independence. For this reason, Indonesia is more likely 
to ignore the visits requested by the UN Special Procedures especially with regard to 
civil rights issues. Prior to the establishment of the Council, Indonesia has denied the 
request for a visit by The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, 
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions since 1994. In 2004, Indonesia also rejected a 
follow-up request by the Special Rapporteur, who planned to visit the Indonesian 
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province of Papua.400 The Government of Indonesia has also not replied to a request 
for a country visit from rapporteurs working on civil and political rights such as the 
Working Group on Enforced Disappearance and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Religion or Belief. Overall, Indonesia has only accepted 13 out of 47 invitations 
from the Special Procedures to visit the country.401 Most of the Special Rapporteurs 
accepted by Indonesia have dealt with the economy and social rights rather than civil 
and political rights. Due to a fear of politicisation of the issue of Papuan independence, 
Indonesia is not one of the 114 countries that have pledged a standing invitation, which 
is an open invitation extended by a Government regarding all special thematic 
procedures, despite being elected four times as a member of the council.402  
The above discussion shows that Indonesia’s domestic political development, as well 
as its historical difficulty in dealing with international scrutiny, have hindered it from 
playing a constructive role in crafting more robust global human rights governance. 
Indeed, the fact that the bloc politics in the UN cannot be ignored is one of the leading 
factors driving Indonesia’s preferences to block initiatives to strengthen human rights 
governance. However, in the UN Human Rights Council, Indonesia’s stance 
sometimes does not correspond with the bloc politics within the Council. For instance, 
in the case of Myanmar, Indonesia disagreed with the OIC’s approach in naming and 
shaming the Myanmar military junta. The case of Indonesia’s standpoint in institution-
building reflects more its circumspection regarding robust global human rights 
governance, which might have backfired on Indonesia especially with the ongoing 
case of the separatist movement in Indonesia’s Provinces of West Papua and Papua. 
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Indonesia’s role in relations to country-specific issues 
In each pledge for candidacy for the Human Rights Council, Indonesia always 
reiterates that it will contribute further to the global promotion and protection of 
human rights by upholding the principles of objectivity, impartiality and non-
selectivity and the elimination of double standards and politicisation.403 However, in 
practice, the principles are used as a legitimation for Indonesia to block further 
international pressure regarding human rights violations occurring in developing 
countries. Three main factors drive Indonesia’s preference to block several Human 
Right Council initiatives in dealing with country-specific issues, namely: its over-
sensitivity regarding the notion of territorial integrity, its preference for a regional 
approach, and its aspiring role to be a bridge-builder between Western and developing 
countries.  
The first factor could be seen as a part of Indonesia’s efforts to sustain its territorial 
integrity in light of state transformation that open up the process of internationalisation 
of its domestic issues. The second factor could be interpreted as the need for Indonesia 
to sustain its biographical narrative as a regional leader at the global level. The third 
factor could be seen as the internalisation of alter-expectations towards Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s over-sensitivity regarding the notion of territorial integrity has shaped 
Indonesia’s foreign and security policies since its independence particularly with the 
growth of secessionist movements from 1950 that threatened the newly established 
Republic. Suharto’s authoritarian regime has further institutionalised the foreign and 
security policies that uphold the notion of territorial integrity through Indonesia’s 
doctrine of national resilience that emphasise internal security agenda as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Given its historical experience and geopolitical realities as an archipelagic 
state, the likelihood of challenges towards Indonesia’s territorial integrity remains 
high. Thus, the intersecting internationalisations of human rights abuse and the 
growing independence movements in its Papuan provinces, have made Indonesia more 
likely to shield abusive regimes from international scrutiny in the Council particularly 
in the country-specific issue discussion. This could be attributed to the fear that 
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Indonesia would be in the same position in regard to human rights condition in Papua. 
This consideration, arguably, trumps the alter expectations towards Indonesia as an 
emerging democratic power.  
Furthermore, as previously discussed in Chapter 4, its preference for a regional 
framework to deal with human rights issues has pushed Indonesia to play a greater 
role in setting up a robust regional mechanism instead. Thus, when it comes to the 
discussion over country-specific issues that involved Southeast Asian states, Indonesia 
prefers to discuss it through the regional mechanism. Its preference for regional 
framework particularly in the issue of human rights could be attributed to two main 
reasons. First, the notion of territorial integrity has been highly socialised as a norm 
and practice among ASEAN members.404 This has given the member states an 
assurance that human rights issues will not be used to challenge the notion of territorial 
integrity in the discussion of human rights practice within the ASEAN human rights 
mechanism. Hence, a more institutionalised human right mechanism would not 
jeopardise Indonesia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.405 Second, creating a 
robust regional human rights mechanism by emulating the Western liberal view on 
human rights would provide legitimacy to finding a solution to human rights issues 
through regional mechanisms. Moreover, it also reduces the external pressure 
especially from the West on Southeast Asian human rights practice.406 These two 
reasons would eventually allow Indonesia to engage in promoting human rights norms 
and values without having to suffer heavy sovereignty costs. Furthermore, as argued 
in the previous section, given its struggle to protect its territorial integrity from 
international scrutiny, Indonesia had a reservation and expressed its discomfort with 
the country-specific issues discussed at the global level. 
In global human rights governance, Indonesia’s enactment of the role as a bridge-
builder is also a part of its endeavour to fulfil alter-expectations from the international 
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community. As suggested in an interview with the Director of the Directorate for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Issue: 
Indonesia’s democratisation has provided an opportunity for Indonesia to 
bridge a growing divide among developing and developed countries regarding 
the condition of global human rights issues. Many Western powers such as the 
US and EU expect Indonesia to convey their message to developing countries 
on the need for them to address their human rights issues. While at the same 
time, many diplomats from developing countries with a substantial human 
rights issue expect Indonesia to lobby Western powers to stop naming and 
shaming strategy and focus on helping in enhancing state capacity in 
developing world.”407 
This interview extract reveals how international expectations do indeed play a 
significant role in shaping the perception of Indonesia’s foreign policy elites towards 
the importance of Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder particularly in light of the 
democratisation process. However, Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing 
countries that triumphs developing countries’ interest compels Indonesia’s foreign 
policy elites to shield some developing countries from their poor track records on 
human rights issues in international fora. Hence, Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder 
has become a battleground for role conflict between Indonesia’s newly embraced role 
as an advocate of democracy and human rights and its role conception as a vocal voice 
for developing countries.  
Given this conflict, Indonesia’s aspiring role as a bridge-builder has reduced its role 
as an advocate of democracy and human rights. Indonesia’s bridge-builder role was 
mainly translated into Indonesia’s effort to build strategic partnerships with all major 
countries and most of the world’s emerging powers. In the case of its relations with 
developing countries, the need to play a role as a bridge-builder requires Indonesia to 
be seen as a friend rather than foe. This sometimes means Indonesia’s diplomatic 
engagement is directed to support developing countries’ position. Hence, Indonesia 
most of the time has rejected the naming and shaming approach and prefers to use a 
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dialogue and capacity building approach in dealing with gross human rights violations 
that are allegedly conducted by states. Indonesian policymakers believe that naming 
and shaming would only shift the targeted countries away from the process to engage 
them to change their policy.  
This belief stems from Indonesia’s view that human rights violations occurring in 
various developing countries are the result of the limitation to the capacity of the state 
in providing human rights protection to its people rather than deliberate policy from 
the regime. This stance is translated into Indonesia’s reluctance to support a resolution 
that targets a specific country. To substantiate how these factors explain Indonesia’s 
position regarding country-specific issues in the Human Rights Council, its stance in 




In the case of Sudan, during the second session of the Council meeting in September 
2006, like many Western countries, Indonesia expressed its concern about the dire 
humanitarian situation in Darfur. However, Indonesia’s delegates did not want to 
hastily conclude that there was government support for the killing of its people in 
Darfur. In the eyes of the Indonesian delegation, the conflict in Darfur, which is 
resulting in gross violations of human rights, is the result of the lack of capacity in the 
Sudanese government to provide human rights protection to its people.408 For 
Indonesia, the conflict in Darfur is considered as a problem that is internal to Sudan, 
and thus its perception is that the Sudanese government urgently needs the support of 
friendly countries to deal with its domestic problem.409 As stated by the Foreign 
Minister Hassan Wirajuda, the main issue that must be addressed by the international 
community concerning the humanitarian problem in Darfur, Sudan, is ‘to overcome 
the humanitarian problem itself immediately’. The threat of imposing sanctions is 
                                                          
408 Author’s personal interview with Makarim Wibisono, former Senior diplomat, 24 August 2017. 
409 Veeramalla Anjaiah, “RI to Deploy 140-Member Formed Police Unit to Conflict-Torn Darfur 





inappropriate and not necessarily practical.410 Hence Indonesia preferred to address 
the situation with those operating in the region and stressed the importance of a 
regional solution to the problems in Sudan involving the African Union (AU) 
peacekeeping forces, avoiding more foreign intervention outside the region. 
Indonesia also rejected Western countries’ approach in dealing with Darfur, which 
seemed to treat the Sudanese government as the perpetrators who should face 
international pressure.411 While normatively, Indonesia maintains that it fully supports 
the international community’s endeavours to improve the human rights situation in all 
countries, Indonesia urged that this should take place through genuine dialogue and in 
the spirit of mutual respect. In November 2006, Indonesia voted a resolution that called 
for ‘the international community at large and donor countries and peace partners in 
particular to honour their pledges of support and to provide urgent and adequate 
financial and technical assistance to the Government of Sudan in the promotion and 
protection of human rights’.412 Many Western countries such as Canada and EU 
Countries voted against this. Furthermore, despite criticism from Western countries as 
well as international NGOs regarding the Sudanese government’s lack of cooperation 
with the international community, Indonesia argued that the government of Sudan 
have shown willingness to cooperate with the UN Human Rights mechanism and was 
being ‘open to the outside world’. This can be seen from the presence of NGOs in 
Darfur, which was the highest per capita presence of NGOs in the world at the time.413 
In dealing with the tension in Darfur, the Council conducted the fourth special session 
to discuss the human rights situation in Darfur in mid-December 2006. During the 
special session, Indonesia and many non-Western countries disputed the reports 
stating that numerous human rights violations were being committed in Darfur.414 In 
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order to address this debate regarding the information, it was finally agreed by all 
states, during the fourth special session, to dispatch a high-level mission to Darfur. 
The mission consisted of six highly qualified persons, appointed by the President of 
the Human Rights Council, following consultation with the members of the Council, 
and the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Sudan.415 The Indonesian 
permanent representative to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Makarim Wibisono, was 
selected as one of the members of the high-level mission to Darfur, Sudan. Besides 
Ambassador Wibisono, there was Jody Williams (1997 Nobel Peace laureate), Mar 
Nutt (member of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance), Bertrand 
Ramcharan (former deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights), Patrice Tonda 
(permanent representative of Gabon in Geneva), and Sima Samar (the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan).  
During the fact-finding mission, Ambassador Wibisono announced that he would 
withdraw from the mission.416 The reason for Wibisono’s resignation was due to the 
failure of the team to visit Darfur because permission not being granted by the 
government of Sudan.417 Despite not visiting Darfur, the high-level mission reported 
that indeed human rights violations had been committed in Darfur. Indonesia distanced 
itself from the finding of the high-level mission. Ambassador Wibisono’s resignation 
from the mission can be considered as a diplomatic move by Indonesia to show its 
support for the Sudanese government. This stance represents Indonesia rejection of a 
unilateral approach that does not actively involve the state under investigation in the 
process.  
Indonesia’s aspiring role to be a bridge-builder and its long-standing good relations 
with Sudan may have contributed to Indonesia’s standpoint in defending Sudan at the 
global level. Indonesia’s statements regarding the issues always invoke the need for 
the international community to help rather than to condemn the Sudanese government 
in dealing with the human rights issues in Darfur. However, the main factors hindering 
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Indonesia from assisting in putting international pressure on Sudan is the separatist 
nature of the Darfur conflict.418 Thus, intervention in Sudan might open a Pandora’s 
box for Indonesia given its West Papuan issue at home. There are many calls from 
international NGOs for Council-led investigation on the alleged human rights abuse 
in Papua. In 2014, various international NGOs such as Amnesty International called 
for a quick, independent and impartial investigation into the reports of human rights 
NGOs stating that there were killings and excessive use of power visible to the 
Indonesian security forces in Papua.419 So far, Indonesia has rejected any efforts to 
conduct such investigation. Given the above discussion, the West Papuan issue 
eventually would restrain Indonesia’s support towards the need for country-specific 
discussion at the UN that face conditions similar to those in Indonesia.  
The case of Indonesia’s stance towards Sudan shows that the idea of territorial 
integrity has caused Indonesia to shield abusive regimes and reduce its enactment of 
an advocate of democracy and human rights at the global level. In other words, 
Indonesia is willing to abandon the enactment of role conception when the enactment 
would jeopardise Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, historical experience 
under country-specific issue scrutiny has also informed Indonesia’s policymakers to 
be more suspicious of the process which may be used against Indonesia. Hence the 
fear that allowing pressure through the Council regarding human rights issue would 
backfire towards Indonesia due to its Papuan issue also reduces the enactment of an 
advocate of democracy and human rights. 
 
Myanmar 
The case of Sudan shows how the ambivalent enactment of role conception could be 
attributed to the domestic constraints due to its human rights issue in West Papua. The 
case of Indonesia’s long-standing role as the defender of Myanmar on the global level 
can be explained by its long-term preference for regional solutions to regional 
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problems and its aspiring role to be a bridge-builder between non-democracies and the 
international community. Rather than pushing for regime change through the UN 
Human Rights Council or other UN-related institutions, Indonesia preferred to 
establish a regional framework to influence Naypyidaw to play a more active role in 
protecting the human rights of its citizens and gradually make the transition towards 
democracy.420 Indonesia believed that in dealing with Myanmar, the international 
community should work closely with the military junta and establish trust through 
dialogue and intense communication. When Indonesia held a non-permanent seat at 
the Security Council (2007 – 2008), Indonesia strongly opposed the Council’s 
involvement in relief work in Myanmar to deal with the impact of cyclone Nargis in 
2008 that devastated the country.421 France, at the time, invoked the principle of the 
responsibility to protect to make sure that the aid was delivered to the victims of the 
disaster. Indonesia argued that the Security Council’s involvement would only 
‘jeopardise and undermine aid work, not only for Myanmar but also for future 
humanitarian situations’ since it would undermine Myanmar’s sovereignty.422  
In the Human Rights Council, again Indonesia tends to shield the military junta from 
criticism from the international community. An example of this can be seen in 
Indonesia’s response towards the ethnic conflict in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, 
which erupted in 2012, in which 100,000 Rohingya Muslims were displaced since the 
beginning of the conflict.423 In response to this issue, Indonesia opted to reject the 
adoption of a resolution on the situation of the ethnic Rohingya by the Human Rights 
Council in June 2013, arguing that it was too soon to act despite OIC pressure to 
condemn the attack on the Rohingya. It was finally agreed that the Council would 
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adopt a consensus-based presidential statement on the gross violation of human rights 
towards Rohingya people, rather than voting-based resolution.424 
Furthermore, as observed by the NGO Human Rights Watch, Indonesia played a 
significant role in weakening language on violations and strengthening language on 
progress in the discussion on the human rights resolution in Myanmar. For instance, 
during the 7th session of the Council in March 2008, Slovenia, on behalf of the 
European Union, introduced a draft resolution that expressed concern about 
restrictions to freedom of movement, assembly and association, on the widespread 
practice of torture, forced labour, child soldiers, sexual violence, and ill-treatment of 
detainees in Myanmar.425 Indonesia argued that the resolution should reflect the 
progress made by the Myanmar military junta so that it could be adopted by consensus. 
By doing so, Indonesia believed that it would send a strong message to the Myanmar 
government that the international community supports the progress in Myanmar so 
that the Special Rapporteur would be able to visit the country. By weakening the 
language of the naming and shaming approach, the majority of the resolutions 
concerning the human rights situation in Myanmar could be adopted through a 
consensus. As a result, in August 2008, the Myanmar military junta allowed Tomás 
Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, to 
visit the country.426 
In the case of Myanmar, Indonesia always stressed that it could hardly support 
country-specific resolutions and prefers to monitor the human rights situation in 
particular countries through the UPR. While Indonesia is disinclined to strengthen the 
Advisory Committee and Special Procedures, it was very supportive of the 
establishment of the UPR as a new mechanism within the UN Human Rights Council. 
Indonesia considered the UPR as a mechanism to change the Commission’s practice 
of naming and shaming to a more cooperative model of human rights evaluation. 
Through this mechanism, the Council is obliged to conduct a thorough review on the 
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achievement of human rights obligations by all member states of the UN. The UPR as 
one of the mechanisms for protecting and promoting human rights fits with 
Indonesia’s approach, which emphasises a constructive, non-confrontational and non-
politicized process in reviewing human rights issues within countries.427 According to 
Indonesia, the UPR provides a mechanism that can eliminate selectivity and double 
standards in the promotion and protection of human rights.428 
However, even during the UPR session in 2011, Indonesia continued to ignore the 
massive human rights violations in Myanmar. During the interactive dialogue session 
on Myanmar, the Indonesian delegates stated that they welcomed the positive 
developments in Myanmar recently, including the holding of general elections and the 
release of Aung San Suu Kyi. The delegate even further stated that these developments 
would bring even more significant changes in the social and political life of the people 
of Myanmar. However, many international observers had stated that the 2010 
Myanmar General Election could not be considered democratic due to the structural 
constraints that made the election not credible, including the allocation of seats to the 
military junta.429 Nevertheless, Indonesia insisted that pushing and condemning the 
military junta would not help in Myanmar’s transition towards democracy. Thus, 
Indonesia is more likely to continue its effort to shield Myanmar from criticism at the 
international level and prefers to address the human rights issues through a bilateral 
and regional mechanism. 
The discussion above shows that the role as a bridge-builder was enacted in 
Indonesia’s approach towards Myanmar in the Council while the role as an advocate 
of democracy and human rights was largely absent. This might be attributed to the 
need for Indonesia to convince Myanmar that it genuinely wants to help the process 
of democratisation. For Indonesian policymakers, the global level may not be the most 
suitable place to help the Myanmar transition given the Western approach that put 
Myanmar as the guilty party which alienated the Myanmar government. Thus, 
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Indonesia prefers to actively promote democracy and human rights towards Myanmar 
through regional and bilateral relations, but enacts a different role at the global level. 
Moreover, as suggested in Chapter 2, the different enactment of roles at the regional 
and global level might be attributed to the difference in how alter expectations are 
internalised. These factors are: (1) historical constraints preventing the state from 
incorporating alter expectations into their role conceptualisation; (2) the structural 
difference between a regional and global order which in turn structurally affects the 
expectations and pattern of behaviour of the state. 
These factors arguably affect the abandonment of the role as an advocate of democracy 
and human rights in the case of Indonesia’s approach towards Myanmar in the 
Council. First, although Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democracy has been a part 
of Indonesia’s state identity in the post-authoritarian era, it is yet to be a part of 
Indonesia’s biographical narrative that needs to be sustained. Thus, at the global level, 
where the enactment of such roles may jeopardise Indonesia’s domestic and regional 
interests, the role would be easily abandoned. This is especially true for Indonesia’s 
role enactment towards Myanmar at the global level.  
Secondly, alter expectation for Indonesia to be an advocate of democracy and human 
rights may not be as strong as the one at the regional level. At the global level, 
Indonesia is also occupied and criticised with its human rights issue in Papua and has 
no higher moral ground in regard to advocate democracy to other countries. Hence, 
Indonesia is more confident in positioning itself as a bridge-builder at the global level 




While its preference for a regional solution to a regional problem can explain 
Indonesia’s reluctance to put pressure on the Myanmar military junta, Indonesia’s 
long-standing support for North Korea by shielding its regime from scrutiny in the 
Council is somewhat puzzling. Indonesia is the only functioning democracy which is 
considered very tolerant towards the gross human rights violations that occur in North 
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Korea. Considering that the human rights situation in North Korea is not challenging 
North Korea’s territorial integrity and there is no proper regional mechanism to 
address the issue, Indonesia should have more political space to join western countries 
to put pressure on North Korea in regard to its human rights situation. However, in 
reality, Indonesia seems reluctant to criticise the North Korean government regarding 
their human rights situation. This is reflected in Indonesia’s voting behaviour in the 
UN Human Rights Council as well as the UN General Assembly on resolutions related 
to the human rights situation in North Korea. 
Indonesia’s reluctance to put pressure on North Korea might stem from its long-
standing good relations with North Korea, which give Indonesia a unique opportunity 
to be a bridge-builder between isolated North Korea and the international community. 
In terms of its relations with other countries, North Korea turned its focus to bilateral 
relations with Indonesia since it perceives Indonesia under Yudhoyono as one of the 
few democratic countries with which it still has good relations. According to former 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, cooperation with North Korea 
continues to be developed and is part of a broader strategy of Indonesia's foreign policy 
at the global level.430 By engaging with North Korea, Indonesian foreign policymakers 
believe that North Korea could be as open as Myanmar. Natalegawa argued that 
through this interaction – communication in all fields, including sports, trade, 
investment and cultural exchange – Indonesia can help North Korea to put an end to 
isolation from the international community.431 
In order to establish self-confidence for North Korea to engage with the international 
community, the Indonesian government has continued its efforts to make North Korea 
feel comfortable to interact with Indonesia as well as to exchange views with 
Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia’s stance that seems to shield North Korea from criticism 
in the UN Human Rights Council resolutions is part of the Indonesian strategy to 
engage with North Korea.432 Indeed according to Indonesian policymakers, 
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Indonesia’s effort in engaging North Korea has had some positive effect. North Korea 
has seen Indonesia as an honest mediator that can potentially help to mediate a return 
to the Six-Party Talks.433 North Korea Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong has submitted a 
proposal to the Indonesian foreign minister, which might ease the tension in the region. 
North Korea hoped that Indonesia could communicate the proposal to other parties.  
South Korea also has a similar view to North Korea in regard to Indonesia’s potential 
role in mediating the conflict between the two countries. Given its good and healthy 
relations with both Koreas, the Ambassador of South Korea (ROK) to Indonesia, Cho 
Tai-young, hoped that Indonesia could engage more actively in campaigning for peace 
on the Korean peninsula. 
However, Indonesia’s efforts to engage North Korea with the international community 
are forcing Indonesia not to raise concerns about its human rights abuse. Indonesia is 
one of a few countries along with China, Cuba and Russia that never vote in favour of 
UN Human Rights Council Resolutions on the human rights situation in North Korea. 
Furthermore, in 2013, during Indonesia’s diplomatic visit to North Korea, the 
Indonesian delegation did not discuss human rights and democracy in North Korea. 
The official meeting only included a discussion on the economic relations between the 
two countries.434 
Marzuki Darusman, a former Indonesian Attorney General and politician who is also 
the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in North Korea, urged the Indonesian 
government to change its attitude towards North Korea and follow the international 
mainstream, which supports a resolution that condemns the human rights situation in 
North Korea.435 Indeed there is a shifting from Indonesian voting behaviour in UN 
Human Rights Council regarding human rights situation in North Korea. As seen in 
the table below, from 2008 to 2010, Indonesia always voted against resolutions on the 
human rights situation in North Korea. However, from 2014, due to pressure by both 
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domestic NGOs as well as the international community, Indonesia shifted its voting to 
abstain. As stated by Foreign Minister Natalegawa:  
Indonesia continues to review and adjust its position on various issues 
concerning the human rights situation in certain countries, which receive 
special attention from year to year, both in the Human Rights Council and in 
the General Assembly, based on a constructive spirit for the promotion and 
protection of human rights.436 
Despite the shift, many Indonesian human rights activists have urged that rather than 
abstaining, Indonesia should have voted yes to the resolution on North Korea to send 
a strong message to the regime regarding the human rights abuse that is happening in 
the country.437 However, it seems that Indonesia prefers not to directly persuade North 
Korea to improve the human rights situation in the communist state. Thus, it is not 
surprising that many critics find that Indonesia’s approach towards North Korea 
undermines its commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights on a 
global level.  
 
Table 5.2 Indonesia’s voting record regarding North Korea 
Year Number Title Vote 
2008 7/15 The situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Against 
2009 10/16 The situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Against 
2010 13/14 The situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Against 
2012 19/13 The situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Consensus 
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Year Number Title Vote 
2013 19/13 The situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Consensus 
2014 25/25 The situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Abstention 
2015 28/22 The situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Abstention 
Source: Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/un/elections/asia/indonesia.htm  
 
Conclusion 
The empirical analysis of its role in the UN Human Rights Council shows that 
Indonesia has ambivalent roles when it comes to promoting human rights norm at the 
global level. While Indonesia’s stance regarding strengthening human rights 
mechanism seems to challenge the Western-dominated liberal international order, the 
cause of such a stance does not stem from Indonesia’s search for autonomy from 
Western values. Domestically, Indonesia has widened its engagement with the 
international human rights regime through the signing, accession or ratification of 
international human rights instruments. Regionally, it has become a proponent that 
pushes to make the agenda of human rights central to ASEAN’s objectives and 
mechanisms. The evidence above further suggests that Indonesia’s domestic political 
issue related to its territorial integrity, namely the problem of the separatist movement 
in the provinces of West Papua, has forced it to block initiatives to strengthen global 
human rights governance by endorsing the negative reform of the UN Human Rights 
Council. This can be attributed to the fear that a more powerful UN mechanism would 
backfire for Indonesia considering that its domestic separatist issue is yet to be 
resolved. 
As argued in Chapter 2, there are two types of role conflict stemming from differences 
between regional and global levels. The first is where one particular role is manifested 
differently at the regional and global levels. The second is where one particular role is 
highly performed and seemingly treated as a part of state identity in one level but  
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contested and utterly disregarded in the other level. The above analysis shows that the 
reason for Indonesia’s lack of enactment of the role as an advocate of democracy and 
human rights at the global level can be attributed to the emergence of the second type 
of role conflict. In our case, the role as an advocate of democracy and human rights is 
highly enacted at the regional level but seemingly abandoned at the global level. The 
reason for this, as argued throughout the chapter, could be linked to three main 
considerations driving Indonesia’s stance in global human rights governance 
especially in relation to country-specific issues.  
The first is the extent to which the human rights problems in specific countries are 
framed and discussed in a way that might threaten the territorial integrity of the 
country under scrutiny. The international scrutiny that might threaten the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity are more likely to be opposed by Indonesia. This is important 
for Indonesia given that it has historical experience being scrutinised and still has 
ongoing separatist movement issue in its Papuan provinces in which the issue of 
human rights could be mobilised to internationalise the secessionist movement 
agenda. The second is the extent to which regional mechanisms can handle and 
provide a solution to human rights issues. Given its long-standing focus on regional 
solutions for the regional problem, Indonesia is more likely to prefer a regional 
mechanism to solve human rights issues, which reduces the likelihood of outsider 
intervention. The third is the extent to which Indonesia can exploit its position as a 
bridge-builder at the international level. Given its rising profile at the international 
level as an emerging democratic power, Indonesia has increasingly taken on the role 
of bridge-builder between developing countries and the developed world. 
As a bridge-builder, Indonesia tends to see the outbreak of human rights violations in 
developing countries as the inability of the state to protect its citizens. In this regard, 
for Indonesia, the issue of human rights cannot be separated from the issue of a state’s 
capacity to govern and administer its territory effectively. Thus, the solution for human 
rights violations should be directed more to the role of the international community to 
help the state to be able to perform the function of providing security and protection 
rather than shaming the state. This stance has made Indonesia, from the beginning, 
express its discomfort with country-specific issues, which can be highly politicised. 
While the role indeed provides Indonesia with leverage to socialise an abusive regime 
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towards the international community, it also creates an ambivalent role for Indonesia 
in global human rights governance. By using the justification that it tries to engage the 
abusive regime with the international community, this stand causes Indonesia to be 
seen as a country that protects abusive regimes from the pressure of the international 
community which stands in contrast with its effort to promote democracy and human 






















































Managing domestic contestation: Indonesia’s role in 
regional trade governance 
 
Introduction 
In the previous part, this thesis showed how Indonesia’s ambivalent role in the realm 
of democracy and human rights issues could be attributed to the emergence of inter-
role conflict in the enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions in the post-authoritarian 
period. The previous part also touched upon the importance of domestic political 
processes such as historical experience and the state transformation process undergone 
since the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. This part, which consists of this 
chapter and the next one, examines Indonesia’s role conceptions within regional and 
global trade governance. The chapters aim to show how the enactment of Indonesia’s 
role conceptions in the economic realm, particularly in regard to trade governance, 
face different challenges to its role enactment in the realm of democracy and human 
rights.  
At the regional level, Indonesia has enacted the role of advocate of democracy and 
human rights in the region. However, at the global level, Indonesia has been prevented 
from enacting such a role due to efforts to sustain its bridge-builder role as well as the 
need to counter the internationalisation of the separatist movement in Papua. In 
contrast with the human rights issue, this thesis finds that Indonesia’s role as a regional 
leader is more constrained in the realm of regional trade governance while it plays a 
more significant role in global trade governance by taking the role of bridge-builder. 
This chapter aims to explain this puzzle by examining how the process of state 
transformation, which has led to a fragmented state agency, hinders the coherent 
enactment of Indonesia’s role conception in the realm of trade governance. To do so, 
this chapter analyses the ambivalence between Indonesia’s role conceptions and its 
trade policy in enhancing free trade at the regional level through the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), and the ongoing negotiation of a mega-regional project, 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 
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As argued in Chapter 3, the insistence of Indonesia’s support towards the regional 
integration project is the result of its role as a regional leader being treated as a 
reflection of Indonesia’s biographical narrative, which can legitimise the enactment of 
such a role in regional trade governance. This chapter argues that Indonesia’s ambition 
to enact the role of regional leader in Southeast Asia by continuously providing new 
ideas and direction to regional institution-building has pushed its foreign trade rhetoric 
to support liberal economic policies. However, the enactment of such a role has been 
hindered precisely because the translation of the role of regional leader within regional 
trade governance has taken the form of the advancement of a project aimed at 
integrating the region into one single market. The neoliberal norm underpinning the 
project has not been well-received by the majority of domestic actors in Indonesia and 
has only been advocated by economic and technocratic elites. As a result, the 
enactment of the role of regional leader in the realm of regional trade governance is 
not thoroughly embraced by policymakers in other ministries.  
The conceptualisation of such roles is mostly driven by the foreign policy agenda, set 
out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The issue is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has no competence in the realm of trade issues. Instead, such a role conception is 
primarily articulated into a set of regional trade policy goals and objectives within the 
authority of ministries such as the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. These ministries are also responsible for translating the 
international commitment made at the regional level into domestic policies. This 
considerable institutional set-up has created fragmentation in the enactment of 
Indonesia’s role conception in the realm of regional trade governance. Moreover, the 
state transformation process has also given space for domestic economy actors, that 
may be resistant towards the enactment of certain roles, to influence and capture the 
ministries focusing on the implementation of trade policy commitments to reject the 
enactment of such roles.  
As a result, there is substantial incoherence in the enactment of Indonesia’s role 
conception in the realm of regional trade governance and the policies it implements. 
While Indonesia rhetorically subscribes to one particular role conception, at the policy 
level this role conception is not reflected in the policies made by other ministries 
responsible for translating the role conception into policies. However, despite 
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attracting significant domestic contestation, Indonesia’s role conception towards 
regional trade governance can still be characterised as that of an aspiring regional 
leader due to the role legitimation process mobilised by policymakers. 
To substantiate the argument, this chapter is organised as follows. In the second 
section, it provides an overview of the impact of Indonesia’s state transformation on 
its trade policymaking process. It also explains how this state transformation has 
affected the enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions in regard to regional trade 
governance. The third section discusses how the insistent enactment of the role of 
regional leader in enhancing the AEC as a part of continuing Indonesia’s biographical 
narrative has been contested by a coalition of domestic political actors and other state 
agency particularly the Ministry of Industry. The fourth section examines the 
enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions in its negotiating position in the ongoing 
RCEP negotiations. In particular, the section discusses how Indonesia needs to balance 
the growing pressure from the mainstream nationalistic view of its socio-economic 
and aspiration to maintain its leadership in pushing forward the RCEP negotiation. 
The last section provides an overall discussion of how the state transformation 
literature provides a more nuanced understanding of the enactment of role 
conceptions. 
 
State transformation and Indonesia’s trade policy 
In this section, I discuss how Indonesia’s state transformation process affects its role 
enactment within regional trade governance. Much of the literature on the political 
economy of Southeast Asian trade policy is mainly state-centric in its analysis in which 
states are treated as generally enjoying a substantial autonomy from domestic actors’ 
interests in formulating foreign economic policies.438 Thus, compared with other 
studies on the US or the EU trade policy, the literature on the domestic politics of trade 
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policy in Asian countries is often very thin.439 Building upon the tradition of political 
economy studies of regional integration project that focus on how the domestic 
political economy processes have shaped the outcome of regional economic 
integration projects, in this thesis, I aim to link the discussion with the literature on 
foreign policy analysis. To do so, in this section, I discuss the state transformation 
process within a broader discussion on role theory. I focus primarily with respect to 
how the process complicates the interactions within state institutions that affect the 
overall role enactment by the state at the regional level. In our case, while one agency 
within the state such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have a higher autonomy to 
conceptualise Indonesia’s role conception in regional trade governance, however, the 
implementation of such role conception may become an arena for contestation by other 
agencies that have diverging interest. This contestation is made possible by the process 
of state transformation. 
As previously stated in Chapter 2, along with the democratisation process that has led 
the country to embrace democratic norms, Indonesia has also undergone a state 
transformation process that has altered the organising principle of the Indonesian state. 
While under Suharto’s authoritarian regime, the organising principle revolved around 
a supreme patriarch that put the regime above society, in the post-authoritarian period, 
democratisation has opened up the marketplace of potential patrons to domestic 
economic-political actors, enabling them to compete with one another to capture the 
agency or apparatus within the state.440  
This competition between domestic political actors in capturing and influencing the 
government agencies and apparatus has been more apparent within the realm of the 
economic policy-making process, particularly among those related to international 
trade-related issues. As shown by Basri and Hill, the effect of the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime is evident in the formulation of trade policies. While under 
Suharto’s authoritarian regime, trade policy-making was centralised based on the 
technocratic outlook of elite circles, in the post-authoritarian era, Indonesia’s trade 
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policy making has been democratised with a growing number of domestic actors 
playing more significant roles in affecting the outcome of Indonesia’s trade policies.441 
That is not to mention that decentralisation, as one of the important features of 
Indonesian democratisation, has made the policy-making process more diffused, 
involving actors from a wide range of levels.  
Thus, while under an authoritarian regime, the policy-making process in the area of 
trade issues was centralised, which provided a coherent policy outcome, in the post-
authoritarian era, the political economic landscape of the policy-making process in 
regard to trade issues has been more fragmented and decentralised, which has created 
a conflicting and incoherent policy outcome. As a result, the Indonesian democratic 
transition has made Indonesia prone to domestic dynamics in influencing its trade, just 
as democratic countries are prone to domestic political dynamics, as shown by several 
IPE literature on domestic politics and trade policy.442 
In the post-authoritarian period, the Ministry of Trade is the main focal point for the 
government in formulating Indonesia’s negotiating position in the regional and global 
multilateral trade system. This stems from the authority of the Ministry to formulate 
both international and domestic trade policy. However, as shown in Chapter 3, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs also plays a significant role in the decision-making process 
regarding international trade negotiations given that international trade policies can 
also relate to Indonesian foreign policy objectives. This is particularly true within the 
realm of regional economic governance, in which regional economic integration 
projects have been used as a platform for Yudhoyono’s administration to enhance 
Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. This means that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
also plays an active and vital role alongside the Ministry of Trade in the preparation 
of trade negotiations in the area of regional and multilateral governance.  
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Besides these two central ministries, other agencies have important roles in the 
formulation of the country’s regional trade policy, namely, the Coordinating Ministry 
for Economy, the Ministry of Finance and the National Development Planning 
Agency, as well as other sectoral ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Labour.443 The involvement of other 
ministries within the trade policy-making process has created a major challenge for 
the Ministry of Trade in pursuing its international trade agenda. As argued by Bird, 
Hill and Cuthbertson, the institutional problem for Indonesia in the post-authoritarian 
era in articulating its international trade policy, particularly during Yudhoyono’s 
presidency, has been the absence of a single minister able ‘to take control over the full 
array of trade policy instruments and to adopt an economy-wide public interest 
viewpoint’.444  
During Yudhoyono’s presidency, the international trade agenda was also used as a 
platform for the foreign policy establishment to further Indonesia’s foreign policy 
objectives. The core of Indonesia’s enactment of the role of regional leader in the 
realm of trade governance is its support for the liberalisation of the Southeast Asian 
market through a regional free trade agreement. The Indonesian foreign policy agenda, 
which emphasises a stronger regional institution, could be achieved through 
promoting the creation of a regional economic integration project in Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, through the creation of a trade agreement that puts ASEAN at the centre, 
Indonesian policymakers in the foreign policy establishment hope that Indonesia can 
make ASEAN central in the evolving regional order in East Asia. In this regard, 
Indonesia’s trade policies, which are accommodating towards the liberalisation 
project, support Indonesia’s enactment of the role of regional leader, which 
emphasises the strengthening of ASEAN both internally and externally. 
However, the Ministry of Trade, which has become the focal point in coordinating 
Indonesia’s position in many trade-related negotiations, has been constrained by 
domestic economic actors in enacting foreign trade policies that may not favour their 
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interests. It seems to be the case that the role conceptions projected by President 
Yudhoyono and his foreign policy establishment through a commitment to enhancing 
free trade have not been followed by implementation by other relevant state agencies. 
Although on paper, there is coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Ministry of Trade, so that the policies and positions taken by the Ministry of Trade 
reflect the projection of Indonesia’s role conception, in reality, the coordination is a 
chaotic process that is seldom leading to coherent outcomes.445 
In the realm of democracy and human rights governance, the emergence of role 
conflict has been mainly caused by the different global and regional contexts in which 
Indonesia enacts its roles. In the realm of regional trade governance, given the 
fragmentation of the Indonesian state, the constraint over the enactment of its role 
conception appears to be mainly due to the incoherence in articulating the role 
conception between the Indonesian foreign policy establishment and the policymakers 
in charge of trade issues. This is because, while the foreign trade agenda is mobilised 
to pursue the role of regional leader, the ministries responsible for articulating such an 
agenda are still profoundly influenced by domestic socio-economic actors that tend to 
lean more towards protectionist policies. 
As stated by the Director General of International Trade within the Ministry of Trade: 
In Indonesia, international trade decision-making involves many ministries, 
and coordination among ministries is quite absent in the synchronisation of our 
voices abroad and decisions taken at home. This is because sometimes we have 
different visions. Although internally our stance would be different, we always 
voice out the same vision in our negotiations position. I can make sure we 
always get along together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is just that 
the profile is different between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Trade; 
the Foreign Ministry may be more active in voicing out their position because 
they do not have domestic constituents that are sensitive as in the economic 
sector as faced by the Ministry of Trade.446 
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To enact the role of regional leader in the realm of regional trade governance, there 
were efforts to contextualise Indonesia’s commitment towards such a role by 
advocating in favour of the trade liberalisation process in the region. This is evident in 
the number of free trade agreements signed by Indonesia in the last few decades, which 
has grown significantly despite the lack of coherence with the domestic regulations 
issued.447 During Yudhoyono’s presidency, Indonesia had eight FTAs in effect, of 
which six were part of the regional free trade agreement through ASEAN Plus one 
free trade agreement with Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Japan and Korea. 
Only two are bilateral, namely the Indonesia-Japan EPA and the Indonesia-Pakistan 
FTA. These agreements mean that Indonesia has FTAs with trading partners that 
account for 67 percent of its total trade (see table 6.1). Moreover, during Yudhoyono’s 
presidency, Indonesia launched negotiations for seven more free trade agreements. 
Although, compared to other ASEAN countries, the number of Indonesia’s free trade 
agreements could be considered modest, the number of free trade agreements 
discussed and signed shows that Yudhoyono’s presidency aspired to have a friendly 
policy towards the regional integration project as well as supporting the trade 













Table 6.1 FTAs launched and signed during Yudhoyono era, 2004 – 2014 
No Name Status Dates 
1 ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement   




2 ASEAN-People’s Republic of China 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement   
Signed and In 
Effect 
1 July 2005 
3 ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership    




4 ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement   




5 ASEAN- Korea Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement   
Signed and In 
Effect 
1 June 2007 
6 Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership 
Agreement   
Signed and In 
Effect 
1 July 2008 




8 Preferential Tariff Arrangement-Group of 
Eight Developing Countries   




9 ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free Trade 
Agreement   
Launched 11 July 2014 
10 India-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Arrangement   
Launched 4 October 
2011 
11 Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement   
Launched 26 September 
2012 
12 Indonesia-Chile Free Trade Agreement Launched 2014 
13 Indonesia-European Free Trade Association 
Free Trade Agreement    
Launched 31 January 
2011 
14 Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership   
Launched 9 May 2013 
15 Korea-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement   Launched 12 July 2012 




Figure 6.1 Comparison of number FTAs for selected countries 
 
Source: WTO RTA-IS database https://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx  
 
The Ministry of Industry, however, responded to the commitment to enhance the 
liberalisation process through FTAs made by the Ministry of Trade with more 
restrictive measures, instead of liberalising measures. Contestation from the Ministry 
regarding Indonesia’s growing liberalisation is illustrated by the statements and 
policies expressed, which do not correspond to the position expressed by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade. The contestation became more apparent 




















































the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry, in the early months of 
Yudhoyono’s presidency.  
Since the separation, the Ministry of Industry has become the agency that is 
continuously lobbying for and pushing the agenda of protectionism. The Ministry of 
Industry has even pushed for a temporary suspension of FTAs as one of its priorities 
due to the negative effect these bring to the Indonesian manufacturing sector.448 MS 
Hidayat, the Minister of Industry during Yudhoyono’s presidency, stressed that FTAs 
should not only emphasise the trade aspect as negotiated by the Ministry of Trade but 
should also include investment commitments such as opening up new factories and 
technology transfer in order to make them beneficial for the Indonesian industrial and 
manufacturing sector.449 Despite the call for an FTA moratorium from the Ministry of 
Industry, the Ministry of Trade asserted that there would be no attempt to temporarily 
halt the FTAs between Indonesia and its partner countries. 
Moreover, while several units within the Ministry of Trade were designed to enhance 
free trade, the units and bureaucratic structure within the Ministry of Industry was 
designed to impede the process. For instance, when the Ministry of Trade formed the 
Directorate General of International Trade Negotiations, the Ministry of Industry 
established the Directorate General of Resilience and Development of International 
Industrial Access. While the Directorate General at the Ministry of Trade was tasked 
with creating policies to deepen and widen Indonesia’s international trade, the 
Directorate General of Resilience and Development of International Industrial Access 
issued protectionist policies.450 Hence, there is a widespread perception at the Ministry 
of Trade that the formation of the general directorate and directorate within the 
Ministry of Industry aimed to undermine the policies created by the Ministry of Trade. 
In the post-authoritarian era, the state transformation process also allows growing 
efforts by business actors to try to bring the government agencies in line with their 
economic interests. Several business associations have been successful in such an 
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endeavour. Chief among these is the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
known as KADIN. The initial goal of establishing KADIN in Suharto’s era was for its 
members to become a government partner in the planning, implementation and 
evaluation of economic programmes desired by the government. The link between 
KADIN and the government was so strong during Suharto’s authoritarian regime era 
that it became an extension of the regime to keep businesses in line with the regime’s 
vision and mission in the economic sector.451 KADIN’s influential position prompted 
business people to become members of the Chamber to gain access to business from 
the government.  
In the post-authoritarian period, KADIN has transformed into an interest group that is 
constantly lobbying the government agencies that deal with economic issues.452 The 
Ministry of Industry is the part of the state whose vision and interests are most in line 
with that of KADIN. In fact, since 2004, there has been an unwritten convention in 
which the minister post for the Ministry of Industry always goes to the former 
chairman or other high-ranking officials of KADIN. Thus, arguably, the Ministry of 
Industry has been captured by KADIN. Through the Ministry of Industry, the 
Indonesian private sector can enhance its agenda and interests by influencing and 
contesting the policies made by other state apparatuses that are not in line with their 
interests. 
Besides KADIN, labour and farmer unions are domestic actors that are active in 
voicing their rejection of the notion of regional market integration. Normatively, 
Labour and farmers movements such as the All-Indonesia Trade Union Confederation 
(KSPI), Federation of Indonesian Workers Struggle (FPBI), and Indonesian Peasant 
Union (SPI) have rejected the introduction of free markets in ASEAN. Nevertheless, 
the lobbying of the labour movement on issues related to regional economic 
integration is not as intense as the entrepreneurs who are generally represented by 
KADIN that able to influence Indonesia’s state apparatus. This may be because in the 
post-authoritarian regime the labour movement in Indonesia is fragmented and still 
struggling with issues of labour dispute with employers. 
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As discussed above, the fragmentation of the Indonesian state apparatus plays a 
significant role in making the enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions ambivalent. 
The ambivalent enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions in the realm of trade also 
stems from the lack of acceptance of the neoliberal norm within Indonesia’s political 
establishment. As argued in Chapter 4, Indonesia’s transition towards democracy 
could be translated into the role of advocate of democracy and human rights at the 
regional level. However, Indonesia still has an internal debate regarding the neoliberal 
norm as the governing principle of the market.  
In the Indonesian context, which resonates with a broader phenomenon of democratic 
transition in Latin America and the former socialist states, the neoliberalism agenda 
has been framed as necessary part of the transition to democracy. 453  The neoliberalism 
agenda, which includes extensive privatisation and the promotion of alliances between 
foreign and domestic capital, was believed to be able to dissolve rent-seeking 
behaviour by the government in the Indonesian market. Moreover, the opening up of 
the Indonesian market to the world economy is believed to have exposed Indonesia to 
more international pressure to preserve democracy.  
Although the relation is strongly contested, given that there is also the phenomenon in 
which authoritarianism is continuing to thrive in the neoliberalising Southeast Asian 
state,454 neoliberal reforms are often presented as being in favour of democracy.455 
Hence, Indonesia’s neoliberal reform is treated as part of a broader democratisation 
process. This has solidified the need for Indonesia to promote neoliberal values 
throughout the region as part of an effort to create a sound and cohesive regional 
integration project. As a result, many within Indonesia’s foreign policy establishment, 
along with technocrats in the Ministry of Finance and President Yudhoyono himself, 
have framed the need for Indonesia to be the driver of the regional economic 
integration project as part of the larger effort to enact the role of advocate of 
democracy and human rights. 
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In his speech before the ASEAN Forum, Yudhoyono reiterated his notion of ASEAN’s 
values also embracing the free market: 
Today we have to rethink ASEAN in that new light. We have to think in terms 
of the need for political cohesiveness among the members of the ASEAN 
family. Such political cohesiveness should stem from a shared commitment to 
the fundamental values of democracy, human rights and the free market.456 
In this speech, Yudhoyono made clear that he  perceived the importance of free market 
within ASEAN as part of a wider, strategic, objective concerning  the need to utilise 
some form of economic statecraft to maintain ASEAN political unity. However, at the 
policy level, this objective has not been well implemented.  In the political and security 
realm, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Yudhoyono’s presidency put many 
resources into enacting the role of advocate of democracy and human rights norms 
within ASEAN. However, in the realm of regional economic integration, the 
administration seems to be more restrained in voicing support for economic openness 
and liberalisation, which affects further economic regional integration. Indonesia’s 
biographical narrative as a post-colonial state has, to some extent, affected how the 
idea of free trade is seen among both Indonesia’s political elites and the broader public.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Indonesian economy, 
when a neoliberal prescription were forced on Indonesia by the IMF,457 there was a 
growing perception among the political elites and Indonesian public that Indonesia 
was under foreign influence. However, for many economic liberals, the IMF 
interventions have been treated as recipes for optimism, particularly in regard to the 
opening up of Indonesia’s engagement with the regional and global economic order.458 
Several high-profile economists, bureaucrats and politicians who are more 
internationalised in their outlook, such as Sri Mulyani, Chatib Basri and Mari Elka 
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Pangestu served in Yudhoyono’s economic team. The number of economic 
technocrats that served in Yudhoyono’s administration who were much more inclined 
towards economic openness, rather than protectionism, resulted in the perception that 
the administration adhered to market liberalisation.  
Furthermore, while at the beginning, Indonesia’s role of regional leader was developed 
within the context of political and security cooperation, the evolution of ASEAN into 
a single regional market has affected Indonesia’s articulation of the role of regional 
leader. The foreign policy establishment legitimise Indonesia’s support towards 
economic integration of ASEAN as a part of the enactment of its role as a regional 
leader. It is not surprising to see that Indonesia frequently opts to forge FTAs with 
partner countries through ASEAN rather than bilateral agreement. By doing this, 
Yudhoyono’s government could legitimise the proliferation of the FTAs towards its 
domestic audiences as a part of Indonesia’s role in making ASEAN central to the 
broader evolution of the East Asian regional order. The next section will further 
substantiate this claim. 
 
Fragmented enactment of roles in the AEC 
Having discussed how Indonesia’s state transformation may have affected the 
enactment of its role conceptions, this section illustrates the dynamics of the enactment 
of Indonesia’s role conception in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The AEC 
is a further deepening of the ASEAN economic integration process that began with 
the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement signed on 28 January 1992 in 
Singapore. The objective of AFTA is to increase ASEAN’s competitive edge as a 
production base in the world market through the elimination of tariffs, by creating a 
common effective preferential tariff scheme. While AFTA focuses solely on trade 
related to goods, and covers nearly 98 percent of all tariff lines in ASEAN, there is an 
urge to further integrate the economies of ASEAN member countries to strengthen 
ASEAN’s economic cohesion. After the economic crisis in Southeast Asia, at the 9th 
ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia in 2003, the ASEAN Heads of State agreed to 
establish the ASEAN Community through the declaration of the ASEAN Bali 
Concord II. The AEC was envisioned as a regional community based on three pillars, 
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namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APCS), the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). In order to 
establish the AEC by 2015, the member countries agreed to transform ASEAN into a 
regional economic community through the implementation of several measures 
referred to in the AEC Blueprint. 
The AEC Blueprint published in 2008 contains four main components, namely: (1) 
ASEAN as a single market and production base supported by the free flow of goods, 
services, investments, high-skilled labour and capital; (2) ASEAN as an area of high 
economic competitiveness, with competition rules, consumer protection, intellectual 
property rights, infrastructure development, taxation, and e-commerce; (3) ASEAN as 
an area with equitable economic development with elements of small and medium 
enterprise development, and ASEAN integration initiatives for CMLV countries; and 
(4) ASEAN as a region that is fully integrated with the global economy that needs to 
have a coherent approach to economic relations outside the region, and increasing 
participation in global production networks.459 The blueprint also stipulates that there 
are twelve priority sectors to be integrated within the framework of the ASEAN 
Economic Community. Seven of these are goods sectors, namely the agro-industry, 
fisheries, the rubber-based industry, textile and textile products, wood and wood 
products, electronic equipment and the automotive industry. The rest are service 
sectors, namely air transportation, health services, tourism, logistics, and the 
information technology industry or e-ASEAN. The integration of these sectors would 
certainly bring implications, especially in terms of the movement of goods and 
services among ASEAN countries being increasingly free. In addition, the integration 
is also expected to affect the movement of factors of production, especially labour 
movement, among member countries.460 
Unlike in the democracy and human rights realm, since the beginning, Indonesia’s 
foreign policy elites have not invested many resources into enhancing the ASEAN 
regional integration project through economic integration. From the beginning, 
Singapore drove the regional economic integration project through AFTA and later on 
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the AEC. Although Indonesia did not play an essential part in initiating the regional 
integration project, the Indonesian foreign policy and economic establishment, 
particularly during Yudhoyono’s presidency, has increasingly treated the idea of 
forging closer economic integration among Southeast Asian members through the 
AEC as part of Indonesia’s geopolitical strategy to maintain ASEAN’s centrality, 
rather than just seeing it as in its economic interests.  
Arguably, Indonesia’s support in enhancing the economic integration agenda is 
framed as part of Indonesia’s enactment of the role of regional leader.461 Its aspiring 
role to be a regional leader within ASEAN requires Indonesia to be able to maintain 
the relevance of ASEAN within the evolving nature of regional governance in East 
Asia, not only in the realm of security but also in regard to the economy. For other 
ASEAN members, Indonesia’s regional leadership role is also crucial for the AEC to 
be successful, given the sheer size of its economy and population. As stated by Datuk 
Seri Nazir Razak, a chairperson of the Malaysian CIMB Group, a leading Bank in 
Malaysia, ‘ASEAN is nothing without Indonesia’.462  
The analysis above is in line with Ravenhill’s argument that the pursuit of a broader 
regional trade agreement in East Asia is not driven mainly by economic opportunities 
but rather by political and security considerations.463 This is particularly true for the 
case of the AEC. The idea of establishing the AEC was part of the response to the 
financial crisis of 1997-1998, which required the ASEAN member states to further 
enhance their loose cooperation in a more structured and binding framework for policy 
coordination. As a result, the AEC was devised by the political elites to maintain the 
relevance of ASEAN in the light of the growing economic interdependence of the 
ASEAN members with other regional powers, such as China, Japan and South Korea. 
The strengthening and institutionalisation of the AEC aimed to avoid the 
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marginalisation of ASEAN by major powers and its disintegration due to a lack of 
cohesiveness among its member countries. 
The enactment of Indonesia’s role of regional leader within the realm of trade 
governance, however, is not as straightforward as it is within the realm of human rights 
governance. Indonesia is hardly an innovative actor in pushing the economic 
integration agenda within the framework of ASEAN. In fact, Indonesia tends to be 
more inclined to treat regional economic integration in Southeast Asia as a form of 
regulatory regionalism that functions as a platform to establish further coordination 
among state agencies and to harmonise the changes regarding domestic regulation.464 
This tendency is illustrated in Indonesia’s active involvement in regional reguatory 
initiatives such as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), the Asian 
Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) and the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility 
(CGIF). Those initatives aim to strengthen the financial safety net for members of 
ASEAN Plus Three.465 None of these initiatives are strictly ASEAN integration 
projects. 
Indonesia’s creeping protectionism during the second half of Yudhoyono’s presidency 
shows the internal struggle for the administration to maintain its coherent role 
enactment as a regional leader in the realm of regional trade governance. The internal 
struggle revolves around the incoherence between Indonesia’s support for trade 
liberalisation, accrording to its rhetoric, and its actual domestic trade policies. This 
struggle is clearly illustrated by the increase in non-tariff measures put in place by 
ministries that deal with trade policies, such as the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of 
Industry, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Although the tariffs have been reduced 
almost to zero for the majority of Indonesian products, many agencies have introduced 
non-tariff measures. Examples of these NTMs are the expanding quarantine 
requirements for various imported products and the use of the Indonesian National 
Standard instead of international standards for various imported goods from ASEAN 
member countries (see tables below). 
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Table 6.2 Number of tariff lines subject to multiple NTMs, by product group 
No Product group 1 NTM 2 NTMs 3 NTMs 
or more 
1 Animal & Animal Products 11 9 551 
2 Vegetable Products 74 12 449 
3 Foodstuffs 47 2 399 
4 Mineral Products 46 34 110 
5 Chemicals & Allied Industries 46 200 510 
6 Plastics/Rubbers 22 15 101 
7 Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, & Furs 37 25 28 
8 Wood & Wood Products 19 17 348 
9 Textiles 2 194 958 
10 Footwear/Headgear 1 6 33 
11 Stone/Glass 72 20 70 
12 Metals 17 15 370 
13 Machinery/Electrical 98 286 491 
14 Transportation 118 84 268 
15 Miscellaneous 40 49 162 
16 Total 650 968 4,848 
Source: Ernawati Munadi, “Indonesia’s Non-Tariff Measures: An Overview,” in Non-Tariff Measures 
in ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot (Jakarta: Economic 
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia and United Nations Conference on Trade and 







Table 6.3 Number of non-tariff measures by issuing institutions 




of NTMs (%) 
1 Ministry of Trade 186 29.2 
2 Ministry of Industry 139 21.8 
3 Ministry of Agriculture 92 14.4 
4 Ministry of Marine and Fisheries 70 11.0 
5 World Trade Organization (the 
information is provided by the WTO)* 
44 6.9 
6 Ministry of Industry and Trade 30 4.7 
7 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 17 2.7 
8 Ministry of Health 23 3.6 
9 National Agency on Drug and Food 
Control 
10 1.6 
10 State Secretariat 7 1.1 
11 Others 20 3.1 
 Total 638 100 
*Data on measures of Antidumping, counter failing duties and safeguards are provided by the WTO. 
The WTO does not issue any regulations. 
Source: Munadi, 70. 
 
Table 6.4 Comprehensiveness of Indonesian non-tariff measures 
No NTM Regulation Number 
1 Total NTM-related regulations 199 
2 Total NTM reported to the WTO 296 
3 Total affected products (National tariff lines)  
 a. Total number of affected products 6,466 
 b. The share of the number of affected 
products to the number of total products 
(%) 
64.58% 
4 Total Issuing institutions 14 




Figure 6.2 Comparison of Indonesia’s discriminatory and liberalising measures 
 
 
In 2008, President Yudhoyono pledged to uphold the G-20 commitment on ‘Rejecting 
Protectionism’. Despite being projected as a government that supported regional 
economic integration, Yudhoyono’s administration not only increased NTMs to limit 
imports and exports but was also amongst the large, emerging economies that used 
this protectionist tool extensively to protect its domestic industry.466 As a result of this 
policy, Indonesia has the most restrictive NTMs among the ASEAN member states, 
which have been estimated to add roughly 30% to the costs of more than half of all 
imported goods.467 As shown in the graphic above, despite having issued some 
liberalising measures, discriminatory measures are increasingly used against foreign 
products with a number of NTM-affected foreign products is 6,466. This tells a story 
of Indonesia’s inclination towards a protectionist policy instead of an open market 
policy.  
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Indonesia’s creeping protectionism also shows how inter-agential conflict due to the 
state transformation has affected the enactment of Indonesia’s role conception as a 
regional leader. While regionally, Indonesian foreign policy is directed towards 
fostering regional economic integration, domestically, the government agencies have 
not shared the same impetus to promote such integration. Indonesia’s LARTAS468 
database reveals that 13 different government agencies have the authority to issue non-
tariff measures in the form of import permits, although the Indonesian Ministry of 
Trade was responsible for issuing 58 percent, on average, of the total NTMs issued 
between 2009 and 2014.469 
Moreover, the changes in leadership in the Ministry of Trade haves also affected the 
changes in the position of the Ministry regarding regional integration. The previous 
Minister of Trade, Mari Elka Pangestu, was more resistant in regard to protectionist 
pressures. She was one of the country’s most high-profile ministers, who was widely 
seen as supportive of liberal and free trade policies. However, the Indonesian Trade 
Minister from 2011 – 2014, Gita Wirjawan, was more sympathetic to the lobbying 
from vested interests for Indonesia to be more protectionist.470 Under his leadership, 
the Ministry of Trade reinstated import licensing on some products and imposed 
tighter control over the distribution of imported goods, while other ministries, such as 
the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture, added new products to the 
list of those that require permits. 
In the second half of Yudhoyono’s presidency, the return of protectionism in 
Indonesian trade policies was institutionalised with the issuance of a highly 
protectionist trade law in 2014, Law no. 7/2014. As revealed by an official from the 
Ministry of Trade, while the House of Representatives introduced and passed the law, 
it was the Ministry of Industry that was the significant actor behind its creation. The 
Ministry of Industry was constantly lobbying the already nationalistic House of 
Representatives to pass more significant protectionist measures, on the grounds of 
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helping Indonesia’s dying manufacturing sector.471 The new trade law seems to have 
had an adverse impact on Indonesia’s standing role as an advocate of the liberal norm 
that rhetorically emphasises the importance of international trade. This is because the 
law provides an opportunity for government agencies to put in place measures to 
protect the domestic market, such as import restrictions on commodities.  
This new trade law does not set specific provisions or contain precise information, 
thus leaving the further technical regulations to the authority of relevant government 
agencies. For instance, according to Article 35 paragraph (1) letter (h) of the trade law, 
the government can impose restrictions on the trade of particular goods and services 
on the grounds that the free trade of these goods and services deemed detrimental 
towards Indonesia’s national interest. This new regulation is highly likely to be used 
to create restrictions or prohibitions on the trade of goods by relevant ministries and 
agencies. In addition to the law on trade, many laws have been passed that have created 








                                                          




Table 6.5 Protectionist-related laws issued during Yudhoyono’s presidency 
No.  Law  Measures  
1 Law 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal 
Mining 
the forbidding of the export of 
unprocessed minerals and coal within 
five years of the law’s inception 
2 Law 13/2010 on Horticulture the law stipulates every person 
engaging in horticulture business 
should prioritise domestic goods and 
services 
3 Law 18/2012 on Food the law stipulates that food sources 
should come from domestic food 
production and national food reserves 
4 Law 19/2013 on Protection and 
Empowerment of Farmers 
the government is obliged to prioritise 
domestic agriculture products to meet 
domestic needs 
5 Law 3/2014 on Industry To empower domestic industries, the 
government will increase the use of 
domestic products or components. 
6 Law 7/2014 on Trade Two features of this law stand out: its 
mercantile tone and its anti-consumer 
stance 
Source: Arianto Patunru and Sjamsu Rahardja, “Trade Protectionism in Indonesia: 
Bad Times and Bad Policy,” Analysis (Lowy Institute for International Policy, July 
2015. 
 
The primary driver for the creeping protectionism in Indonesia, despite its continued 
rhetorical support for trade liberalisation, can only partially be explained by looking 
at a rhetoric-performance gap. The notion of domestic-driven role conflict, however, 
provides a more nuanced understanding of Indonesia’s involvement in regional trade 
governance. Indeed, technocratic coalitions, which are at the helm of the decision-
making process in several key ministries, have shaped Indonesia’s foreign economic 
policy in favour of greater regional integration and openness in order to attract foreign 
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investment, which will generate export-led economic growth.472 However, domestic 
economic actors also influence trade-related ministries, such as Ministry of Industry 
and Ministry of Agriculture, and makes them more likely to opt for a more 
protectionist approach towards a greater regional integration project.473 
Since the beginning, KADIN, as the representative of the Indonesian private sector, 
has been involved in the formulation of the AEC through its engagement in the 
ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC). Nevertheless, when the AEC 
came into force, it was KADIN that was at the forefront of the criticism towards it. 
The main reason for this is political, given that KADIN aims to shift its position and 
be a vocal advocate of SMEs’ interests.474 The global financial crisis, which slowed 
demand for Indonesian products in the global market, has also caused a shift in 
KADIN’s standpoint towards economic integration. Moreover, the increased 
resistance towards liberalisation gained more traction when liberalisation came into 
force, which created negative consequences for Indonesian domestic economic actors. 
The contestations, however, are not specifically aimed at Indonesia’s role as a regional 
leader; rather, they are centred on the need for the state to focus more on the domestic 
issues. As argued by officials from the Ministry of Industry, while regional integration 
may provide an opportunity for Indonesia to maximise its economic opportunities, it 
should also be complemented by domestic reform, leading to a lowering of the costs 
of doing business, which would enhance the capability of domestic economy actors to 
maximise the opportunities that FTAs offer.475 The Ministry believes that Indonesia 
has experienced a trade balance deficit, especially in the manufacturing sector, which 
needs to be addressed, but not through trade liberalisation. Thus, rather than expanding 
its FTAs with more countries, Indonesia needs to conduct a detailed evaluation of the 
implementation of the ongoing FTAs. The Ministry always invokes the notion of the 
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decline of Indonesia’s national competitiveness due to the regional integration project. 
The previous Minister of Industry, MS Hidayat, argued that some industries in 
Indonesia are still less competitive than other ASEAN countries, such as Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore.476 Indeed, according to the World Economic Forum Index, 
in terms of competitiveness, Indonesia's position is far behind some other ASEAN 
member countries. Indonesia is in 34th place, well below Singapore in 2nd place, 
Malaysia in 20th place and Thailand in 31st place.477 Indonesia’s low competitiveness 
leads to only a few business sectors excelling in the export market, including minerals, 
apparel, wood products, chemical products and non-electronic machines. 
Moreover, the AEC is deemed unfavourable towards an Indonesian trade balance. By 
looking at the statistics regarding Indonesia’s trade balance with all of the ASEAN 
countries, Indonesia experienced net imports from 2005 to 2016 in which the trade 
balance deficit tended to increase. In 2005, Indonesia’s net imports to ASEAN 
amounted to only US$ 1.2 billion, while in 2013 the net imports reached US$ 13.21 
billion. When Indonesia joined AFTA, its exports to ASEAN countries were only 10 
percent of its total exports.478 In 2014, Indonesia’s exports to ASEAN countries were 
only US$ 39,6 billion, and accounted for only 22.5% of its total exports, while 
Indonesia's imports from ASEAN amounted to US$ 50 billion, 28% of its total imports 
from all over the world.  
Moreover, the performance of Indonesia’s total exports, both oil and gas and non-
oil/gas, in the period 2011 – 2016, decreased drastically from US$ 203,495.6 million 
to about US$ 144,433.5 million, down 29.02%. Meanwhile, in the same period, 
imports also decreased from US$ 177,435.6 million to US$ 135,650.7 million, down 
23.5%. Based on data provided by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), 
in the period 2000 – 2015, Indonesia achieved a trade balance surplus with ASEAN 
only in 2004. After that, the trade balance deficit tended to widen from year to year.479 
Of the nine ASEAN member countries, Indonesia’s trade is only in surplus against the 
                                                          
476 Detik Finance, “MS Hidayat: Daya Saing Kita Bisa Dibawah Level 30,” Finance.Detik.Com, 
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Philippines, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. Indonesia’s trade deficit in ASEAN has 
motivated domestic economic actors such as KADIN, labour and peasant unions, as 
well as the Ministry of Industry, to view free regional economic integration as an 
economic threat to many Indonesian domestic economic actors. 
 















2014 $39,697,193.86 $50,726,410.87 -$11,029,217.01 22.55 28.47 
2013 $40,629,938.49 $53,851,082.21 -$13,221,143.72 22.26 28.85 
2012 $41,831,097.12 $53,630,988.90 -$11,799,891.78 22.01 27.98 
2011 $42,098,910.84 $51,108,876.38 -$9,009,965.54 20.69 28.80 
2010 $33,347,510.07 $38,912,170.02 -$5,564,659.95 21.14 28.68 
2009 $24,623,898.57 $27,722,015.33 -$3,098,116.76 21.13 28.63 
2008 $27,170,819.68 $40,971,203.68 -$13,800,384.00 19.83 31.70 
2007 $22,292,114.70 $23,792,133.70 -$1,500,019.00 19.54 31.95 
2006 $18,483,087.14 $18,970,619.64 -$487,532.50 18.34 31.07 
2005 $15,824,919.26 $17,039,914.00 -$1,214,994.74 18.47 29.74 
2004 $12,995,363.75 $11,494,445.68 $1,500,918.07 18.15 24.71 
Source: World bank database, 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/IDN/Year/2003/TradeFlow/EXPIMP  
 
Given this condition, officials from the Ministry of Industry are convinced that 
Indonesia will not gain significantly from AFTA through Intra-ASEAN trade and 
hence is unlikely to gain a significant advantage through the AEC. This reasoning has 
been used by policymakers in the Ministry of Industry to resist Indonesia’s further 
liberalisation project within the framework of the AEC. This has resulted in a delayed 
liberalisation process in Indonesia within the framework of the AEC. As shown by the 
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ASEAN scorecard, which compares the ASEAN Members, Indonesia’s achievement 
in terms of liberalising its market is less than that of the other countries.480 
The fragmentation of Indonesian foreign economic policymaking has affected the way 
in which its role conceptions are enacted. In the realm of trade governance, Indonesia’s 
role as a regional leader has not been reflected in its policies and initiatives. However, 
as shown in the analysis of Indonesia’s involvement in the AEC, the Yudhoyono 
administration tried to enact its role as a regional leader by keeping the regional 
integration project on track and not pulling out from it despite the contestation from 
domestic economic actors as well as within the state. Thus, on the one hand, 
Indonesia’s willingness to enhance the regional integration project shows its minimum 
commitment to enact its role as a regional leader, given that without Indonesia’s 
involvement as the largest country in ASEAN the project would collapse. On the other 
hand, the process of state transformation, in which the role conceptions it enacts are 
not coherently translated into regional trade policy, created an ambivalence with 
regard to Indonesia’s role conception as a regional leader under Yudhoyono’s 
administration.  
Many analysts would argue that the AEC is failing due to the constraints from many 
of its members, particularly Indonesia, who are not ready to implement the 
liberalisation process in many areas of liberalisation.481 However, the fact that, in 
general, Yudhoyono’s administration enabled the regional integration to progress, 
shows that Indonesia is still willing to enhance the project. This ambiguity can best be 
explained through the framework of domestic-driven role conflict developed in 
Chapter 2.  
Arguably, Indonesia’s role enactment as a regional leader in regard to regional trade 
governance is in the second stage of role conflict. As suggested in Chapter 2, the 
second stage of role conflict refers to a condition in which roles are conceptualised 
and enacted by one agency while other agencies resist the enactment of such roles. 
                                                          
480 ASEAN, “ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard” (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2012), 
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208 
 
This has led to a vagueness in the conceptualisation of its roles. In our case, the 
enactment of the role of regional leader by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requires 
policies that are supportive of liberalisation. However, many technical ministries have 
issued protectionist policies, which contradict the role conception as a regional leader 
conceptualised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These protectionist policies show 
that the enactment of the role has not found its way into domestic policies due to 
contestation by other technical ministries. 
Moreover, the notion of role legitimation introduced in Chapter 2 is particularly useful 
to understand the insistence of Indonesia in enhancing economic integration within 
ASEAN by framing it as a way to enact Indonesia’s role as a regional leader within 
ASEAN. This framing is a part of the process of role legitimation in which 
policymakers try to invoke Indonesia’s historical role as a regional leader. This 
strategy is deployed by foreign policy elites to legitimise Indonesia’s position in 
liberalising its market within the framework of the ASEAN Economic Community. 
The continued success of the foreign policy elites in legitimising the role of regional 
leader by linking it to Indonesia’s biographical narrative is illustrated in the acceptance 
of the role by other ministries. Many within the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of 
Industry perceive the AEC as a part of Indonesia’s historical imperative to be the 
regional leader within ASEAN, which Indonesia needs to fulfil.482 Although the 
deepening of regional integration projects by liberalising the Indonesian market is seen 
as detrimental, mainly by elites within the Ministry of Industry, they accept the project 
as a part of Indonesia’s strategic interest. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Indonesia will 
abandon the AEC. As shown in the analysis above, the Ministry of Industry does not 
challenge Indonesia’s role conception as a regional leader but rather articulates its 
contestation in regard to Indonesia’s low competitiveness and the need to focus on a 
solution to increase it. 
This legitimation strategy is likely to be maintained by the Widodo administration. So 
far, despite making the renegotiation of free trade agreements part of his economic 
agenda, Widodo has continued to respect the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) as well 
as continuing the negotiations initiated under his predecessor although many of these 
                                                          
482 Author’s personal interview with Director and expert staffs from Directorate of ASEAN 
negotiation, Ministry of Trade, 20 September 2016. 
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FTA’s exclude sensitive products. In fact, Widodo’s administration has even pursued 
a policy to complete the free trade agreement negotiations launched by Yudhoyono’s 
presidency, as a response to doubts about the Widodo government’s stance on the 
importance of free trade agreements.  
 
Indonesia’s roles in the RCEP 
Indonesia’s role enactment in the AEC mainly reflects its regional leadership, which 
aims to maintain the cohesiveness of ASEAN as a regional platform for Southeast 
Asian member countries. Indonesia’s foreign policy establishment also aims to further 
enhance its regional leadership by making ASEAN a hub for East Asian regional 
architecture building. Within the realm of political and security issues, ASEAN has 
been the central actor in driving regional security arrangements in the region through 
platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS). 
In the realm of economic issues, it also aims to make ASEAN the institutional anchor 
of the Asia-Pacific regional economic architecture.  
One such endeavour in the realm of trade governance aims to establish an ASEAN-
driven mega-regional project that covers not only Southeast Asia but also a broader 
Asia-Pacific region through the initiation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP). The ASEAN-driven RCEP is a form of economic and trade 
cooperation between ASEAN and its six economic partners, namely, China, Japan, 
South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. The 16 participating countries are 
home to almost half of the world’s population and account nearly for 30% of global 
GDP as well as more than a quarter of world exports.  
Although many analysts treat RCEP as a China led mega-regional trade project due to 
the importance of it as a platform for China to consolidate its leadership role in the 
region,483 from the beginning, RCEP was initiated by ASEAN. In essence, the RCEP 
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is an effort by ASEAN countries to harmonise the different trade rules among their six 
trading partners. Before the inception of RCEP, ASEAN signed five Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs): the ASEAN-China FTA, the ASEAN-Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement, the ASEAN-Korea FTA, the ASEAN-Australia/New Zealand 
FTA, and the ASEAN-India FTA. RCEP was agreed at the 19th ASEAN Summit, in 
November 2011, through the ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership. The launch of the RCEP negotiations took place from 18-20 
November 2012 during the ASEAN Summit between ASEAN and six of its FTA 
partner countries, and was aimed to be completed in 2017. In May 2018, the ASEAN 
RCEP negotiations entered their 22nd round, and it does not seem that they will be 
concluded anytime soon. 
Before the inception of the RCEP, the idea of establishing a broader mega-regional 
integration project had been proposed by many major powers in East Asia. In the past, 
Japan once proposed the establishment of the East Asian Community (EAC) through 
its policy initiative, The Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia 
(CEPEA). This proposal was not received very well, particularly in China. In fact, 
China has also proposed its own initiative, the East Asia Free Trade Agreement 
(EAFTA). However, the initiatives proposed by Japan and China, despite being highly 
significant for the development of cooperation in East Asia, have been met with a 
sceptical view by the ASEAN countries, particularly Indonesia. This is due to the fear 
that the initiatives could be a part of a strategy by the major powers in the region to 
influence the middle and small powers in Southeast Asia. To make sure that the driving 
seat for East Asia regionalism is still ASEAN, Indonesia brought the idea to create 
RCEP when it became the Chairman of ASEAN in 2011. 
As stated by the Director General of International Trade within the Ministry of Trade, 
the idea to establish the RCEP can be attributed to Indonesia’s initiative to consolidate 
five free trade agreements (FTA) involving ASEAN and its partner countries into one 
trade agreement area involving 16-member countries with a market of 3.4 billion 






people.484 The initiative was met with a positive response from both ASEAN members 
and other major powers in the region as well as ASEAN trade partners, such as 
Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Korea and Japan.485 As a result, ASEAN 
Ministers agreed to appoint Indonesia as the ASEAN coordinator to negotiate the 
RCEP with the other ASEAN trade partners. Indonesia was also appointed as 
Chairman of the RCEP negotiations.486 These positions certainly show the recognition 
of Indonesia’s leadership in the ongoing negotiation process. Thus, for Indonesian 
trade policymakers, the RCEP is seen as the enactment of Indonesia’s role of regional 
leader in ASEAN, which should be maintained. 
The RCEP is expected to become the world’s largest free trade bloc. The partnership 
will also serve as a stepping stone for the establishment of a free trade area in the Asia-
Pacific region in 2020 under the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which 
has been endorsed by the APEC countries.487 Given the importance of maintaining the 
balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, the notion of ASEAN’s centrality is 
considered necessary as a basis for developing the architecture of the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
As a model of a mega free trade area, the RCEP is expected to regulate trade and 
investment liberalisation comprehensively and beyond the WTO regulation. Even with 
the resurrection of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the form of Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreed in November 
2017, the encouragement to realise the RCEP into a trade bloc in the Asia-Pacific 
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region has been growing. In fact, with the signing of CPTPP, RCEP member countries 
reportedly aim to bring the negotiations to a conclusion in 2018.488 
For Indonesia’s domestic audience, the RCEP has been framed by the Ministry of 
Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an important endeavour that needs to be 
concluded to open up the market for Indonesian products. Fifteen RCEP member 
countries represent 56.2% of Indonesia’s exports to the world and 70% of Indonesia’s 
imports from the world. The RCEP members are also the source of 48.21% of foreign 
investments in Indonesia.489  
Given that global trade negotiations seem not to be going anywhere due to the failure 
of the Doha Round, which tarnished the legitimacy of the WTO, regional free trade 
negotiations have become an alternative platform to enhance trade liberalisation.490 
While the goal is to create a ‘high-quality, modern, comprehensive and mutually 
beneficial free trade agreement’, the RCEP opted for a more flexible deal.491 Thus, the 
level of depth of the agreement made in the RCEP is somewhat different from CPTPP. 
Given the pressure by other ministries, such as the Ministry of Industry, as well as 
other domestic economic interests to be more protectionist, the persistent efforts by 
the Indonesian foreign policy establishment as well as from Ministry of Trade to 
initiate the RCEP are not merely a product of economic imperatives. As revealed in 
interviews with high-ranking officials within the Ministry of Trade, despite the 
economic opportunity rhetoric, since the beginning the RCEP has been part of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda to pursue its geostrategic interest in East Asia. The 
geostrategic concern of Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda in regard to trade is the 
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reason why, from the beginning, Indonesia was reluctant to join the now-defunct 
America-led TPP.  
Many argue that this reluctance was due to the fact that Indonesia’s exports to a 
number of advanced industrial countries incorporated in the TPP rely solely on the 
mining and energy sectors, whereas TPP countries export more manufactured products 
to Indonesia.492 However, there are two main reasons for Indonesia not joining the 
TPP and instead initiating the RCEP. First, the TPP was an American-led trade project 
that aimed to get countries in the Asia-Pacific closer to the US while at the same time 
isolating China from the project. Second, ASEAN was never at the centre of the 
initiative and the US does not seem interested in promoting regional trade integration 
with ASEAN countries as a group, which is perceived by Indonesia as undermining 
ASEAN’s centrality.493 It is therefore understandable that Indonesia chose the RCEP 
over the TPP. Indonesia’s active involvement in the RCEP is a translation of its role 
as a regional leader, which put ASEAN at the centre of the multilateral regional trade 
agreement. On the contrary, Indonesia’s involvement in the TPP would merely have 
been as a follower of the US-led regional architecture building.  
Nevertheless, in practice, the objective of realising the RCEP is problematic due to the 
difficult positions within the RCEP negotiations that Indonesian trade negotiators face. 
As stated by a senior Indonesian negotiator, the difficulty in situating Indonesia’s 
negotiating position lies in the three different interests and positions that the 
negotiators should enhance: first, Indonesia’s domestic interests; second, Indonesia’s 
position as a leader within ASEAN; and third, Indonesia’s position as part of the 
ASEAN group. Given these three positions, rather than pushing the agenda of its 
domestic market, which leans towards protectionism, Indonesia’s role in the 
negotiations tends to be as a bridging force to make sure that the RCEP negotiation 
can be concluded. The role of bridge-builder is manifested within two positions, 
namely Indonesia as a part of ASEAN and Indonesia as the representative of ASEAN 
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towards other ASEAN partners within the RCEP negotiations. The former is enacted 
to provide cohesiveness and coherence within ASEAN while the latter is enacted to 
make sure that ASEAN can show its ability to deliver the mega-trade project and 
become the hub for it.  
In order to enact its role of bridge-builder, Indonesia needs to offer more concessions 
that the domestic interests would more likely to resist. Given that the current ASEAN 
FTAs with partner countries have already eliminated over 80 percent of their tariffs, 
to make the RCEP attractive to other ASEAN partners, it needs to offer more 
concessions than the ASEAN plus one FTA has offered. As a minimum, the RCEP 
aims to eliminate 95% of tariffs. The main challenge, however, is the different tariff 
classifications for tariff concessions by ASEAN+6 countries, which need to be 
harmonised. This is due to the fact that ASEAN is not a customs union and does not 
have a common external tariff. To be able to bridge the different interests of the many 
ASEAN members, Indonesia should show that it is willing to open its market to be on 
a par with ASEAN members, in order to achieve common concessions that require all 
ASEAN member countries to have the same schedules. Currently, Indonesia’s 
liberalisation status is still low compared with other ASEAN countries. Among the 
ASEAN countries, it is only Singapore that will have no issue in achieving a high-
level region-wide FTA. Thus, to make a common concession for ASEAN, some 
ASEAN countries need to reduce the tariffs on many tariff lines. As revealed by one 
senior Indonesian negotiator on the RCEP: 
If Indonesia’s position is below the average position of liberalisation of other 
ASEAN members, it is a hassle. How can Indonesia bridge if that is the case? 
Sometimes we are in a tricky situation to do a positioning that represents 
Indonesia's domestic interests because on average they ask Indonesia to be in 
a very low position in terms of market liberalisation compare with the positions 
of ASEAN countries. Therefore, sometimes we like to be scolded by ministers 
if we cannot make our position clear which reflects the interests of domestic 
economic actors.494 
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Table 6.7 Distribution of tariff lines by liberalisation status in ASEAN 
Country % of ‘Eliminated to 
All’ Products 
% of ‘Depends on 
FTA’ Products 
Brunei Darussalam 84.1 15.9 
Cambodia 64.3 35.3 
Indonesia 46.0 52.8 
Lao PDR 68.0 31.6 
Malaysia 76.0 22.9 
Myanmar 66.6 31.8 
Philippines 74.6 24.4 
Singapore 100.0 0.0 
Thailand 75.6 24.3 
Viet Nam 78.1 19.1 
Average 73.3 25.8 
Sources: Arata Kuno, “Constructing the Tariff Dataset for the ERIA FTA Database,” in Comprehensive 
Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia, ed. Chang Jae Lee and Misa Okabe, ERIA Research Project 
Report 2010, No. 26, n.d., 13–37. 
 
Furthermore, in order to convince ASEAN partners that the RCEP can provide more 
high-quality free trade agreements than the ASEAN Plus One FTA can offer, the 
RCEP should eliminate the noodle bowl effects of the proliferation of free trade 
agreements in East Asia. One central issue in this regard is the Rules of origin (ROOs). 
While the ROOs ensure that FTA benefits are restricted to the parties to the agreement, 
they may also create constraints to trade flows, due to the adoption of different ROOs 
by different FTAs. There is a need for the RCEP to create a common rule for ROOs 
or to adopt lenient rules on cumulation. Rules on cumulation offer the possibility for 
products that have obtained originating status in one partner country to be further 
processed or added to products originating in another participating country as if they 
had originated in that latter country, without the finished product losing the benefit of 
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preferential customs tariffs.495 This has become one of the contentious items in the 
negotiations that so far the ASEAN countries cannot agree on.496 
Although the RCEP was the platform for Yudhoyono’s government to enact the role 
of regional leader, Indonesia’s domestic political discourse is still heavily dominated 
by a protectionist approach and quite suspicious of the ongoing RCEP negotiations. 
Indonesia’s enactment of the role of regional leader at the RCEP has thus invited 
increased domestic contestation. As a result, Indonesian policymakers, particularly in 
the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, need to face the challenges on 
two fronts. First, Indonesia needs to perform its role as a bridge-builder to find a 
common goal that bridges the diverging interests within the ASEAN countries in order 
to manifest its role as a regional leader in the RCEP negotiations. Second, it also needs 
to deal with the growing domestic contestation towards its regional leadership role at 
the RCEP.  
It is then again, the Ministry of Industry, that shows its tendency to keep Indonesia’s 
liberalisation commitment low within the RCEP. The Director General of 
International Industrial Cooperation of the Ministry of Industry, Agus Tjahajana, has 
openly said that the Indonesian negotiators should be careful and wary regarding the 
target of the elimination of tariffs within the RCEP framework tariff.497 According to 
him, in regard to the manufacturing sector, Indonesia is not ready to open up its 
markets to industrialised countries like Japan, China, South Korea and India.498 In fact, 
while the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have struggled to 
accelerate the RCEP negotiations, the Ministry of Industry has called for the 
possibility of renegotiation of the economic cooperation that is detrimental to 
Indonesia, especially the current FTAs, in particular the ACFTA, which deepens the 
Indonesia trade balance deficit. 
However, despite the growing domestic contestation, particularly from the Ministry of 
Industry, the Ministry of Trade still considers the RCEP negotiations an Indonesian 
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foreign trade diplomacy priority. Interviews with one of Indonesia’s senior negotiators 
in the RCEP negotiation process revealed that Indonesia’s role as a regional leader 
enacted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been internalised within the Ministry 
of Trade positioning in the trade negotiations. This affects Indonesia’s negotiating 
position; often it should give up some of its domestic interests in favour of pushing 
the negotiation forwards. The way in which the negotiators legitimise Indonesia’s 
trade position, which may not reflect Indonesian domestic business interests, is by 
invoking the historical position of Indonesia as a regional leader within ASEAN. Thus, 
Indonesia’s historical narrative as a regional leader within Southeast Asia is a 
significant factor in driving Indonesia’s assertiveness in taking a position that is in 
favour of enhancing ASEAN’s role in the evolving regional economic architecture in 
Asia. 
As stated in an interview with a senior Indonesian trade negotiator in the RCEP:  
Actually, we were not ready to build a bigger regional architecture yet. At that 
time, we prefer to consolidate internally with ASEAN members who still have 
many problems with the efforts of economic integration. However, external 
pressure with the intensity of China and Japan to be the front guard in 
regionalisation in the region could make Southeast Asia just a sphere of 
influence. For that, we can convince other ASEAN Ministers to agree to 
initiate the RCEP initiative by inviting all ASEAN FTA partners to join in the 
formation of a regional mega block where ASEAN became its hub.499 
However, unlike Indonesia’s ambition to be a regional bridge-builder through political 
and security regional platform, the geopolitical ambition to keep ASEAN centrality 
through economic statecraft should take into consideration domestic contestation 
particularly if it is deemed too costly for domestic economic actor mainly from Small 
and Medium Enterprises. To avoid a further domestic contestation from business 
sector that usually invokes the condition of SMEs, Indonesia needs to secure the 
protection of Small and Medium Enterprises within the RCEP. The Indonesian 
delegation emphasised the importance of the agreement on protecting SME within the 
                                                          




framework of RCEP, which is the biggest economic actors in terms of the number in 
the Indonesian economy. Since the 7th Trade Negotiation Committee of Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP-TNC), Indonesia stressed the 
importance of the role of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to encourage regional 
economic growth. On the sidelines of the 7th TNC meeting, Indonesia proposed the 
concept of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME)-Friendly RCEP. RCEP should be 
designed to encourage SMEs engagement in regional and global supply chains. The 
inclusion of the ‘SME friendly’ concept was finally concluded at the 16th round of 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. By doing so, 
the Indonesian delegation sought to provide an early guarantee that RCEP would 
include a provision that enables SMEs to benefit from market liberalisation.  
As argued by one member of Indonesia’s delegation: 
More than 95% of local Indonesian business actors are SMEs. Therefore, we 
propose that the RCEP should further encourage SME involvement in regional 
and global supply chains through the SME-friendly concept. This includes the 
easing of import duties, customs procedures, standard harmonisation, financial 
access, and the provision of technical assistance for capacity building for 
SMEs to improve the quality of their products in utilising RCEP.500 
Despite accounting for the largest share of total employment and making the most 
substantial contribution to the country’s GDP, Indonesian SMEs’ share of total exports 
is still low compared with other countries. Under the Indonesian leadership as the chair 
of the trade negotiating committee, progress has been made with the approval of the 
Chapter on Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the Chapter on Economic and 
Technical Cooperation (ECOTECH). By concluding these two chapters on SME 
provision and the Chapter on Economic and Technical Cooperation (ECOTECH), 
Indonesia could appease its domestic economic actors while at the same time pushing 
forward the ongoing, tough RCEP negotiations. 
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Trade, 16 September 2016. 
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Figure 6.3 SMEs in several economic indicators of selected countries 
 




This chapter points towards a number of findings that suggest how the emergence of 
state transformation, characterised by the increasingly fragmented nature of the 
Indonesian state, has affected the way Indonesia enacts its role conceptions in regard 
to regional trade governance.  
This chapter elucidates Indonesia’s effort to enact two main overarching roles, namely 
the role of regional leader and the role of bridge-builder, as part of its pursuit of 
regional and global recognition as an important global player. The role of regional 
leader is evident in Indonesia’s initiative to maintain the regional integration project 
through ASEAN as well as to enhance ASEAN’s centrality within the evolving 
regional economic architecture in East Asia. Moreover, the role of bridge-builder 
mainly appears in Indonesia’s effort to project ASEAN as an institutional hub for the 
evolving regional economic architecture in East Asia.  
However, as suggested by the analysis, Indonesia’s enactment of the role of regional 
leader within ASEAN through the enhancement of the ASEAN Economic Community 
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has been hindered by the fragmentation of the Indonesian state. Its role as a bridge-
builder is also contested domestically due to the need for Indonesia to making new 
trade concessions in order to enact the role. This is not to mention the fact that other 
ASEAN partners, particularly the developed ones, are also pushing for a more 
comprehensive free trade agreement to make sure that their engagement in the 
ASEAN-led RCEP is beneficial. As a result, Indonesia is struggling to conclude the 
RCEP negotiations promptly. Moreover, even if Indonesia can manage to conclude 
the RCEP, there is a possibility that the parliament will not ratify the agreement.  
The theoretical contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate the extent to which the 
fragmentation of the Indonesian state has created an ambivalent enactment of the role 
conceptions envisioned by the foreign policy establishment. Given this condition, 
there are two inter-related factors that shape how Indonesia’s state fragmentation could 
have affected the emergence of role conflict in Indonesia’s role conception enactment 
within regional trade governance, namely normative and organisational factors.  
First, there is a lack of normative acceptance of the underpinning norm of regional 
economic integration, namely the liberal economic norm. This is precisely reflected in 
how the invocation of Indonesia’s role in advocating the liberalisation agenda has been 
heavily contested by domestic actors, including particular agencies within the state. In 
order to resolve this contestation, the actor within the state, in this case the Ministry 
of Trade, seeks to legitimise the role by linking Indonesia’s growing technocratic 
acceptance towards the economic integration agenda to its effort to maintain 
Indonesia’s role as a regional leader.  
In the political realm, Indonesia’s role as an advocate of democratic and human rights 
norms is in line with its democratic transition following the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime. However, the notion of the neoliberal economic agenda has been 
increasingly contested within Indonesia’s domestic audiences in the post-authoritarian 
period. The norm is yet a part of Indonesia’s economic worldview, which should be 
accepted by the political elites as well as domestic economic actors. This is due to the 
fact that the neoliberal agenda could not be framed as a part of Indonesia’s 
biographical narrative as a developing country. In fact, there is growing resistance 
towards the neoliberal agenda including the regional integration project. In addition, 
since the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, neoliberal reform has often been 
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seen as a foreign intervention towards Indonesia’s economy. Accordingly, enacting 
the role as an advocate of regional economic integration does not fit with Indonesia’s 
biographical narrative. For this reason, Indonesia’s greater engagement in enhancing 
regional economic integration is not attributed to Indonesia’s biographical narrative in 
the way that the foreign policy establishment successfully attributes Indonesia’s role 
as a regional leader in regard to political and security issues to its biographical 
narrative. Thus, it is difficult for policymakers to sustain the enactment of the role of 
regional leader through advocating trade liberalisation in the realm of regional trade 
governance.  
Second, there is a lack of organisational coordination among the ministries, which 
stems from the fragmentation within the Indonesian state, which made the role 
conceptions enacted by Yudhoyono’s administration vague in regard to trade 
governance. In the economic realm, in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not the 
focal point, the enactment of its role conception is not as straightforward as in the 
realm of democracy and human rights. The trade policies taken by other ministries 
may not be in line with the role conception enacted by foreign policymakers. This has 
created an outcome where there is a rhetoric-performance gap between the 
commitment made at the international level and the policy taken at the domestic level. 
As a result, Indonesia’s role as a regional leader in the realm of trade governance has 
been severely hindered.  
Having examined the enactment of Indonesia’s role conception in regard to regional 
trade governance, the next chapter will examine the different dynamics of Indonesia’s 
enactment of its role conceptions in regard to global trade governance, particularly in 











In the previous chapter, I showed how the state transformation process has constrained 
Indonesia’s role enactment as a regional leader in enhancing regional economic 
integration projects in Southeast Asia. It has also hindered its enactment of the role of 
bridge-builder in making ASEAN an institutional hub for the evolving regional 
economic architecture in East Asia. This chapter examines Indonesia’s increasingly 
assertive engagement in global trade governance through its role in the WTO Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) round. While, at the level of regional trade governance, 
Indonesia seems to have been prevented from taking the role of regional leader and 
bridge-builder, Indonesia seems to enjoy relatively little hindrance in enacting the role 
conceptions it aspires to at the global level. Why is this the case?  
In order to examine this puzzle, this chapter contends that multilateral trade 
governance, particularly the DDA round of negotiations, has been utilised by 
Indonesian foreign policymakers as an arena for Indonesia to play a greater role at the 
global level. To do so, Indonesia has enacted two main overarching roles, namely the 
role of a voice for developing countries and the role of bridge-builder. Through the 
role of a voice for developing countries, Indonesia is not only able to fulfil its 
biographical narrative but also enhances its domestic interests through consistent 
efforts to fight for the inclusion of concepts such as Special Product (SP) and Special 
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) in the DDA negotiations. These two are directly related 
to the Indonesian government’s domestic efforts to alleviate poverty, develop rural 
areas, and strengthen food security. The role of bridge-builder stems from the 
opportunity to enhance Indonesia’s international status by capturing the opportunity 
to fill the role to bridge the increasingly different standpoints of developing countries 
and developed countries in the negotiations. 
Indonesia’s leadership role as the coordinator of the G33, a defensive alliance of 
developing countries in the agricultural sector, which was enacted after the collapse 
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of the DDA negotiations in Cancún, illustrates its enactment of the role as a voice for 
developing countries. Indonesia’s bridge-builder role can be seen from its substantial 
initiatives and diplomacy in the breakthrough, albeit limited outcome of the ninth 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali in 2013. 
Despite Indonesia’s increasing role enactment as a bridge-builder, which requires it to 
also support the liberalisation agenda at the global level, there has been a growing 
tendency towards protectionism in its trade policy in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis in 2008. Rather than reflecting the domestic policy preferences, 
international expectations towards Indonesia are more likely to drive the enactment of 
Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder in the DDA negotiations. At this point, the 
commitments made as well as the rhetoric calling for a more liberalised multilateral 
trading system within the negotiation by Indonesia are not in line with its domestic 
trade policies. 
The reason for the gap between its role conceptions and domestic policies can be 
interpreted as a result of the co-optation of trade policy in the WTO by the Indonesian 
foreign policy agenda. While the Ministry of Trade has full authority to formulate its 
trade negotiation position, Indonesia’s role conception as a bridge-builder, enacted by 
its foreign policymakers, has significantly influenced its trade policy agenda and 
negotiating position in the DDA round. 
To facilitate the argument, the chapter firstly conceptualises global trade governance 
as an arena for role-playing. It examines how the multilateral negotiation within the 
WTO is seen as an arena, not only to enhance emerging powers’ agenda and interests, 
but also for states to project their role conceptions based on the alter expectations that 
they can fulfil. The third section discusses the co-optation of trade policy by the 
foreign policy agenda. It examines how the ambivalence between Indonesia’s 
protectionist trade policy vis-à-vis its foreign policy outlook has led to incongruence 
in its enactment of its role conceptions in regard to global trade governance. The fourth 
and fifth sections provide a detailed account of how Indonesia has exercised its role in 
the G33 coalition within the Doha Development Round since 2003 and its increasing 
role as a bridge-builder since the collapse of the Doha Round negotiations in 2008. 
This chapter concludes with an overall assessment of how the case of Indonesia in the 




The Doha round negotiations as an arena for role enactment 
The WTO, and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
has traditionally been seen as an arena for states to negotiate and implement trade 
rules. Given the nature of the decision-making process, which requires political 
bargaining, the WTO has become an arena for both Western countries and developing 
countries to exercise their power and resources. While previously developing 
countries were economically too weak to challenge Western hegemony in terms of 
global trade governance, with the rise of the so-called emerging powers, twenty-first 
century global trade governance can be characterised as more multipolar. Non-
Western emerging middle powers are increasingly utilising global governance 
institutions as a site to challenge the Western hegemony over developing countries.  
Indeed, many studies have established that the WTO has been utilised as a platform 
by developing countries to challenge US dominance in regard to global trade 
governance.501 As noted by several scholars, in their negotiation strategies, emerging 
developing countries such as India, Brazil, and South Africa tended to contribute to 
the deadlock of the WTO negotiations in the Doha development round due to their 
redistributive aspirations.502 
The study of the coalition building of developing countries in the DDA negotiation 
also shows that power politics has shaped the strategy as well as the objectives of 
developing countries.503 For instance, by employing a constructivist reading of the 
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Philippines’ behaviour in the WTO, Quinsaat shows that the coalition building 
strategy among developing countries is the result of social learning and adaptation by 
trade negotiators within their interactions with other developing countries as well as 
developed ones.504 She further argues that given that the domestic structure may not 
pose heavy constraints to trade negotiators, power politics in the WTO, rather than 
interest based on a long-term programme formulated by states, is the main driver for 
developing countries’ coalition-building strategy.505  
Hopewell further asserts that the greater role of developing countries in the WTO is 
not merely a result of increased material power resulting in their changing structural 
position.506 In her study on Brazil, China, and India, Hopewell argues that the rise of 
Brazil and India’s leadership is not the result of their economic structural conditions 
as an emerging economic powerhouse. Rather, it can be attributed to their diplomatic 
efforts in mobilising coalitions amongst developing countries primarily through the 
G20507 group, which has an offensive agenda in the agricultural sector.508 Through 
their diplomatic strategies, Brazil and India have created major challenges for 
developed countries seeking dominating roles in terms of agenda setting within the 
WTO. However, their strategies have also created a stark divide between developing 
and developed countries. The politics of confrontation culminated in the collapse of 
the negotiations at the Cancún Ministerial Conference, in which developing countries 
seemed to be unified in resisting the developed countries’ position.509  
Eagleton-Pierce provides a more critical approach towards the WTO by employing the 
Bourdieusian concept of symbolic power. He shows how the countries from the Global 
South tried to challenge the power imbalance within the DDA negotiations by 
mobilising symbolic power, namely providing heterodox opinions about a legitimate 
vision of the social world that challenged the orthodox liberalisation agenda of the 
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developed countries.510 Hence, other than employing their institutional power by 
creating a coalition-building, developing countries from the Global South also use 
another source of power, which might not be based on material and institutional power.  
Given the discussion above, the growing number of studies of how emerging powers 
behave in the multilateral setting, particularly in the DDA round, are usually situated 
within debates on developing countries’ struggle to challenge developed countries’ 
dominance in global trade rule-making. While developing countries wanted to make 
the DDA round not merely an instrument of multilateral liberalisation, but also of 
development, developed countries viewed the round as a way to improve their market 
access to developing countries.511 Arguably, treating the WTO as an arena for 
developing countries to challenge Western hegemony only shows a partial picture of 
the emerging powers’ behaviour in the WTO.  
In this thesis, the DDA negotiation process is treated not solely as an arena for 
developing countries to challenge Western hegemony; it is also treated as an arena for 
states to articulate their role conceptions, which are enacted by foreign policymakers 
to enhance their international status. Treating the DDA round as a venue for the 
articulation of role conceptions can help us to understand the seemingly ambivalent 
and inconsistent nature of states’ behaviour in international negotiations. In particular, 
we can understand why sometimes emerging powers enact a role that aims to challenge 
developed countries, while at other times they enact a role that aims to build bridges. 
This thesis is not the first attempt to apply role theoretical approach in understanding 
states’ behaviour in the WTO. Through the case of the EU’s roles, Ahnlid and 
Elgström employed a role theory approach to understand how the changing power 
constellation in regard to trade governance with the rise of the emerging powers and 
the relative decline of the US and the EU has created role uncertainty, which has forced 
the EU to change its role conception from a leader and a benign partner to developing 
countries to a more realist approach.512 However, their reading of role theory is still 
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structural, in that roles changes are seen as the product of structural changes in power 
constellations. 
To further the discussion, this chapter aims to show that changes in the international 
system should also take into account a broader understanding of role dynamics 
happening within states. One of the aspects that is unexplored in the study of emerging 
powers’ behaviour in global governance is how the WTO can be treated as an arena 
for the convergence and conflict between foreign policy and trade policy. The case of 
Indonesia’s role in the multilateral trade negotiations is a case in point, in that the role 
conception articulated in the DDA round was a result of negotiation and co-optation 
of trade policy by Indonesian foreign policy agenda, which affected Indonesia’s 
position in the Doha round negotiations.  
Moreover, by treating the WTO as an arena to articulate role conceptions, the 
interaction within the WTO is not merely about a struggle to enhance particular 
domestic interests in multilateral rule-making as suggested by the mainstream 
literature on the WTO. Nor is the interaction solely understood as a power struggle 
between the developed and developing countries. Instead, the DDA negotiation 
process was an arena in which states aimed to enact particular roles that could be 
associated with their biographical narrative and their efforts to incorporate alter 
expectations. Rethinking the WTO in such role-theoretical terms provides us with an 
alternative understanding of how the emerging middle powers changed the enactment 
of their roles at the DDA negotiations in the WTO. 
Having discussed how the DDA negotiation process within the WTO can be seen as 
an arena for enacting role conceptions, the next section will examine how the trade 
policy under the authority of the Ministry of Trade has been co-opted as an instrument 
to operationalise the role conceptions developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
The co-optation of trade policy and Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda 
To what extent is Indonesia’s trade policy at the global level shaped by the role 
conceptions articulated by foreign policymakers? This chapter reveals that under 
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Yudhoyono’s Presidency, Indonesia’s international trade policy at the global level was 
shaped by its aspiration to play a greater role at the global level. This is evident in 
Indonesia’s behaviour in the DDA Round, which started in 2001.  
As argued in the previous chapter, the democratisation undergone by Indonesia since 
the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 has had significant 
repercussions for the decision-making process regarding Indonesia’s trade policy. This 
also applies to Indonesia’s standpoint and negotiating position in multilateral trade 
governance, such as at the WTO. Under Suharto’s authoritarian regime, the decision 
to negotiate in the WTO was more homogeneous, centralised and top-down; the 
president played an important role in the making of the final decisions.513 At that time, 
Indonesia, as a developing country, could be seen as a strong advocate of liberalism 
in the multilateral trading system due to its proposal for a very low tariff line for many 
products. The decision regarding trade liberalisation came directly from the President 
and Indonesia’s position in the negotiations was coordinated by the Ministry of State 
for Economic Coordination.  
After the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, from 1999 to 2003, which can be 
considered an early stage of the post-authoritarian era, in practice, Indonesia did not 
take a leading role in the negotiations at the WTO. Under Yudhoyono’s leadership, 
Indonesia’s involvement in the WTO was designated as one of the main venues that 
needed to be developed in pursuit of Indonesia’s status as a middle power. For the first 
time in the post-authoritarian period, the administration created Indonesia’s trade 
diplomacy strategy, which was elaborated in the National Long-Term Development 
Plan (RPJPN) from 2005 to 2025 under Law 17 of 2007 as well as in the National 
Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN). The incorporation shows the importance 
of the coherence and alignment of Indonesia’s trade interests with its diplomacy.  
Yudhoyono’s Trade Minister from 2004-2011, Mari Elka Pangestu, articulated the 
concept of a ‘multi-tracks trade strategy’, which sought to make Indonesia play a 
greater role at the bilateral, regional, and global levels.514 In the RPJPN as well as the 
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RPJMN, Yudhoyono’s government initially emphasised the urgency for trade 
diplomacy in the WTO because of the belief by officials in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that it was through active involvement in the multilateral trading system that 
Indonesia could achieve its international status other than expanding the market for 
Indonesian goods.  
However, officials within the Ministry of Trade are more sceptical regarding the 
importance of the WTO in enhancing the Indonesian foreign trade agenda in opening 
up the overseas market for Indonesian products. This is because negotiating an 
agreement at the WTO takes a long time and many countries have opted for an FTA 
bilaterally and regionally. Moreover, as already argued in the previous chapter, given 
the importance of ASEAN due to Indonesia’s aspiring role as a regional leader, many 
of the FTAs that Indonesia has signed and ratified have put ASEAN at the centre. By 
doing so, ASEAN can be internally strong and become a hub for East Asia’s regional 
economic architecture building. Given this condition, the WTO has been seen as a 
second priority within Indonesia’s foreign trade agenda at the Ministry of Trade. As 
revealed by interviews with Indonesian officials from the Ministry of Trade, the 
proliferation of regional free trade agreements, as well as the stalemate in the Doha 
Round, means that the WTO has been neglected by many Indonesian economic 
policymakers and legislators, who increasingly focus on regional free trade 
agreements.515 
Furthermore, many policymakers at the Ministry of Trade, particularly in the 
Directorate of Multilateral Negotiations, felt that under Yudhoyono, the 
implementation of WTO rules that informed the legislation process of national 
regulations and policies was at the lowest point.516 There are many domestic economic 
regulations related to the field of trade that are not in the spirit of the WTO agreements 
as references in policy formulation.517 For instance, in 2012, the Ministry of Trade 
issued the Regulation of the Minister of Trade (Permendag) Number 60/2012 on 
Provisions on the Import of Horticultural Products. This regulation restricted the sale 
of imported beef only for restaurants and hotels, and not in traditional markets or 
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supermarkets. Trading partner countries consider this import policy as distorting and 
protecting the domestic market and hence a violation of the WTO Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures.  
Thus, as suggested in the previous chapter, a prominent feature of trade diplomacy in 
the post-authoritarian era is that trade policy at home and Indonesia’s trade rhetoric 
are not coherent and consistent. During Yudhoyono’s first administration, initially 
trade policies often emerged that were inconsistent with policies made by other 
agencies outside of the Ministry of Trade. In the second half of Yudhoyono’s 
administration, the Ministry of Trade itself contributed and participated in ignoring 
the WTO rules. The leading cause of this was the growing sentiment of nationalism, 
which led to the WTO being increasingly perceived as part of an external force that 
threatened Indonesia’s economic sovereignty.518  
Nevertheless, despite the WTO rules being neglected in the making of trade policy by 
related technical ministries, Indonesia’s active involvement in the DDA round 
significantly increased. Given the fragmented situation within the domain of the trade 
policy-making process, Indonesia’s negotiating position, which was supposed to 
reflect its trade policy agenda, became co-opted by the foreign policy agenda. Thus, 
Indonesia’s position in the multilateral negotiations was driven more by foreign policy 
objectives than based on Indonesia’s trade agenda. This stemmed from a growing 
desire in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to utilise trade governance as a platform to 
project its foreign policy agenda.519 
From a reading of Indonesia’s official documents on its standpoint in the Doha Round 
negotiations as well as interviews with both foreign and trade policymakers, this 
chapter reveals two main overarching roles that Indonesia wanted to enact within the 
WTO Doha round negotiations, namely a voice for developing countries and bridge-
builder. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 3, the role of a developing country has become 
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Indonesia’s historical role, and the role of bridge-builder is a role conception that is 
strategically crafted given Indonesia’s unique position in the international system.  
Indonesia’s growing role enactment as a voice for developing countries was also the 
result of the push for an anti-neoliberal agenda, resulting in a greater call for 
protectionism mainly in the agricultural sector. This role has been articulated since the 
Cancún Ministerial Conference in which Indonesia became the coordinator for the 
G33 developing country alliance.  
Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder is strategically enacted to fulfil expectations from 
the international audience given Indonesia’s significant position within the global 
economy. The role of bridge-builder has been increasingly visible since the collapse 
of the Doha round negotiation in 2008 and Indonesia’s admission to the G20 group in 
2008.  
There are two main reasons why in the realm of multilateral trade negotiations, such 
as the Doha Round negotiation, the role conception developed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is more dominant in influencing Indonesia’s trade position. First, in 
the Uruguay Round, Indonesia successfully negotiated its commitment to schedules 
on concessions on goods set out by the article XXI of the GATS in accordance with 
the level of liberalisation that was accepted by domestic economic sectors. 
Consequently, Indonesia’s commitment to the WTO agreement is secure enough, even 
with a scenario in which Indonesia remained in the position of the status quo in the 
Doha Round. Under the existing agreement, Indonesia has bound 96.6% of its tariff 
lines at a rate of 40%. However, this agreement does not apply to Indonesia’s 
agricultural sector, where tariffs on more than 1,300 products have bindings at 
47.7%.520 Although it has a high bound tariff, the average rate applied is below 7%; 
currently it is 6.8%, lower than most ASEAN countries. Thus, Indonesia does not have 
to fight as hard as other developing countries in tariff reduction negotiations. 
Moreover, Indonesia does not have to be as tough as Brazil in undertaking offensive 
strategies for agricultural products since an average tariff rate of 40% is a relatively 
safe level for Indonesia and is, in fact, rarely utilised. This gives greater flexibility for 
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Indonesia to use tariffs as a main trade policy instrument. In addition, the existing 
agreements, in particular, the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) does not interfere 
with domestic interests as it accommodates the provisions of national legislation. 
Given this condition, there was greater space for Indonesia’s foreign policy 
establishment to mobilise the DDA as an arena to play a greater role in its pursuit of 
status. 
Secondly, the formulation of Indonesia’s positioning is highly dependent on the style 
of leadership and insight and is influenced by the figure of the Minister of Trade. It 
rarely happens that bureaucrats fill the post of the minister. The ministers of trade in 
the reformasi era were mostly academics and business practitioners whose insights 
were relatively limited regarding the politics of bureaucracy in the ministries. 
Nevertheless, the ministers of trade who were academics, such as Mari Elka Pangestu 
(2004 – 2011), had a relatively transparent, predictable and understandable vision 
regarding Indonesia’s position as a developing country. Through her role in 
positioning Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries, she was considered a 
respected figure within the WTO community. Conversely, ministers who were 
business practitioners, such as Gita Wirjawan (2011 – 2014), tended to ignore the 
positioning of Indonesia as a developing country but somewhat being socialised into 
the positioning of Indonesia as an emerging power.521 This was particularly true after 
the inclusion of Indonesia in the G20, which requires Indonesia to show that its role is 
in line with its new international status. With a Minister who shares the same agenda 
in pursuing Indonesia’s international status, it is easier to co-opt the foreign policy 
agenda into the domain of the Ministry of Trade as a focal point for the enactment of 
Indonesia’s role conception within trade governance.  
Having discussed how the foreign policy agenda could co-opt the international trade 
agenda, particularly in a multilateral forum such as the WTO, the next section will 
discuss how Indonesia’s struggle for the agricultural sector has been framed as a way 
for Indonesia to enhance its role as a voice for developing countries.  
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Struggle for agriculture and the role as a voice for developing countries 
In regard to its outlook towards trade liberalisation, Indonesia domestic trade policy 
in the post-authoritarian era can be summed up as an increased fear of liberalisation, 
which makes protectionism appealing within Indonesia’s domestic environment. As 
suggested in Chapter 3, in the early phase of democratisation from 1999 – 2004, many 
domestic political actors were increasingly suscpicious of global economic institutions 
such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.522 This was a direct impact of the 
economic crisis and the subsequent ramifications of the IMF conditionality, which 
required the liberalisation of Indonesia’s economy. Under the IMF conditionality, the 
Indonesian government was required to minimise the role of states in many economic 
sectors ranging from banking to agriculture.  
In the agricultural sector, starting in 1999, several neoliberal reforms were put in place, 
such as allowing the market mechanism to determine rice prices, permitting huge rice 
imports, and cutting rice subsidies.523 Given that the majority of the Indonesian 
population are heavily reliant on the agricultural sector, the limited role of the state in 
the sector has negatively affected many rural and poor Indonesians. As a result of the 
structural reform imposed by the IMF, from 1999 to 2004, food-related product 
imports increased rapidly. During this period, Indonesia’s import dependency ratio 
increased by twice as much as in 1998. For example, the ratio for rice reached 10%, 
for corn 20%, for soybeans 55% and for sugar 50%. In the same period, these four 
commodities were consumed by 23 million, 9 million, 2.5 million, and 1 million 
households respectively, or 68 % of the total of 52 million households in Indonesia.524  
Policymakers within the Ministry of Agriculture viewed Indonesia’s increasing 
reliance on food imports as not only a result of the IMF conditionality but also of 
broader inequality within the multilateral trade system that favoured the developed 
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countries.525 Low food prices in the world market do not reflect the level of efficiency, 
but rather a distortion by the support provided by developed countries, primarily 
export subsidies and other domestic support to their farmers.526 This market distortion 
has slowed the pace of development in developing countries. In addition, it also has a 
negative impact on food security and rural development, and hampers efforts to 
eradicate poverty in developing countries.  
Although several administrations during the early phase of democratisation focused 
more on domestic issues, especially in ensuring political stability, under the Megawati 
Presidency, Indonesia gradually sought to play a more significant role in voicing 
antagonism towards the WTO regulation, which was perceived as unfair. In 2001, 
during the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, WTO member states agreed 
to launch the next round of negotiations, known as the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) Round. The negotiations covered about 20 areas of trade including agriculture. 
Given that half of Indonesia’s population are somehow related to the agricultural 
sector, this sector became the primary concern for Indonesia during the DDA round.  
The DDA round provided a new arena to improve the trading prospects of developing 
countries given that the development aspect was at the heart of the round. The launch 
of the DDA provided the newly democratic Indonesia, which was undergoing 
structural reform, an opportunity to voice its concerns, as well as causing frustration 
regarding the neoliberal agenda imposed during the first five years of the Indonesian 
transition towards democracy.527 The DDA also provided a new arena for Indonesia 
to conceptualise its role conception as a voice for developing countries, which was 
relatively neglected during the last decade of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, which 
focused on enacting the role of advocate of development.  
One of the most challenging negotiation items within the DDA round was trade in 
agriculture. Even though globally, the agricultural sector has a relatively small share 
of trade, accounting for only 4% of total global exports, the sector became a 
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battleground between developing and developed countries in the DDA negotiations. 
This was due to the perceived unfairness in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
within the framework of the Uruguay Round, which became one of the founding 
agreements of the WTO.528 The AoA aimed to reform trade in the agricultural sector 
and make policies more market-oriented, fair, and predictable. The rules and 
commitments stipulated in the AoA covered three pillars, namely (1) Market access 
(2) domestic support, and (3) export competition.529 
To further boost its growing role conception as a voice for developing countries, 
Indonesia has continued to participate actively in various negotiations on agriculture 
at the WTO. This is evident in Indonesia being a Coordinator for the group of 
developing countries incorporated in the G33, which consists of 47 countries.530 The 
idea to establish the G33 was developed during Indonesia’s preparations for the fifth 
WTO Ministerial Conference in 2003, Cancún, Mexico. In March 2003, six months 
prior to the Ministerial Conference, Indonesia set up a proposal for a specific modality 
with the title: ‘Specific Modalities Inputs on Strategic Products: Non-Paper by 
Indonesia’.531 
The draft mainly contained Indonesia’s idea to follow up on the failed concept of a 
development box proposed by Pakistan. The development box was envisioned as 
provisions that would only apply to developing countries and would consist of broad 
flexibilities rather than specific prescribed policies targeting low-income farmers 
lacking resources, and secure supplies of staple foods. However, this proposal never 
gained traction in the DDA negotiations. Indonesia’s proposal for specific modalities 
on strategic products was discussed with fellow developing countries in Geneva. The 
draft was finally accepted as a developing countries’ proposal regarding strategic 
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products.532 The proposal was sponsored by Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Nigeria, Turkey, Peru, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. It was the Philippines that initially called for 
the formation of the Alliance for Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanism 
during the WTO special session of the Committee on Agriculture on 18 July 2003. On 
9 September 2003, the coalition was established in Jakarta, Indonesia and became 
known as G33, given that the initial coalition consisted of 33 countries.533  
The G33 has the strategic objective of ensuring that the issues of food security, rural 
livelihood, and rural development become an integral part of the agriculture 
negotiation. Furthermore, the Group’s goal is also to promote the notion of Special 
and Differential Treatment through the concepts of Special Products (SP) and a 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). These two concepts should be embodied within 
the modalities of the WTO agriculture negotiations for all developing countries.  
SP can be defined as specific agricultural products that receive special treatment in 
regard to the obligation around tariff cuts.534 In essence, the category of SPs aims to 
protect and strengthen food production in developing countries, particularly basic 
staple foods, in order to provide food security, encourage the acceleration of rural 
development, and accelerate the alleviation of poverty and hunger. The Special 
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) is aimed at protecting national farmers from the 
flooding of imported products. The concept of protection in the SSM is formulated as 
additional tariffs imposed on agricultural products to counter a surge in imports that 
negatively affects national farmers.535 The ideas for the SP and SSM were developed 
in accordance with the special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions, by which 
developing countries have special rights within the WTO rules.536  
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Although Yudhoyono’s presidency aimed to be seen as pro-economic openness and 
integration as well as sympathetic towards the liberalisation agenda, it continued to 
hold Indonesia’s defensive position within the negotiation regarding the agricultural 
section given its leadership of G33. Thus, Indonesia’s efforts to bring these two 
concepts to the negotiation table were increasingly embedded in Indonesia’s 
standpoint in the Doha round. Since then, through the G33, Indonesia has always 
voiced the interests of developing and the least developed countries, which are heavily 
reliant on agriculture.  
In April 2005, Indonesia held a commemorative Asian-African Summit, which 
became the official symbol for Yudhoyono’s administration to enact Indonesia’s 
historical role as a voice for developing countries. A G33 Ministers’ informal breakfast 
meeting was held during the summit. To follow up the informal ministerial meeting, 
an official G33 Ministerial Meeting was held in June 2005 to discuss the G33’s 
coordination, strategy, and position in the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong, China in December 2005.537 It could be argued that under Yudhoyono’s 
presidency, its position within the G33 was strategically framed as Indonesia’s effort 
to enact its historical role as a voice for developing countries. In this case, Indonesia’s 
defensive position through G33 within the Doha round negotiation could have been 
utilised as part of its foreign policy agenda to be a global player. 
By June 2005, 42 countries, including China, had joined the High-level G33 
Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta, growing from thirty-three since its inception at the 
Cancun ministerial meeting. Currently, the G33 is composed of 46 developing 
countries and least developed countries. Considering the vast membership of the G33 
coalition, ranging from underdeveloped countries to emerging powers, as well as its 
extensive geographic coverage, ranging from countries in Latin America and the Asia 
Pacific, it is not surprising that the G33 acquired enormous legitimacy in the WTO as 
a platform to voice developing countries’ interests in the DDA negotiation.538 
However, given its size as well as the diverse interests of its members, it is difficult to 
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maintain the cohesion of the different interests within the coalition. Indonesia, as the 
coordinator of the G33, tends to give priority to the cohesion of the coalition given the 
constantly changing strategic environment in the multilateral forum. To maintain its 
internal cohesion, the G33’s broad agenda relies heavily on normative claims 
regarding the importance of food security for developing countries. 
 
Table 7.1 Enlargement of G33 membership 
Year  Member 
2003 
Alliance for Special 
Product and Special 
Safeguard Mechanism 
Barbados, Botswana, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Mongolia, 
Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, the Philippines, Tanzania, Trinidad and 





Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, 
Republic of, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka, Suriname, Chinese Taipei, Tanzania, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, 
Bolivarian Republic of, Zambia, Zimbabwe 







Even though Indonesia is the coordinator of the G33 coalition, it by no means always 
acts as a leader within the alliance. In fact, countries like the Philippines, India, China, 
Cuba, Turkey, and Venezuela are also among the most active members in voicing their 
concerns on behalf of the group.539 As the coordinator, Indonesia has been preoccupied 
with maintaining the cohesion of the coalition. Internally, given the diversity of its 
membership, each member has its own standpoint and flexibility. For instance, some 
developing countries want the criteria for SP to be as abstract as possible given the 
difficulty for developing countries to be able to determine the criteria and indicators 
for any products that can be put into the SP scheme. This is due to the lack of 
government capacity in developing countries to have full data concerning their 
agricultural products. After the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún 
in 2003, at the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong 2005, Indonesia, 
through the G33, succeeded in incorporating the SP and SSM concepts into the 
Ministerial Declaration.540 
Despite being the coordinator for the defensive coalition of developing countries in 
the agricultural sector, Indonesia is also a part of the Cairns Group, a coalition of 
agricultural exporters from developed and developing countries, which was conceived 
during the GATT negotiation on agriculture.541 Indonesia was an original member of 
the Cairns group when it was founded in 1986. Indonesia’s membership of the Cairns 
group stems from its position as an exporter of agricultural products. Its membership 
of the group also shows Indonesia’s greater support for liberalisation under the Suharto 
authoritarian regime in the 1980s.  
With Indonesia’s increasingly defensive position in the agricultural sector and its role 
as coordinator of G33, in the post-authoritarian era, Indonesia’s membership of the 
Cairns Group gave it a unique position within the DDA Round of negotiations. This 
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is because, within the DDA round, the Cairns Group had the objective of opening up 
and liberalising the market of agricultural products, which contrasted with the 
defensive nature of the G33 alliance. 
Indonesia’s membership of these two seemingly contradictory negotiating groups is a 
consequence of the structure of its agricultural trade performance. On the one hand, 
there are an increasing number of imported products that dominate the Indonesian 
domestic market, especially rice and soybeans, where domestic producers cannot meet 
the domestic demand. On the other hand, Indonesia still has the potential to increase 
its exports of agricultural commodities such as palm oil, coffee, rubber and cocoa. 
Djunari Inggit, then Director of Multilateral Negotiation within the Ministry of Trade, 
confirmed that the Indonesian government’ positions in the trade negotiations at the 
WTO reflect two essential interests, despite being contradictory to each other.542  
As one of the world’s leading exporters of tropical agricultural products, Indonesia 
does not want significant trade barrier for its products in the global market. Until 2014, 
although Indonesia’s trade balance was in deficit, especially in the agriculture sector, 
a surplus could still be made, mainly through the export of plantation products such as 
palm oil.543 Disruption of the export of agricultural products due to increased global 
protectionism would worsen Indonesia’s trade balance. Given this state of affairs, 
Indonesia, along with other developing countries, insisted on flexibility in the trade 
liberalisation programme at the DDA negotiation meeting in Hong Kong in mid-
December 2005. As stated by the then Minister of Trade Mari Elka Pangestu, 
responding to Indonesia’s primary mission at the WTO, ‘basically, what we are 
fighting for in the WTO is how we can get and fight for the interests of Indonesia and 
developing countries in a balanced way in this negotiation’.544 
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Balancing its defensive strategy and the impetus to push the export of its agricultural 
products has been an underlying factor for Indonesia's membership of the Cairns 
group. However, many officials within the trade policy establishment argue that 
Indonesia’s membership of the Cairns Group was not in line with its interest in the 
Doha round negotiations.545 Some argue that during the negotiations, the group never 
accommodated the interests of Indonesia, even complicating the position of Indonesia 
in the fight to defend the interests of farmers. The Cairns group, according to an 
Indonesian trade negotiator, is often pitting the developing countries against one 
another in order to prevent them from cooperating with one another.546 Most of the 
group’s positions and proposals were sponsored by a small number of developed 
countries in the Cairns Group, namely Australia and New Zealand. Interviews with 
trade negotiators reveal that prior to Cancún, there was a feeling that Indonesia had 
mistakenly aligned itself with members of Cairns Group that were predominantly 
agricultural net-exporter countries.547 One negotiator even said that this coalition is 
very undemocratic.548 Almost all of the proposals and position papers were made on 
the initiative of Australia. The proposals were rarely discussed in a great length with 
other member states.549  
Despite this condition, Indonesian policymakers seemed to continue the dualism of 
Indonesia’s position within the Doha Round negotiation. Under Yudhoyono, 
Indonesia’s membership of the Cairns Group was maintained as a part of its growing 
bridge-builder role, in which Indonesia wanted to show its position not only as part of 
a defensive coalition of developing countries, but also as part of the liberalising force 
within the DDA negotiation. Thus, it could be argued that its membership of the Cairns 
Group is driven more by its foreign policy objectives. In fact, its membership of these 
seemingly contradictory coalition groups has been framed as a strategy for Indonesia 
to be a bridge-builder in the Doha Round negotiations. Indonesia's membership of both 
the G33 and the Cairns Group has been mobilised to support its considerable effort to 
play the role of bridge-builder in the WTO. Indonesia’s aspiring role as a bridge-
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builder can be further seen in the second collapse of the DDA negotiations in 2008 
which the next section will discuss.  
 
The return of protectionism and Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder 
Since the collapse of the negotiations in Cancún in 2003 and later in Geneva in 2008, 
the growing division between developing countries, especially India and Brazil, and 
developed countries, especially the US and the EU, has hindered the progress of the 
Doha round.550 This tension has made a global consensus on this recent new round of 
multilateral trade increasingly difficult to materialise. Many commentators cite the 
issue of SP and SSM as the main factor that led to the collapse of the negotiation in 
2008.551 This was due to the unwillingness of the developed countries to reduce 
domestic support to their agricultural sector, and at the same time, the G33 continued 
to fight for the inclusion of the framework of SP and SSM.552 
While the collapse of the DDA negotiation at the Cancún Ministerial Conference in 
2003 gave birth to the G33, which was eventually utilised as a platform for Indonesia 
to enact the role of a voice for developing countries, the collapse of the July 2008 
package negotiation at the Geneva Ministerial Conference provided Indonesia with 
momentum to enact its role as a bridge-builder. Given the crisis of multilateralism 
reflected in the deadlock of the DDA round, President Yudhoyono, along with 
Indonesian foreign policymakers, saw an opportunity to fill the gap of a voice for the 
developing countries that could bridge the stark divide within the negotiation. 
Domestically, Indonesia’s growing confidence in enacting the role of bridge-builder 
stems from its economic resilience during the 2007 – 2008 global financial crisis, 
which hit many economies. Moreover, Indonesia, alongside India and China, are 
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among the few countries that experienced growth of more than 6% despite the crisis.553 
Indonesia’s economic growth was the result of stable domestic consumption.554 In the 
same year, Indonesia was invited to join the G20, which has been upgraded from 
Ministerial level to Head of State level, which transformed it into a premier forum for 
global economic cooperation. Given these conditions, the foreign policy establishment 
tends to see Indonesia as an emerging middle power and is willing to take a greater 
role at the global level. Furthermore, Indonesia has been seen by the international 
community, especially Western powers such as the US and the EU, as a reliable 
partner from the developing countries that are supporting the liberal world order. As 
revealed by the interviews with Indonesia’s top negotiators in the WTO, the 
international expectation that Indonesia would play a greater global role indeed shaped 
Indonesia’s position as a bridge-builder in the DDA round negotiations.555  
Although, since its inception in 2003, the G33 has been considered an instrument for 
Indonesia to play a greater role as a voice for developing countries, albeit in a 
defensive way, since 2008, Indonesia has also increasingly utilised the G33 as a 
platform to enact the role of bridge-builder. Within G33, Indonesia aims to provide a 
more reasonable, doable, and readable position for the G33 to be presented at 
committees, general consultations, or special sessions. Indonesia has always tried to 
defuse the tough stance of some G33 member states that have an extreme position. In 
other words, Indonesia aims to redirect the G33 to find a middle ground.  
Given its bridge-building and defensive nature, the US and the EU seem to have given 
more sympathy to G33 interests rather than the G20 coalition in the WTO. This is 
because while the G20 emphasised both commercial and non-commercial goals 
(developmental), the G33 mostly emphasised non-commercial objectives in the 
agricultural negotiations.556 As put by an Indonesian negotiator, while the G33’s 
defensive position is more directed to protecting the poor farmers from developing 
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countries, the G20’s offensive stance will disproportionately benefit big developing 
countries like Brazil, India, and China.557  
Indonesia’s increasing enactment of the role of bridge-builder in the Doha round 
negotiations since the second term of Yudhoyono presidency was puzzling when we 
take into account Indonesia’s trade policies. During the first term of the Yudhoyono 
administration, Indonesia’s trade policy could be characterised as more free-market 
oriented and inclined towards trade liberalisation. This is evident from several trade 
policies, such as the easing of the import licence system, which allows a lot of 
imported goods to easily dominate Indonesia’s domestic market. However, unlike in 
the first term, during the second term of the Yudhoyono administration, Indonesia’s 
trade policies tended to be more inclined towards protectionism, especially in the 
agricultural and mining sectors.558 This protectionist tendency was likely to be a direct 
result of the efforts to mitigate the financial crisis that hit the world.559 
As suggested in the previous chapter, in the second half of Yudhoyono’s presidency, 
many protectionist measures were put in place. Chief among all of these were Law 
13/2010 on Horticulture, Law 18/2012 on Food, Law 19/2013 on the Protection and 
Empowerment of Farmers, Law 3/2014 on Industry, and Law 7/2014 on Trade. The 
overall law mandates the government to conduct measures to protect agriculture and 
mining through a package of tariffs and quotas. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry have added new 
products to the list of products that require import and export licences. Besides, the 
Ministry of Trade also re-issued the import licensing rules on a number of products 
and issued rules on more stringent controls on the distribution of imported goods. This 
made the share of tariff lines subject to non-tariff measures (NTMs) on imports grow 
from 37% in 2009 to 51% in 2015.560 The number of NTMs for exports also increased 
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three-fold during the same period and affected 41% of the export value. Since 2009, 
Indonesia has implemented 31 non-tariff measures compared with 16 in India, one in 
Brazil and nine in China.561  
Despite the protectionist tendency in its trade policy, within the DDA Round 
negotiations, Indonesia became increasingly vocal in voicing its concern for the WTO 
members to conclude the negotiations. Indonesia seemingly used a pro-liberalisation 
rhetoric and voiced its concerns about the rise of protectionism around the world. To 
further enact the role of bridge-builder, Indonesia intensified its involvement in forums 
initiated by the developed countries. In 2008, Indonesia hosted the 33rd meeting of the 
Cairns Group Ministerial Meeting (CGMM) in Bali.562 Indonesia also attended the 
Informal Ministerial Meeting in Paris, as well as the Summit of G8 + G5 in L’Aquila, 
at which the Indonesian government endorsed the need to push the Doha Round to be 
concluded.563  
This dualism shows the inter-role conflict between Indonesia’s role as a voice for 
developing countries, which culminated in its leadership role in the defensive coalition 
of the G33, and its aspiring role as a bridge-builder, which requires Indonesia to push 
for a more liberalised multilateral trade system. Moreover, the dualism also shows the 
domestic audience-driven role conflict, in which its aspiration to be a bridge-builder, 
influenced by its foreign policy agenda, was not in line with the increasing domestic 
trade policy, which favoured protectionism.  
Although Indonesia’s aspiring role as a bridge-builder has created increasing role 
conflict with its stance as a proponent of the G33 and its domestic regulations, it 
continues to enact a such role. To substantiate its role conception as a bridge-builder, 
in 2012, Indonesia offered to host the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference. It was 
perceived by policymakers that this event would further boost Indonesia’s credibility 
as an emerging power. As stated by a former Indonesian trade minister, Gita 
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Wirjawan, given its increasingly significant role in global governance, Indonesia 
should exercise its influence at the global level and take a more significant role to 
reflect its position at the global level.564 Through hosting the Conference, 
Yudhoyono’s government indicated a desire to bridge the two major poles between 
developed countries and developing countries that had led to the DDA negotiations 
stalling. Hence, after the WTO General Council finally agreed that the next ministerial 
conference would be held in Bali, Indonesia’s trade diplomacy objective was to secure 
an ‘early harvest’ of deliverables from the DDA Round.  
In several negotiations leading up to the Bali ministerial conference, Indonesia tended 
to position itself as an emerging middle power that could be an honest broker within 
the WTO. In a small meeting of Trade Ministers at a side event of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) in Davos in late January 2013, the Indonesian Trade Minister, Gita 
Wirjawan, asserted that at the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference, Indonesia would 
fight to restore confidence in the multilateral trading system through the small but 
credible package to be agreed.565 Indonesia would support at least three agenda items 
to be achieved in the ministerial conference in Bali, namely trade facilities, packages 
for less developed countries, and the issue of public stock holding.  
For the Yudhoyono administration, the ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali can be 
interpreted as a diplomatic stage on which Indonesia wished to play the role of bridge-
builder. Given its protectionism policy back home, it would have been easier for 
Indonesia to defend itself from liberalisation by taking a stance against the 
liberalisation agenda. On the contrary, Indonesia pushed for the completion of the 
DDA Round even though this meant that it would have to give more concessions. 
Indonesia’s position was directed towards making sure that an agreement was made 
in Bali, albeit minuscule. The small agreement at the Ministerial Conference in Bali 
was framed by the Indonesian government as a historic meeting that enhanced the 
legitimacy of the Doha round.  
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At the ninth Ministerial Conference held in Bali, finally, the WTO member countries 
approved the Bali Package after tough negotiations. The agreed Bali Package 
comprised ten points and included issues on trade facilitation, resolving agricultural 
disputes, and discussions on issues affecting least-developed countries. This success 
was historical for the WTO, given that for the first time since the organisation began 
on 1 January 1995, an agreement had been reached.566 The agreement in Bali was seen 
as a significant small positive step for the multilateral trading system, which had 
recently begun to be eroded by the bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives 
undertaken by countries. 
As revealed by one Indonesian negotiator, Indonesia’s position in pushing forward the 
Bali Package came from President Yudhoyono.567 The success of the Bali Package 
then can be related to Indonesia’s effort to play the role of bridge-builder. During the 
negotiations, to ensure that the outcome of the Bali Ministerial Conference was agreed, 
Indonesia even opposed India’s position on public stockholding as a permanent 
solution instead of an interim one, despite its national interest regarding public 
stockholding being similar to India’s due to the countries having the same domestic 
structural constraints, in which the majority of Indonesia’s population are heavily 
reliant on agriculture.  
Other than India, during the Ministerial Conference, some countries like Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia and Venezuela showed an opposing standpoint towards the Bali 
Package, particularly on Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).568 They viewed the 
developed countries as benefiting from the absence of rules regarding the limitation of 
discrimination in the form of the embargo on transit goods. Their objection caused 
difficulty in reaching a consensus. As expressed by the Minister of Trade, Gita 
Wirjawan, to reach a consensus, the Indonesian delegation had to carry out personal 
lobbying with Latin American countries, especially Cuba. President Yudhoyono was 
also personally involved in lobbying the Heads of State of each country as well 
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lobbying their Western counterparts, mainly the US.569 Finally, a compromise was 
reached in the form of a sentence that upheld the principle of non-discrimination for 
transit goods being added to the Bali Package. This principle was essential for some 
countries like Cuba and Venezuela, where at the time of the agreement were on the 
US embargo list that could disrupt their trade with other countries. 
Through the approval of the TFA, trade facilitation is expected to improve the 
efficiency of trade and customs procedures, resulting in reduced trade costs and 
facilitating small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to enter the global supply chain. 
Indonesia’s view on the approval of the TFA is that it will also have a positive effect 
on the business and trade climate in facilitating Indonesian exports.570 
Indonesia’s seemingly inconsistent behaviour between its increasingly protectionist 
trade policies and the role it takes at the WTO can only be explained through the role-
playing approach. Through the lens of role theoretical approach, Indonesia’s 
negotiation standpoint at the WTO is primarily driven by an effort to fulfil 
international expectations rather than reflecting its growing protectionist trade 
policies. As stated by one official from the Ministry of Trade, the Ministerial 
Conference in Bali was not about Indonesia’s national interest but more about 
Indonesia’s performance in pursuing the status of a global player, namely through the 
role of bridge-builder.571 As a result, the Ministerial Conference became a critical 
‘diplomatic stage’ where Indonesia could mobilise its role as a bridge-builder to 
pursue the status of an emerging middle power while seemingly overlooking its 
growing protectionist trade policies.  
Indonesia’s aspiring role as a bridge builder, however, is problematic. Not only should 
it balance its role as a voice for developing countries vis-à-vis its aspiring role as a 
bridge-builder, it also needs to maintain the coherence of its role conception as a 
bridge-builder, which requires it to engage with the rhetoric of enhancing the 
multilateral trade system, vis-à-vis its growing protectionism at home. This can be 
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seen in the aftermath of the ninth Ministerial Conference, in which Indonesia was one 
of the slowest states to ratify the TFA. Two years later at the next Ministerial 
Conference, only sixty-three of the WTO members had ratified the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. Indonesia was not one of them, despite being the proponent of the TFA. 
Indonesia finally ratified it on 5 December 2017 under President Joko Widodo.572  
Moreover, although the Ministerial Conference in Bali agreed with the interim 
solution on the public stockholding, the permanent solution was not resolved for 
almost a year after the Ministerial Conference.573 The G33, of which Indonesia is the 
coordinator, still reiterated their pre-Bali position for a permanent solution by 
suggesting the moving of public stockholding programmes into the Green Box, 
allowing these programmes to be seen as domestic support that does not distort 
trade.574 Many developed countries rejected this permanent solution.575 The lack of 
progress achieved after the Bali Package agreement led some developed countries, 
particularly the EU and Japan, to call for a new round of negotiations that would 
replace the DDA round.  
Given the discussion above, arguably Indonesia’s enactment of the role of bridge-
builder is in the third stage of role conflict. As suggested in chapter 2, the third stage 
of role conflict refers to a condition in which the contestation among state agencies 
has been won by one agency, but the enactment of such a role is not substantiated 
through policies under the authority of other agencies. This has created an outcome 
where there is a rhetoric-performance gap between the commitment made at the 
international level and the policy taken at the domestic level. 
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This chapter has established that the DDA round can be seen as an arena for role-
playing in which international expectations pushed the state to enact role conceptions 
that may not have been in line with its domestic economic interests. The first section 
elaborated and situated the role theoretical reading within the broader literature on the 
role of emerging powers in the WTO. Arguably, treating the WTO as an arena for role-
playing provides a more nuanced understanding of the puzzling case of emerging 
middle powers’ behaviour at the global level vis-à-vis their domestic trade policies. 
Moreover, the second section of the chapter also provided a detailed exploration how 
the co-optation of the trade policy by the foreign policy agenda led to greater flexibility 
for the foreign policy establishment to assert its role conceptions in an arena where the 
focal point to enact such a role was in the hands of the Ministry of Trade. This co-
optation became the pre-condition for role-playing at the Doha round negotiations to 
be conducted.  
The last two sections of the chapter showed how Indonesia’s roles as a voice for 
developing countries and a bridge-builder were enacted within the DDA round 
negotiations. Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries was translated into 
its leading role in enhancing the defensive agenda of the G33 as a coalition of 
developing countries at the WTO. Although at the beginning, the impetus for 
Indonesia to establish the coalition was a response from Megawati’s administration 
towards a perceived unfair neoliberal reform after the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime, Indonesia’s leadership of the G33 was framed and mobilised by 
Yudhoyono’s administration as a continuation of its historical role as a voice for 
developing countries. Moreover, the chapter showed how Indonesia’s growing active 
role as a bridge-builder stemmed from its treatment of the DDA round as a diplomatic 
theatre in which it could play a role. 
While in regard to regional trade governance, Indonesia’s aim to play a greater role at 
the global level through the roles of regional leader and bridge-builder has been 
hindered by domestic contestation as well as the fragmented nature of the Indonesian 
state, at the global level the same contestations have been missing. Thus, unlike at the 
regional level, Indonesia’s role conceptions, conceptualised by the foreign policy 






We live in an era where the international system is shaped by the active participation 
of non-Western middle powers. Students of International Relations need to understand 
what factors and aspects shape their behaviour. For example, how do international 
audiences shape their role conceptions? Are domestic audiences as powerful in 
determining a state’s international behaviour? To what extent are historical 
experiences linked to the articulation of role conceptions? Can our Westphalian 
assumption of a unitary state, which is widely embraced in the IR field, be sustained 
in analyses of non-Western emerging middle powers? And how can we make sense of 
–what seems at first glance to be contradictory– state behaviour in different areas of 
the regional and global order? Answering these questions by investigating emerging 
middle powers’ behaviour at the regional and global levels can shed light on the 
dynamics of international order and what kinds of interactions we can observe.  
Indeed, the behaviour of these non-Western middle powers is typically analysed 
through the lens of mainstream approaches in International Relations, such as realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism. In fact, the analysis in this thesis confirms several 
findings and conclusions of other literature that mobilise these frameworks. However, 
as I have argued in the introductory chapter, the complexity of the interactions between 
domestic and international levels, the importance of historical experience, as well as 
the different audiences at regional and global levels emphasise the need to find a 
theoretical approach that can provide a more nuanced understanding of these 
dynamics. 
In embarking on such an endeavour, I have developed a theoretical framework within 
the literature of role theory. As argued elsewhere,576 the promise to bridge the gap 
between agency and structure, as well as its ability to incorporate both ideational and 
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material factors in explaining state behaviour, make role theory a starting point for 
students of IR to synthesise other mid-range approaches.  
As I have laid out in the theoretical chapter and substantiated in the subsequent 
empirical analysis of this thesis, the synthesis of a number of mid-range theories such 
as ontological security and state transformation approaches can fill in the theoretical 
shortcomings of role theory. Throughout this thesis, I have developed a novel 
understanding to the question within role theory concerning the change and the 
continuity in role conception, through insights provided by the ontological security 
literature. I argue that the need for the state to sustain its biographical narrative plays 
an important role in the change and continuity of states’ role conceptions. 
Furthermore, I have answered the call to unpack the concept of the state within role 
theory literature by engaging with the state transformation approach. Here I argue that 
the condition of transformation has created an ambivalent enactment of states’ role 
conceptions. I have also directed the research agenda in role theory towards 
problematising international audiences; I argue for attention to be paid to the regional-
global nexus and how it affects states in enacting their role conceptions. Thus, my 
theoretical approach builds upon three propositions: first, the notion of biographical 
narrative, which is central in the change and continuity of role conceptions; second, 
the effect of state transformation on the enactment of role conceptions; and third, the 
fact that role conceptions can be enacted differently at different levels by the state. The 
discussion of these propositions enabled me to refine the concept of role conflict and 
develop the notion of role legitimation. 
This thesis studied how role theory provides a powerful explanation for Indonesia’s 
behaviour at regional and global levels. Drawing on interviews with forty research 
participants, ranging from Indonesian government officials, parliamentarians, and 
other foreign policy actors, as well as an analysis of key documents, this thesis 
identified four main national role conceptions that were conceptualised and enacted 
by the Yudhoyono administration. These overarching roles are a voice for developing 
countries, a regional leader, an advocate of democratic and human rights norms, and 
a bridge-builder. These four role conceptions are set against the backdrop of significant 
changes in the domestic political environment as well as the international system, 
which gave Indonesian foreign policymakers an opportunity to reconstruct Indonesia’s 
253 
 
role in the regional and global order. However, these roles are by no means stable 
given that they are constantly being negotiated and contested. 
Indonesia’s regional and global engagement can be seen as a case study, allowing us 
to conceptualise and substantiate the theoretical framework. The country has 
contrasting experience as an active post-colonial state challenging the existing US-led 
global order, while also a regional power aiming to keep revolutionary ideas at bay. 
Also, for most of its existence, Indonesia has been authoritarian, despite currently 
being a democratic state that aspires to actively promote democracy and human rights. 
While it is a fascinating state to study, it is also a typical developing country from the 
Global South, and is currently showing a greater engagement at the regional and global 
levels. This might enable the theoretical framework developed in this thesis to provide 
insights to the studies of other emerging middle powers.  
After this brief reflection of the main argument, this chapter concludes our journey 
with three final discussions. First, I provide an overview of the similarities and 
differences in four cases to discuss how the role theory approach provides us with a 
framework to understand contradictory and contested Indonesian foreign policy. 
Second, I discuss in great detail how the conceptual framework helps us to understand 
the empirical findings, particularly the notions of role conflict and role legitimation. 
Third, I close by discussing the limitations of this study and avenues for future 
research, as well as my final reflections. 
 
The pattern of Indonesia’s regional and global engagement 
The purpose of the thesis was to examine Indonesia’s international role under the 
Yudhoyono administration at the regional and global level. I have substantiated this 
through four case studies of Indonesia’s regional and global engagement on two 
different issues, namely democracy and human rights, and trade. The four empirical 
chapters have shown that the role conceptions enacted by Yudhoyono’s administration 
had different dynamics in terms of their enactment at regional and global levels. 
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Comparing role enactment at regional and global levels 
The analysis of Indonesia’s role in human rights governance illustrates how the 
regional-global nexus affects the extent to which Indonesia enacts its role as an 
advocate of democracy and human rights. At the regional level, the role has been 
mobilised to reflect international expectations of Indonesia as a newly democratic 
state. Moreover, the role as an advocate of democracy has transcended into Indonesia’s 
enactment of the role of regional leader, making ASEAN embrace democratic norms 
and create a more robust regional human rights mechanism. However, the challenges 
in enacting this at the regional level primarily come from the inter-role conflict with 
being a regional leader and a bridge-builder. Indonesia’s role as a regional leader 
requires it not to be seen as a country that pushes its own agenda to other members of 
ASEAN. Hence, while it is able to some extent, Indonesia cannot push its agenda 
further in promoting democracy and human rights norms in ASEAN’s institutional 
mechanisms. 
Indonesia’s enactment of the role of advocate of democracy at the regional level shows 
us several interesting points. First, the two roles are inextricably linked. In fact, its 
advocacy of the values of democracy and human rights at the regional level can be 
seen as the most successful substantiation of Indonesia’s role as regional leader. 
Second, Indonesia’s enactment of the role of advocate of democracy is operationalised 
through its bridge-builder role. This arguably may stem from Indonesia’s lack of a 
definitive model of democracy that it tries to promote in the region. For Indonesian 
policymakers, advocating democracy and human rights is providing the conditions for 
democratic learning and socialisation among countries that have aspirations to 
democratisation or are undergoing the process. Hence, this fits with the state’s role of 
bridge-builder. 
At the global level, the role of advocate of democracy has not been fully enacted, 
particularly in regard to Indonesia’s involvement in the UN Human Rights Council. 
Indeed, the role is feasible in terms of Indonesia’s normative acceptance of human 
rights as well as its willingness to ratify human rights instruments. However, in the 
case of strengthening global human rights governance to protect human rights, 
Indonesia is seemingly constrained in further advocacy. The challenge to enacting 
such a role comes from the internationalisation of a domestic issue that threatens 
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Indonesia’s territorial integrity because of the Papuan issue, as well as dealing with 
scrutiny from the international community in the historical case of East Timor. 
In line with its growing role of advocate of democracy, the role of regional leader has 
been successfully enacted in the realm of regional human rights governance. In fact, 
Indonesia’s regional leadership has been enhanced by being an advocate of 
democracy. At the global level, the enactment of the roles is evident in the Indonesian 
approach to issues in the Human Rights Council, where it prefers a regional solution 
to regional problems like human rights abuses. 
The role of bridge-builder is heavily enacted both at the regional and global level. 
However, the tone and rhetoric that the state conveys is different at the regional and 
global levels. At the regional level, Indonesia’s role as bridge-builder has been 
successful in establishing and maintaining the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), which 
stresses the importance of equal, constructive dialogue, mutual respect and 
understanding, to enhance cooperation and promote democracy in the region. This 
initiative also provides Indonesia with a platform to further enact its leadership and its 
role as advocate of democracy in the region. At the global level, the enactment of the 
role of bridge-builder has been expressed through defending the abusive regime from 
criticism. Overall, the enactment of the role stems from both Indonesia’s willingness 
to capitalise on international expectations while not triggering domestic contestation. 
Indonesia’s role as a voice for developing countries has rarely been enacted at the 
regional level. Rather, this role is mainly enacted for audiences at the global level. In 
regard to global human rights governance, arguably, Indonesia seems to act as a voice 
for developing countries by challenging Western criticism towards developing 
countries’ human rights conditions. While at the regional level, it seems that Indonesia 
has supported the order by emulating Western liberal norms through its role as 
advocate of democracy, Indonesia’s attitude towards the Western global order is still 
ambivalent. Indeed, although it is still highly supportive of the liberal order, 
rhetorically it hopes for a rearrangement, just like other BRIC countries. This 
aspiration has caused Indonesia’s stance to be considered softly revisionist.577 Given 
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the above analysis, we can summarise Indonesia’s role enactments in regard to 
democracy and human rights issues as follows. 
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The dynamics of the enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions can also be seen in 
regard to trade-related issues. Indonesia’s transition to a democratic state was 
mobilised to create a new conceptualisation of Indonesia’s position that is supportive 
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of trade liberalisation. However, Yudhoyono’s attempt to enact the role through the 
auxiliary advocate of economic liberalisation never gained any support from domestic 
audiences, other than a small number of technocrats in the inner circle of his 
administration. In fact, while the role of advocate of democracy is the direct result of 
the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, the role of advocate 
of liberalisation has been hindered precisely because of the democratisation process, 
in which Indonesia’s domestic audience has become increasingly suspicious. This is 
because the liberalisation was widely blamed for the collapse of the Indonesian 
economy.  
Thus, at the regional level, Indonesia is reluctant to lead the regional economic 
integration project as a part of the liberalisation agenda. However, given that the role 
of regional leader has been entrenched in Indonesia’s biographical narrative, the 
technocratic elite and Indonesia’s foreign establishment can legitimise Indonesia’s 
support towards the regional economic integration project. This is done by framing 
involvement in regional economic integration as a part of Indonesia’s role as a regional 
leader. However, in practice, the enactment takes the shape of reluctant support for the 
project. 
Just like in the area of human rights governance, Indonesia's role as a voice for 
developing countries is the main feature of its role at the global level, although the role 
is mainly disregarded at the regional level. Indonesia’s growing role as a voice for 
developing countries reflects its biographical narrative developed in the formative 
years of its independence. The re-enactment of the role as a voice for developing 
countries in the post-authoritarian period also echoes growing resentment over the 
liberalisation project, which is perceived as unfair towards developing countries.  
Furthermore, at the global level, Indonesia is relatively more confident in enacting 
roles that have the potential to trigger domestic contestation. As elucidated in Chapter 
7, this is the result of the co-optation of trade policy for the purposes of foreign policy, 
which allowed the Doha round negotiations, to become an arena for role-playing in 
which Indonesia’s enactment of role conception was detached from its domestic trade 
policy. This is particularly true for Indonesia’s role as a bridge-builder, which requires 
an international commitment that is not in line with its domestic trade policies. 
Indonesia’s enactment of the bridge-builder role is an internalisation of alter 
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expectations. However, it may not relate significantly to the need to advance 
Indonesia’s domestic economic interests.  
Indonesia’s role enactment at the WTO has been relatively uncontested. Indonesia 
remains able to enact its role as a voice for developing countries throughout its 
involvement in the DDA negotiations, as a coordinator of G33. This in line with its 
biographical narrative, of showing Third World solidarity. Its position as a coordinator 
of G33 allows Indonesia to enact the role of bridge-builder and its involvement in the 
G20 group of the world’s major economies solidifies the role conception. 
Thus, at the global level, Indonesia can enact the role of voice for developing countries 
while at the same time taking the role of bridge-builder without significant domestic 
contestation. This stems from views among domestic economic actors that do not 
emphasize the important aspects of the WTO as much as they focus on regional trade 
governance. Moreover, the enactment of role conceptions at the global level, which 
are relatively uncontested, is aided by the fact that commitments from being a bridge-
builder are not necessarily translated into domestic trade policies. Given the above 
analysis, we can sum up the pattern of Indonesia’s role enactments in regard to trade 
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Implications for Indonesia’s engagement in regional and global governance 
In the above analysis, I discussed Indonesia’s role enactments at the regional and 
global level. I showed that the regional-global nexus has an important effect on the 
enactment of Indonesia’s role conceptions. There is a pattern to Indonesia’s enactment 
of its role conceptions across two areas, namely human rights and trade issues. In these 
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two areas of investigation, we can see that there is a process of contestation in the 
enactment of the four overarching main role conceptions. Having discussed the 
patterns of Indonesia’s enactment of its role conceptions, the next question is, what 
are the implications of this analysis for Indonesia’s current engagement at regional 
and global levels? 
First, Indonesia’s engagement in strengthening democracy and human rights issues in 
ASEAN will always be constrained by the extent to which the government emphasises 
the need to enact the role of advocate in order to play a more significant role in the 
regional and global order. This is because it has not been a part of Indonesia’s 
biographical narrative and its enactment should always be linked to its role as a 
regional leader. While Yudhoyono took some landmark initiatives, such as the Bali 
Democracy Forum, Joko Widodo has been relatively reticent to promote regional 
democracy. As explained by a close advisor of Widodo, Luhut Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s 
regional leadership will be directed to help Widodo’s vision of Indonesia as a global 
maritime fulcrum, in order to pursue status as an Indo-Pacific region middle power.578 
This shows that Indonesia’s role as an advocate for democracy and human rights is 
relatively subject to change due to the government’s agenda.  
Second, Indonesia’s engagement in the global human rights mechanisms, particularly 
in the Human Rights Council is likely to continue its ambivalent approach in regard 
to strengthening and promoting human rights. Under Widodo’s administration, the 
influence of alter expectations on Indonesia’s role conceptions seems to have 
vanished. Three years into his presidency, his government has been under the 
spotlight, especially in the Human Rights Council. A number of countries have 
highlighted a large number of death penalty sentences in Indonesia. The UPR forum 
recommended Indonesia abolish or postpone the death penalty. However, this has been 
less than welcomed by the current Indonesian government, which is likely to refuse 
implementation.579 Kontras, an Indonesian human rights NGO, noted that 18 people 
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have been executed during the three years of Widodo’s government, compared to 21 
during the ten years of Yudhoyono’s government.580  
Third, Indonesia’s engagement in the AEC will continue to be legitimised through 
Indonesia’s role conception as a regional leader. So far, Joko Widodo’s economic team 
has subscribed to the need to be an active player in the AEC. Despite Indonesia’s 
support even under Widodo’s administration, due to different agencies pursuing their 
own policies which may not be in line with Indonesia’s support towards the AEC, 
rhetoric as a regional leader continues to be vague. This is because contestation over 
the importance of norms between neoliberal technocrats and protectionist domestic 
economic actors dominates the contestation over how Indonesia should enact its role 
conception in the realm of regional trade governance. In the case of RCEP, since its 
ASEAN Chairmanship in 2018, Singapore has taken the role in leading the 10 ASEAN 
members, pledging to conclude the RCEP trade talks by the end of 2018.581 
Fourth, Indonesia’s engagement in the WTO remains characterised by its rhetoric of 
enhancing trade liberalisation and will remain a venue for enacting its role conceptions 
as a bridge-builder and voice for developing countries. There have been efforts to 
reduce the rhetoric-performance gap during Widodo’s administration through his 
economic policies, which focus on a deregulation programme. The deregulation 
programme is evident in the issuance of eleven economic packages to make sure that 
Indonesia’s economic and trade policies are in line with the liberalisation agenda. 
Through these packages, Widodo’s government is committed to reducing regulations 
and simplifying bureaucracy in order to improve industrial competitiveness. This can 
be seen in the cancellation of more than 3,140 regional regulations that hampered 
trade. In the last meeting between President Widodo and the Director General of WTO, 
Roberto Azevedo in April 2016, Widodo reiterated Indonesia’s deregulation 
programmes and its commitment to trade liberalisation. Indonesia’s continued 
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enactment of the role of bridge-builder and a voice for developing countries can be 
summed up by the statement from the then Indonesian Trade Minister, Thomas 
Lembong, in the press conference after the meeting of Widodo and Azevedo: 
The position of Indonesia is quite special (in the WTO) because we are a big 
but not a giant economic country, being a member of G20 but still a developing 
country. So, we fit right in the middle, between a big country and a small 
country, a rich country and a developing country. So, we can talk to all. And 
of course, we are asked to play a positive and reconstructive role in the WTO 
in the future.582 
 
Role theory, state transformation, and biographical narrative 
The previous section discussed the patterns of Indonesia’s regional and global 
engagement in two different areas. This section discusses how the theoretical 
framework, particularly the notion of role conflict and role legitimation developed in 
this thesis, informs our general understanding of states’ behaviour in international 
politics.  
 
Role conflict  
As shown in the four empirical chapters above, Indonesia’s role enactments are 
contested, creating a seemingly ambivalent foreign policy agenda. The 
conceptualisation of role conflict developed in this thesis allows the further scrutiny 
of Indonesia’s enactment of its role conceptions. Chapter 2 established that role 
conflict can also occur due to the regional-global nexus and state transformation 
process. While the former conflict arises from the different expectations of the 
international audience, the latter comes from contestation within agencies of the state. 
In relation to the regional-global nexus, there are two types of role conflict; the first 
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appears when one particular role manifests differently at the regional and global levels, 
while the second is when one particular role is highly performed, seemingly treated as 
a part of state identity, at one level but is contested and utterly disregarded at another. 
The first type of role conflict leads to the rhetoric-performance gap, in which the role 
being enacted might be the same, but the performance might be different from one 
level with another and one realm with another. This type of conflict can be seen in 
Indonesia’s bridge-builder role at regional and global levels. At the regional level, 
Indonesia’s enactment is directed towards its shared democratic experiences with both 
democratic and non-democratic countries. The role of bridge builder is connected to 
the role as an advocate of democracy. However, at the global level, the role of bridge-
builder is enacted in a way that shields the abusive regime from international scrutiny 
in the Council. 
The second most compelling type of role conflict in Indonesia’s case is its enactment 
of the role of advocate for democracy and human rights. At the regional level, this is 
seen as a manifestation of Indonesia’s new identity as a democratic state. However, at 
the global level, the enactment of such a role is relatively absent. This can be traced 
back to Indonesia’s historical experience with international scrutiny over its human 
rights conditions, as well as the fear of internationalising the separatist agenda of its 
Papuan Provinces through the UN human rights mechanism.  
Role conflict can also result from state transformation. As already established in 
Chapter 2, in the case of undergoing this process, the state may be represented by the 
different transnational issues being discussed, such as security, trade, finance, the 
environment, and development aid, as well as at the regional and global levels. While 
there might be coordination among a wide range of state apparatuses, in practice, the 
roles taken by particular agencies may not be in line with the role conception enacted 
by foreign policymakers. 
The case of Indonesia’s engagement in trade issues illustrates the impact of state 
transformation on the enactment of role conceptions. At the regional level, Indonesia’s 
trade policy, which is supportive of regional integration projects, has been contested 
by other state agencies that have the same domestic objectives and who perceive the 
project as detrimental due to their low competitiveness. At the global level, 
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Indonesia’s enactment of the role of a voice for developing countries serves its 
domestic economic actors’ interests and is in line with Indonesia’s historical narrative. 
However, its increasing enactment of the role of bridge-builder deviates from its 
increasingly protectionist domestic trade policies. 
This thesis further introduced the typology of the degree of domestic-driven role 
conflict as outlined in Chapter 2 in order to understand the different outcomes of role 
conflict. The first stage is when each agency enacts and devises particular roles in their 
respective arenas. The outcome is a contradictory standpoint held by the state, which 
may be difficult to interpret for international and domestic audiences. The second stage 
is when roles are crafted by one agency while others resist by rejecting the enactment. 
The outcome of the second stage of role conflict is a vague conceptualisation of roles. 
The third stage is when roles are crafted and mainly enacted by one agency while the 
other agencies follow with some caveats. The result of the third stage of role conflict 
is a rhetoric-performance gap between commitments made at the international level 
and the policy taken at the domestic level. 
The case of Indonesia’s role enactment in regard to regional trade governance can 
elucidate our understanding of the stages of role conflict. At the regional level, we can 
observe the second stage of conflict in Indonesia’s enactment of the role of regional 
leader. Support of trade liberalisation has been hindered by domestic contestation from 
other relevant agencies. In our analysis, the role has been crafted by one agency while 
the others have resisted by rejecting the role enactment. Although so far Indonesia has, 
to some extent, supported the regional integration project through the AEC and RCEP, 
many of its agencies are still resisting such projects. Hence, Indonesia’s 
conceptualisation of the role of regional leader remains ambivalent in the realm of 
trade governance. At the global level, we observe the third stage of role conflict in 
regard to Indonesia’s as a bridge-builder. Given that Indonesia’s stance and position 
in the WTO arguably follows the role conceptualised by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the enactment creates a rhetoric-performance gap between commitments 





In my analysis on Indonesia, sustaining a biographical narrative is the impetus for 
policymakers legitimising the enactment of roles. Through the discussion of the 
evolution of Indonesia’s role conceptions, I have shown that roles are a constitutive 
part of identity formation, but they can also be a strategic instrument in maintaining a 
coherent biographical narrative. Thus, role conceptions are crafted and enacted in a 
way that reflects the continuity of the state’s biographical narrative to both 
international and domestic audiences. The discussion also relates to my 
conceptualisation of role legitimation, to understand how governments resolve 
potential role contestation from domestic audiences. As suggested in Chapter 2, role 
legitimation can be performed through two social mechanisms: reframing the 
historical role from a specific period and reproducing the alter expectation in domestic 
political discourse. 
Indonesia’s enactment of the role as an advocate of democracy and human rights is a 
case in point in regard to the importance of the concept of role legitimation. As argued 
in Chapter 3, the role conception can be interpreted as a response to alter expectations 
of Indonesia’s democratic transition in the post-authoritarian period. However, this is 
a recent role conception that is not yet a part of Indonesia’s biographical narrative. In 
order to sustain the enactment of such a role, Indonesian foreign policymakers aim to 
link the enactment to the role as a regional leader. Furthermore, the enactment of such 
a role is not a threat to the country’s core interest and is relatively free from domestic 
contestation. However, the enactment of a similar role has been relatively absent at 
the global level. This can be interpreted as a lack of ability to legitimise the role 
through the role legitimation process. In fact, as was widely discussed in Chapter 5, 
the enactment of the role of advocate of democracy and human rights is not in line 
with Indonesia’s biographical narrative as a part of developing countries and a regional 
leader. Indonesia’s enactment of the role is hardly linked to these two historical role 
conceptions. Thus, this leads to Indonesian policymakers’ preference for the role of 
bridge-builder.  
The notion of role legitimation is also helpful in understanding Indonesia’s role 
conceptions in regard to trade issues. Despite the economic technocrats under 
Yudhoyono’s presidency being in favour of Indonesia’s increasing support for trade 
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liberalisation, given its increasing anti-economic liberalisation, Indonesian 
policymakers have been able to continue to support the regional integration project in 
the form of the AEC and RCEP. Arguably, Indonesia’s support for the regional 
integration project is also framed as a part of the enactment of the role of regional 
leader. 
 
Limitations and future research agenda 
Overall, this thesis has made substantive contributions to two different strands of the 
literature, namely role theory and Indonesian foreign policy. Having acknowledged 
these contributions, the rest of this conclusion seeks to highlight several routes forward 
by identifying limitations and suggesting future research in several fields of 
International Relations, foreign policy analysis in particular. The first and most 
obvious limitation of this thesis is empirical. Due to its single case study, this thesis 
could not establish the generalizability of the framework. I hope that further research 
can be conducted so that we would be able to see the extent to which the theoretical 
framework fits with another case study especially other non-Western emerging middle 
powers. Further comparative research on the behaviour of non-Western middle power 
through the lens of role theory might provide us with insights on varieties of roles 
enacted by them at regional and global levels.  
In this thesis, I have introduced a role theory approach to the study of an emerging 
middle power. Given its mid-range theorisation, role theory could be introduced to 
other literature in IR. For instance, the literature on institutional balancing in IR 
benefitted from role theory through the recent work of an institutional balancing 
theorist.583 Role theory could enhance debates in the growing body of literature on 
practice theory and relational theory.584 Relational theory assumes that social relations 
produce and reproduce actors’ identities, define and redefine their roles.585 Thus, 
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studies on bilateral relations utilising relational theory, such as US-Iran relations or 
Saudi Arabia-Iran relations, could benefit from a synthesis of role theory and relational 
theory. Role theory could also be mobilised to enhance our theoretical exploration of 
the micro-processes of diplomacy in international relations. A growing body of 
literature in IR is devoted to the role of emotion in understanding state behaviour in 
international politics.586 Synthesising this and role theory literature could be a fruitful 
endeavour on how emotions are translated into policy process at the group level.587  
Further research on dynamic interactions of the states in international organisations 
and negotiations could also benefit from the application of role theory. As suggested 
in my analysis of Indonesia’s role in the WTO, international organisations can be seen 
as an arena for role-playing. However, this thesis does not further scrutinise the notion. 
This could be a new lacuna that role theory could contribute to. Thus, further 
conceptualisation of international organisations as an arena for role-playing could 
provide us with a more nuanced understanding of how international organisations 
shape the behaviour of states and vice versa. For instance, with non-Western powers 
establishing more and more international organisations,588 the incorporation of 
organisational role theory would arguably unpack the process of the institution-
building of new international organisations. 
As a final note, I want to reflect on my thesis as a direct answer to the call for IR 
scholars to embrace non-Western ideas and concepts, those that reflect the voices, 
experiences, knowledge claims, and contributions of the vast majority of the societies 
and states of the world.589 Through this thesis, I have contributed to making Indonesia 
a site for theorisation in IR, in particular to develop concepts such as role contestation 
and role legitimation. The study of the Indonesian experience allows us to open up a 
new insight into IR and foreign policy analysis, which is currently based on the great 
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and major powers’ behaviour. With growing numbers of non-Western powers on the 
international stage, it is my hope that I have contributed to specific literature in IR in 
ways that will advance the endeavour to give a greater voice to the non-Western world 
in the theorisation of IR.  
However, arguably, much of my contribution in this thesis still draws on Western 
theorisation, albeit infused with insights from the Indonesian experience. Despite this 
limitation, my research contributes by developing a proposition and premise that 
builds on cases from the Global South. Thus, this thesis does not mean to invalidate 
the abstraction and theorisation of particular concepts in role theory based on the 
Western experience but provides a new voice and alternative way in which the theory 
might work. I hope that this work will provide a stepping stone for IR research that 
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